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Abstract

Title: The economic impact of anti-corruption legislation on foreign investor
perceptions of corruption.
Author: Jean-Marie van der Elst, M.A.
Advisor: Dr. Charles Bryant, B. Eng., DBA.
Corruption has increasingly become an international challenge and the
coordination of Anti-Corruption Legislation (ACL) and its implementation, a priority
for nations. The economic impact of corruption on economic growth, foreign direct
investment flows, and international trade is indicated in international research
studies. The significant increase in global financial and trade transactions has
presented new and increased opportunities for rent-seeking and increased the need
for coordinated action against all forms of corruption. The effectiveness of national
ACL measures in combatting and reducing corruption in all its forms, remains poorly
defined and the extant research inconclusive. This study explores the economic
impact of anti-corruption legislative measures on the relationships between nation’s
perceptions of corruption and economic performance.
The results of this study indicate support for the established relationship
between nation’s levels of corruption and economic performance, particularly
economic growth and foreign investment. This study also find support for the direct
effect of ACL measures on economic growth, even though this is not the primary
focus of this research, since the phased introduction of ACL measures is found to
iii

reduce the impact of corruption on economic growth. More specifically, this study
find support for the moderating impact of resourced and implemented ACL measures
on the impact of corruption. The study’s main policy implication suggests that
adequately resourced and effectively implemented ACL measures, moderate the
relationship between nation’s levels of corruption and their economic performance
and therefore reduces the impact corruption has on nation’s economic growth and
foreign investment levels.
Keywords: Corruption. Foreign investor perceptions. Anti-Corruption
Legislation. Economic growth. Foreign direct investment. International trade.
Governance. Economic freedom.
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Resumen

Título: El impacto económico de la legislación anticorrupción en la percepción de
corrupción de los inversores extranjeros.

Autor: Jean-Marie van der Elst, MA.
Asesor: Dr. Charles Bryant, B. Eng., DBA.

La corrupción se ha convertido en un desafío internacional siendo la
coordinación de la legislación anticorrupción (ACL) y su implementación, una
prioridad para las naciones. El impacto económico de la corrupción en el crecimiento
económico, los flujos de inversión extranjera directa y el comercio internacional, están
indicados en estudios de investigación internacionales. El aumento significativo de las
transacciones financieras y comerciales globales, ha presentado nuevas y mayores
oportunidades para actividades de lucro, aumentando la necesidad de acciones
coordinadas contra todas las formas de corrupción. La efectividad de las medidas ACL
nacionales para combatir y reducir la corrupción en todas sus formas esta
insuficientemente definida y la investigación existente no es concluyente.
Este estudio investiga el impacto económico de las medidas ACL en la
relación entre la percepción de corrupción, y su desempeño económico, encontrando
que la introducción gradual de las medidas ACL reduce el impacto de la corrupción.
Específicamente, este estudio corrobora el impacto moderador de las medidas ACL
v

con recursos e implementadas, sobre el impacto de la corrupción. La principal
implicación política del estudio indica que las medidas de ACL con recursos e
implementación adecuadas, moderan la relación entre los niveles nacionales de
corrupción y su desempeño económico. Como resultado, reducen el impacto que la
corrupción tiene en el crecimiento económico nacional y los niveles de inversión
extranjera correspondientes. Adicionalmente, el estudio ha determinado el efecto
directo negativo de estas medidas ACL en el crecimiento económico.
Palabras clave: Corrupción. Percepciones de inversores extranjeros.
Legislación anticorrupción. Crecimiento económico. Inversión extranjera directa.
Comercio internacional. Gobernabilidad. Libertad económica.
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Résumé
Titre: L'impact économique de la législation anticorruption sur les perceptions des
investisseurs étrangers de la corruption.

Auteur: Jean-Marie van der Elst, M.A.
Conseiller : Dr Charles Bryant, B. Eng., DBA.

La corruption est devenue de plus en plus un défi international et la
coordination de la législation anticorruption (ACL) et sa mise en œuvre, une priorité
pour les nations. L'impact économique de la corruption sur la croissance économique,
les flux d'investissements directs étrangers et le commerce international est indiqué
dans des études internationales. L'augmentation significative des transactions
financières et commerciales mondiales a présenté de nouvelles possibilités accrues de
recherche de rentes et accru la nécessité d'une action coordonnée contre toutes les
formes de corruption. L'efficacité des mesures nationales de l'ACL dans la lutte et la
réduction de la corruption sous toutes ses formes, reste mal définie et la recherche
existante peu concluante. Cette étude explore l'impact économique des mesures
législatives anti-corruption sur les relations entre les perceptions de la corruption et la
performance économique des nations.
Cette étude examine l'impact économique des mesures ACL sur la relation
entre la perception de la corruption et ses performances économiques, en concluant
que l'introduction progressive des mesures ACL réduit l'impact de la corruption. Plus
vii

précisément, cette étude corrobore l’impact modérateur des mesures ACL avec des
ressources et mis en œuvre, sur l’impact de la corruption. La principale implication
politique de l’étude indique que les mesures ACL dotées de ressources suffisantes et
que leur mise en œuvre, modère la relation entre les niveaux de corruption nationaux
et leurs performances économiques. En conséquence, ils réduisent l'impact de la
corruption sur la croissance économique nationale et les niveaux correspondants
d'investissements étrangers. En outre, l’étude a déterminé l’effet négatif direct de ces
mesures du ACL sur la croissance économique.
Mots-clés: Corruption. Perceptions des investisseurs étrangers. Législation
anticorruption. Croissance économique. Investissement étranger direct. Commerce
international. Gouvernance. Liberté économique.
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The following acronyms are referred to in this study, based on international norms and
the literature reviewed.
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Chapter 1
Introduction

Overview
“Economic control is not merely control of a sector of human life which can
be separated from the rest; it is the control of the means for all our ends.” (Hayek,
1944, p. 95)
Corruption, defined as the abuse of entrusted power for private gain (Mauro,
1997), is a broadly researched and debated topic, both nationally and internationally.
This definition of corruption is widely used by public institutions and civil society
organizations, including the World Bank and Transparency International, and is
consistent with the provisions of the United Nations Convention against Corruption.
However, studies into its impacts and causes remain largely misunderstood by
the large majority of national populations (Transparency International, 2017).
Research into the impact of Anti-Corruption Legislation (ACL) introduced by
countries remains narrowly centered on international multi-lateral institution
regulations, including those of the Organisation for Economic Development (OECD)
and World Bank, international multi-lateral organizations and or specific country
initiatives with international influence and impact, including the United States of
America (USA) and the United Kingdom (UK) (Friedman, 2010).
Corruption not only impacts economic growth but equally results in the
misallocation and inefficient use of resources, impacts private sector development,
1

and weakens institutions necessary for the efficient functioning of the State and the
markets (Rugman, 2001). Extensive research concludes that corruption remains a
major obstacle to economic growth, resulting from foreign investment and
international trade (Bryant 2016; Mauro, 2004).
Countries across the world have as a result, introduced various measures and
legislation in an attempt to combat the scourge of corruption on their respective
national economies and societies (Transparency International, 2017).
This study seeks to research and understand the impact of these national anticorruption legislation measures on the documented relationships between nation’s
perceptions of corruption and economic performance (Ades & DiTella 1996, 1999;
Habib & Zurawicki 2002; Mauro, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998; Voyer & Beamish 2004;
Wei 2000; Wu 2006). The measurement of economic performance in this study
includes national economic growth, foreign direct investment, and international trade
flows. This study researches these relationships across a broad range of countries,
using published and updated corruption data from international institutions, including
Transparency International, and macro-economic data from international multilateral institutions, including the World Bank and the OECD.
Identifying and understanding the potential impact these legislative measures
may have, within the national cultural and social contexts, may provide policy
makers and researchers with insights and specific suggestions into the root causes of
corruption in the region (Husted, 2002) and importantly, possible remedies.

2

Background and Rationale
History of the focus of this research
Corruption is an age-old practice recorded in historical annals and has been
found to be economically and socially detrimental to countries (Bardhan, 1997;
Kaufmann, 1997; Mauro, 1995, 1997, 1998, 2007; Rose-Ackerman, 1999; Wei, 2000).
Corruption, as an irregular tax that increases costs and uncertainty whilst distorting
investment incentives (Shleifer & Vishny, 1993), affects economic growth (Mauro,
1995), government expenditure (Mauro, 1998), foreign direct investment (Delgado et
al., 2014), and international trade (Norbet, 2015). In addition, it impacts the orderly
functioning of society (Seligson, 2002). Reducing corruption is therefore important for
the economic and social development of countries.
The relationship between international and national corruption and its
economic and social consequences is extensively researched and well documented.
Countries have sought to introduce legislation to reduce these economic and social
costs using varying approaches. One such approach by Rose-Ackerman (1998)
recommends a two-pronged strategy aimed at increasing the benefits of being honest
and the costs of being corrupt. Laws are designed to reduce the economic rents
resulting from corrupt activities and transactions, so as to effectively increase the cost
of corruption, making investors more sensitive to corruption, and impacting
investment and trade flows, thus affecting economic growth. To improve their
effectiveness, these measures also need to be coordinated internationally, both in their
framing and implementation (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2008).
3

Corruption is increasingly “cross-border dimensional” in a globalized
economic world, and the international legal framework for the control of corruption is
a critical element for governments to consider in their quest to effectively and
sustainably reduce corruption. These anti-corruption measures reflect both
international cooperation at the multi-lateral level, as well as at the national levels of
governance. The extant literature primarily focuses on the impact, of lack thereof, of
international multi-lateral measures rather than on the numerous measures introduced
at the country level by nations, that are anxious to fall in line with international
developments in the field (Friedman, 2010). Empirically measuring the resultant
impacts of these developments remains a challenge in the absence of reliable data and
objective assessment of national efforts beyond the stated intentions and early
implementation. The coordinated and sustained enforcement of these measures
remains the litmus test of the success of the relative legislative initiatives, which
remains largely undocumented.
Evidence from previous research
The international efforts at establishing a legislative framework and a set of
guidelines for adoption of anti-corruption measures by countries is recorded by
international multi-lateral institutions including, but not limited to, the World Bank
and the OECD (Getz, 2006). Much of the research into the causes of corruption has
determined its impacts as summarized above; however, research into the effectiveness
of these anti-corruption measures remains inconclusive.
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Key issues requiring elaboration
Anti-corruption measures, like all public policy, require coordination both at
the international and national levels, reinforced by efficient monitoring and
enforcement to be a sustainable deterrent (Getz, 2006). This study focuses on the
empirical measurement of the resourcing and implementation of these legislative
initiatives and their impact on the established relationship between countries’
corruption and economic performance.
Foreign investment contains measures of risk, particularly when host countries
are deemed unstable. A major obstacle to the desirability of foreign investment into
emerging markets is corruption. Numerous studies identify corruption as a primary
deterrent to foreign investments (Mauro, 1995, 1997; Knack & Keefer, 1995;
Kaufman, 1995; Wei, 2000).
Most countries have enacted some form of anti-corruption laws (Heineman,
2006) and when developing anti-corruption legislation, they have tended to follow
international regime frameworks and guidelines (Transparency International, 2010),
including the United Nations (UN) Convention Against Corruption (UN, 2004) and the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Convention on
Combatting Bribery of Foreign Public Officials (OECD, 2010). In addition, major
national ACL legislation, including the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, as
amended, (FCPA, 2010) and the UK’s Anti-Bribery Act of 2010 (ABAC, 2010) has
also served to influence the development of legislation of ACL measures in other
countries including regional initiatives (Getz, 2006).
5

Statement of the Problem
Principal proposition
A review of the extant literature on nations’ levels of corruption and the impact
on national economic factors, including economic growth, foreign direct investment,
and trade flows, suggests a correlation between nation’s perceived levels of corruption
and economic performance.
The relationship between levels of corruption and economic growth has been
extensively researched and its resultant impacts empirically determined by Ades and
DiTella (1996, 1999); Delgado et al. (2014); Ehrlich and Lui, (1999); Huang (2016);
Mauro (1995, 1996, 1997, 1998); and Voyer and Beamish (2004). One of the field’s
seminal authors, Mauro (1997), concludes that corruption may have considerable
effects on a nation’s economic growth, primarily through, but not limited to, the
reduction in private investment.
The relationship between levels of corruption and foreign direct investment
flows has also been extensively researched and documented, suggesting the impact
corruption has on investment flows (Ades & DiTella 1996, 1999; Bryant & Javalgi
2016; Delgado et al. 2014; Egger & Winner 2005, 2006; Habib & Zurawicki 2002;
Jain 2017; Mauro 1995, 1996, 1997; Mudambi, Navarra & Delios 2013; Norbet 2015;
Peng & Beamish 2008; Teixeira 2014; Voyer & Beamish 2004; Wei 2000; Wu 2006).
Some empirical studies also suggest that corruption has a material non-linear role in
the FDI-economic growth relationship, which reduces the effectiveness of FDI in
improving GDP in developed countries. In contrast, developing countries, with low
6

returns to FDI were found to significantly benefit from reduced corruption levels
(Delgado et al., 2014; Shleifer & Vishny, 1993; Mauro, 1995).
Finally, the relationship between levels of corruption and trade flows has also
been researched and the impacts empirically determined in studies by Ades and
DiTella (1999); Akter (2004); Bryant and Javalgi, (2016); Rugman (2001); Rugman
and Verbeke (2004); Sanchez-Martin et al., (2014); and Friedman (2010). Trade
openness has been found to have a significant impact on corruption (Treisman, 2007)
whilst research by Ades and DiTella (1999, 1996) suggests that countries tend to be
less corrupt when more open to international trade.
However, while international studies using political risk data demonstrate a
strong link between the level of corruption and economic development (Bohara,
Mitchell, & Mittendorff, 2004; Gerring & Thacker, 2004; Montinola & Jackman,
2002; Treisman, 2000; Wilhelm, 2002) and where increased economic prosperity may
often be linked to reform, this does not automatically translate into anti-corruption
reform, as has been evident in many countries (Brinegar, 2006; Getz, 2006).
Research has established the relationship between corruption and economic
performance, as outlined above; however a gap exists in the literature in researching
and determining the impact of anti-corruption measures on this relationship between
levels of corruption and the resultant impact on national economic performance
variables as measured by economic growth, investment, and trade flows.
The emergence of global anti-corruption measures was marked by the initial
and explicit measures of the US’s FCPA in 1977, which criminalized business bribery
7

of foreign public officials, followed by the UN’s Convention in 2004 and the OECD’s
Convention on Combatting Bribery in 2010. As a result, the number of countries
legislating against corruption has increased significantly since the introduction of these
international and national anti-corruption regimes (Transparency International, 2017).
Despite the increasing number of countries developing and legislating anticorruption measures, following international frameworks and guidelines, research on
their effectiveness remains inconclusive (Friedman, 2010). Whilst research by Getz
(2006) suggests three key attributes impacting ACL regime effectiveness – clarity of
objectives, allocation of resources, and balanced implementation – Getz’s study
concluded that international anti-corruption policy regimes were not effective (p. 275).
Similarly, Husted’s (2002) research found that international ACL regimes did not
significantly reduce the perceptions of corruption measured by Transparency
International’s Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI). Indeed, many of these supply side
voluntary regimes were found to be at odds with cultural norms and practices
(Argadoña, 2007; Husted, 2002; Pacini, C., Swingen, J. A., & Rogers, H., 2002).
However, while ACL measures, such as the OECD Convention (2010), oblige
signatory countries to make bribery a criminal offence on an extraterritorial basis, and
where these provisions may be effective in promoting transparency and accountability
in international business, they can only be expected to curtail corrupt behavior where
the uniform rules are both enforceable and enforced (Pacini et al., 2002), or as is
postulated in their study, where the measures are adequately resourced and effectively
implemented.
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The important role of governance in determining the efficiency of ACL
measures provides the framework and resources for the efficient development and
implementation of anti-corruption measures (Dzhumashev, 2014). Research by Aidt
(2003) suggests that institutional structures determine the degree of organizational
corruption, where governance structures drive the incidence of corruption. Yet other
researchers suggest that corruption alters the effectiveness of institutions in an
economy and hence impacts economic growth (Acemoglu & Verdier, 2000; Aidt,
2009; Keefer & Knack, 1997).
Research by Ayal and Karras (1998), Gwartney et al., (2000) and Carlsson and
Lindstrom (2002) indicates a positive relationship between aspects of economic
freedom and economic growth. However, these authors did not extend their research
into the effects of economic freedom on corruption and it was left to Swaleheen and
Stansel (2007) to explore the relationships between economic freedom, corruption, and
economic growth, finding that ceteris paribus, corruption impacts economic growth, in
the event of low levels of economic freedom, providing some measure of support for
Leff’s (1964) helping-hand posit.
This study expands on this gap in the research and includes a review of the
relevant literature, also exploring other relevant relationships between perceptions of
corruption and multi-lateral ACL measures.
Problem statement
The contradiction between the introduction of legislative measures, without
meaningful and resourced implementation, serves little purpose and function in
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addressing the key challenges of reducing corruption and improving resultant
economic performance (Getz, 2006). Governments may be able to amend and improve
policy, monitoring, and enforcement through improved understanding of the economic
impacts of their respective anti-corruption legislative efforts (Mauro, 1997). This study
seeks to establish and clarify the impact that these ACL measures have on the
established relationship between corruption and economic performance.
Explicative proposition
This study seeks to assist in resolving this contradiction through the
measurement of the impact legislating anti-corruption measures has on the
relationship between nation’s levels of corruption and economic performance.

Purpose of the Study
Reason for conducting the study
The purpose of this study is to explore, measure, and therefore improve the
understanding of the impact of anti-corruption measures on the relationship between
national levels of corruption and economic performance. Improving understanding of
the effectiveness or lack thereof of ACL measures on their economic performance,
may assist countries to seek improvements in their respective ACL legislations,
reflecting their commitment to the significance of the problem and the relevant
resourcing and implementations to ensure enforceability (Getz, 2006).
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Questions that guide the Research
The researched and documented relationships between perceived levels of
corruption and economic performance were updated with current data and form the
basis for the further research proposed on the economic impact of anti-corruption
legislation on this relationship, as follows:
Research Question 1.
a) Do national levels of perceived corruption impact national economic
growth?
This relationship was researched by measuring perceived national levels of
public-sector corruption as measured by Transparency International’s Corruption
Perception Index (CPI) and levels of national economic growth, as measured by
national gross domestic product (GDP) per capita.
b) Do national levels of perceived corruption impact investment flows?
This relationship was researched by measuring perceived national levels of
public-sector corruption (CPI) and investment flows measured by national inward
foreign direct investment (FDI) flows.
c) Do national levels of perceived corruption impact trade flows?
This relationship was researched by measuring perceived national levels of
public-sector corruption (CPI) and trade flows, as measured by the national net trade
balance (NTB).
Once these established relationships between levels of corruption and economic
growth, foreign investment and trade were quantified with updated data, the impact of
11

the introduction of Anti-Corruption Legislation (ACL) in nations was tested on these
relationships. The moderating impact of the extent of the introduction and
implementation of ACL measures was then tested and was expected to influence these
relationships, depending on the extent of the resourcing and implementation of the
legislation, as outlined in research question 2, below.
Research Question 2.
How does ACL resourcing and implementation impact the relationship between
a nation’s levels of perceived corruption (CPI) and its national economic performance?
Research has established the relationship between levels of perceived
corruption and economic performance. However, as expanded above, a gap in the
literature exists, researching the impact of nations’ ACL on the relationship between
perceived levels of corruption and the resultant impact on national economic
performance as measured by growth, foreign investment, and trade flows. This study
has researched the impact of ACL measures on this relationship and suggests
recommendations for policy makers.
This study therefore researched and measured the economic impact resulting
from the introduction of ACL on the relationship between perceived levels of
corruption and levels of growth, investment, and trade flows.

Definition of Terms
The terms utilized in this study follow international norms, as used by the
World Bank, the OECD, and other multi-lateral institutions. These include definitions
12

and measurements of corruption, types of anti-corruption legislation, and economic
performance indices.
Corruption
“Corruption is the single greatest obstacle to economic and social
development.” (World Bank, 2007)
Corruption, defined as the abuse of public and or private power and influence
for private gain, is detrimental for a country (Bardhan, 1997; Cuervo-Cazurra, 2008;
Kaufmann, 1997; Rose-Ackerman, 1999; Wei, 2000). Corruption affects countries’
economies both economically, by impacting growth and politically, through disparate
wealth distribution resulting in political instability. Corruption also adversely impacts
economic growth by reducing domestic investment, discouraging foreign direct
investment, encouraging government deficits, and therefore impacting the composition
of government spending (Wei, 2000). The economic costs of corruption are material,
although difficult to measure precisely. Recent estimates place the annual cost of
bribery alone, in both developed and developing countries, at between $1.5 and $2.0
trillion, or approximately 2 percent of global GDP (Gaspar & Hagan, 2016). However,
the overall economic and social costs of corruption are likely to be even larger, since
bribes account for only one form of the possible means of corruption.
The relationship between corruption and economic performance is well
researched and documented, as detailed elsewhere. This study researched perceptions
of corruption, as measured by Transparency International (2017), for 141 countries
over the period 2011-2016.
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Corruption and economic performance
The combination of economic variables researched in this study reflect a
measure of a country’s economic performance for the specific purpose of determining
the validity of the relationship with perceptions of corruption for the period 20112016. This study measured economic growth (GDP), foreign direct investment flows
(FDI), and international trade flows (NTB) as indicators of countries’ economic
performance, in line with extant research studies, outlined elsewhere.
Corruption and economic growth
Research has documented the relationship between corruption and economic
growth (Aidt et al., 2008, 2009; Mendez & Sepulveda, 2006; Mauro, 1995, 1997)
where the overwhelming majority of studies indicate and support the existence of a
relationship between CPI and GDP, resulting in reduced growth resulting from
increased levels of corruption. Mauro (1995), in his study on the impact of host
country levels of corruption and economic growth, found that corruption is strongly
and correlated with foreign investment and economic growth, irrespective of the level
of bureaucracy in the host country.1
However, studies, in certain circumstances, have stressed the importance of
corruption in greasing the wheels of an economy, specifically where the magnitude,
complexity, and rigidity of relevant regulations are assumed to impair economic

1

Mauro’s (1995) study determined a negative relationship between corruption, investment levels, and
economic growth, where an increase in the CPI of one standard deviation (a reduction in perceived
corruption) increased investment by more than 4% points and the annual growth rate in per capita GDP
by more than 0.5%.
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activity (Dreher & Gassebner, 2013, 2007; Leff, 1964; Huntington, 1968; Méon &
Sekkat, 2005; Méon & Weill, 2010).
Corruption and foreign direct investment
The relationship between CPI and FDI is well documented and studies indicate
levels of perceptions of corruption are strongly related to reduced levels of investment
as measured by FDI (Akhter, 2004; Cuervo-Cazurra, 2008; Egger & Winner, 2005;
Habib & Zurawicki, 2002; Hennart, 1988; Mauro, 1995; Peng & Beamish, 2008;
Rugman & Verbeke, 2004; Voyer & Beamish, 2004; Wei, 2000; Wu, 2004).
However, research indicates that in transition economies, high levels of
corruption may be associated with increased FDI flows (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2008) and
where FDI flows exclude US investors, higher economic growth corrupt countries
received higher levels of inward FDI than high economic growth but less corrupt
countries (Norbet, 2015). These paradoxical relationships seemingly coexist but
maybe impacted by the quality of the rule of law in the country, where political
instability results in increased risks, thus further reducing the favorable investment
climate essential to attracting foreign investments and stimulating economic growth
(Wei, 2000).
Corruption and trade
Research indicates a strong relationship between levels of corruption and trade
(Ades & DiTella, 1999; Akter, 2004; Bryant & Javalgi, 2016; D’Souza, 2012;
Friedman, 2010; Mauro, 1996; Norbet, 2015; Rugman, 2001; Rugman & Verbeke,
2004; Sanchez-Martin et al., 2014; and Warner, 2007). Trade openness has been found
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to have a significant impact on corruption (Treisman, 2007) whilst research by Ades
and DiTella (1999, 1996) suggests that countries tend to be less corrupt when more
open to international trade.
Research into the effects of anti-corruption legislation on trade, which had
previously focused on the USA’s 1997 FCPA (FCPA, 2017), has now been extended
to include the OECD’s multi-lateral Convention (OECD, 2010) introducing a
systematic monitoring process (D’Souza, 2012). Studies indicate that the OECD
regime was found to have material effects on bilateral exports by increasing the costs
of bribery, including those associated with avoiding detection and punishment
(Shleifer & Vishny, 1993).
Corruption and governance
“Governance, the conscious management of regime structures with a view to
enhancing the legitimacy of the public realm” (Hyden, 1992)
Governance, when viewed though a multi-functional vision, allows researchers
to consider both external and internal points of view. Governance refers to both an
existing structure and to processes, whilst the ‘characteristics of a governance
structure may either facilitate or hinder corruption, depending on external links’
(Pietra & Melis, 2016).
The impact of corruption on national economic growth worsens when
indicators of a nation’s quality of governance deteriorate (Méon & Sekkat, 2005).
Research by Transparency International (2010) indicates that national corruption
constitutes a major obstacle to democracy and the rule of law, hindering the
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development of equitable market structures and distorts competition, thus deterring
investments.
Empirical evidence reflects that, based on corruption index measures, richer
countries are perceived as having lower levels of corruption (Mauro, 1995), whilst
larger public sectors and extensive government intervention can be associated with
increased corruption (Tanzi, 1998). Other studies indicate that policies aimed at
improving transparency also help curb corruption and improve growth (Mauro, 2004).
Whilst transparency is a necessary condition for the proper functioning of the markets,
it is equally a core component of an effective anti-corruption policy (Kopits & Craig,
1998). In a study using the Heritage Foundation Index of Economic Freedom (IEF),
Eiras (2003) suggests that ‘economic freedom, in the absence of over regulation,
impairs rule of law and an inefficient public sector is key to reducing corruption’.
Specifically, Eiras finds that where economic freedom, as a measure of governance
including the rule of law is diminished, increased opportunities are created for bribery
and corruption.
The IMF has on numerous occasions advised countries to reduce regulatory
onus and improve transparency, through improving their business climates (Gaspar &
Hagan, 2016). Hence, a sustainable anti-corruption strategy is seen to be only be as
effective as the institution supporting it.
Improving government institutions and governance is therefore a key
component of structural reforms and a critical factor in the sustainability of effective
ACL measures (Kopits & Craig, 1998).
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Significance of the Study
The scourge of corruption, both public and private, national and international,
across the world has been widely researched and its economic and social consequences
well documented. Combatting corruption in a coordinated and sustainable manner has
become an international priority, both at the multi-lateral level but also on the ground
at the national level, as countries seek to gain access to international markets requiring
enhanced levels of compliance and enforcement.
Multi-lateral ACL initiatives, including those by the World Bank and the
OECD, reinforced by major national regimes including the US’s FCPA2 and the UK’s
ABAC3, have sought to coordinate anti-corruption standards across the world
(Friedman, 2010). However, the extent of the implementation, including
administrative processes and structures facilitating compliance and enforcement,
ultimately dictates the value of the outcome of the measures legislated (Chayes &
Chayes, 1993). Implementation therefore requires coordinated action by both public
and private sectors at both international and national levels (Getz, 2006).
Exploring the extent of ACL implementation with specific reference to the
impact on the relationship between levels of corruption and economic performance
serves to improve the understanding of the effectiveness of these measures and where
and how they may be improved.

2

United States of America Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 2010. US Department of Justice,
Washington, DC
3

United Kingdom. The Bribery Act, 2010. UK Ministry of Justice. London. UK.
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This study set out to review the literature and data on the established
relationship between levels of corruption and national economic performance
measured by economic growth, foreign direct investment, and trade, before
empirically measuring the moderating impact of anti-corruption legislation introduced
on the relationship between levels of corruption and economic performance. Many of
these measures are widely reviewed in the press, but to date studies have not as yet
determined the efficacy of the national anti-corruption measures on impacting national
economic performance.
Macro-economic theory suggests effective legislation may result in a change in
economic behavior, as a result of a change in derived economic rents or increased cost
of compliance (Bardhan, 1997; Hofstede, 2001, 1999; Mauro, 1997; Treisman, 2000),
impacting levels of economic growth, foreign direct investment, and international
trade flows. Where these ACL measures are shown to have resulted in improved
economic performance, policy makers can be expected to reinforce and broaden
existing anti-corruption measures. However, where the desired outcomes have not
materialized, policies may be reviewed and amended to improve their effectiveness
and desired impacts (Treisman, 2010). International multi-lateral cooperation in the
formulation, coordination, and implementation of anti-corruption legislation remains a
key determinant in delivering effective policies to combat the scourge of corruption.
By measuring the impact of these ACL measures, this study seeks to provide
specific insights to improve the understanding of the impact of these measures on the
19

relationship between levels of corruption and economic performance, assisting
authorities with their efforts in improving their legislative efforts.

Organization of the Remainder of the Study
Following the overview of this study in Chapter 1, the literature review in
Chapter 2 outlines the historical context of the contradiction identified and outlines the
body of literature supporting the proposed research questions and study. The literature
review explores the documented theories and research on the relationship between
corruption and economic performance as well as the significant developments of anticorruption and anti-bribery measures. The coordination of these measures has served to
improve the international efforts aimed at combatting corruption and improving
economic performance. Understanding and measuring the efficacy of these
international and national measures is of increasing concern to the international
community of nations, given the greatly increased internationalization of economies,
their related investments and international trade.
The quantitative research design and methodology chosen is explained and
justified in Chapter 3 to support the methodology chosen. Specifically, this study
measured the established relationships between corruption and national economic
performance for 141 countries, with updated corruption and macro-economic data for
the period 2011-2016, sourced from published international multi-lateral institution
data bases. This study then sought to determine the economic impact of anticorruption legislation on these relationships through a series of regression analyses.
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The findings of the quantitative data analysis on each research question
conducted, are fully detailed and reported upon in Chapter 4 and include a synthesis of
the data utilized and summarize the learnings achieved.
Chapter 5 provides a discussion of the study’s findings and addresses the
resultant implications and evidence-based conclusions. This study sets out to also
identify the value it adds to the existing body of literature on the topic and to other
related studies, whilst identifying and supporting areas for further research.
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Chapter 2
Literature Review

Overview
A comprehensive literature review was undertaken in order to provide both a
theoretical and empirical basis for the research into the hypothesized relationships, on
the primary research question, the impact of anti-corruption measures on the
relationship between corruption and economic performance. The literature review for
this study covers the broad concept of corruption, the seminal and influential research
covering the many components of corruption, its evolution and national and
international practical applications. Whilst extensive, this literature review does not
cover every aspect of corruption. It is however intended to include the most important
and recent studies providing both a theoretical and empirical basis for this study into
the relationships.
This study analyzes the relationship between corruption and national economic
performance, including economic growth, foreign investments, and international trade
flows. Understanding the extant literature and research into these relationships allows
this study to focus on its primary research question, evaluating the economic impact of
anti-corruption measures on the relationship between a country’s levels of corruption
and its economic performance.
The literature review explores the concept of corruption and its theoretical
demand and supply-side underpinning, beginning with Rose-Ackerman’s (1978)
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seminal work into the abuse of public office for private gain and the resultant
economic costs of corruption practices and the benefits resulting to investors from its
curtailment. Subsequent seminal research into the economic impact of corruption.
including studies by Mauro, (1995, 1996, 1997, 1998), provided insight into the
relationships between corruption and economic growth, foreign investment, and
government expenditure. Additional research into the relation between corruption and
trade (Ades & DiTella, 1999, 1996) then allowed subsequent studies to clarify the
relationship between anti-corruption legislation and trade (D’Souza, 2012).
Establishing and clarifying the role and importance of governance when
evaluating the effectiveness of these anti-corruption measures and regimes is critical,
particularly so in the case of international coordinated legislation and implementation
efforts (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2008). Research indicates that the interaction between
corruption and governance influences the efficiency of government expenditure
(Mauro, 1998), which in turn impacts the growth of corruption (Dzhumashev, 2014).
Aidt (2003) and Bardhan (1997) argue further that corruption is driven by institutional
settings where the degree of corruption is related to the extent and functioning of
governance structures, by impacting the uncertainty of corruption outcomes or
altering the incentives for corruption. Yet other studies indicate that the degree of
corruption impacts the functioning public institutions and its actors and hence impacts
economic growth (Acemoglu & Verdier, 2000; Keefer & Knack 1997).
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Measures of economic freedom, including the Heritage Foundation’s Index of
Economic Freedom4 (IEF) (Olson, 2014), provide useful governance data in a wide
range of studies, determining the effectiveness of governance and institutional
performance (Altman, 2013; Apergis et al., 2012; Carlsson & Lundstrom, 2002; Goel
& Nelson, 2005; Hakimi, 2014; Norbet, 2015; Qerimi, 2012). Identifying the
dimensions of governance – the rule of law, regulatory efficiency, government size,
and the openness of markets, provides a mechanism to evaluate the extent of economic
freedom (Olson, 2014).
Research suggests a relationship between the extent of economic freedom as a
measure of governance, and the level of corruption (Graeff & Mehlkop, 2003) where
regulatory policies have been shown to constrain corruption opportunities (Yamarik &
Redmon, 2017) and hence impact investment (Norbet, 2015), trade (Carlsson &
Lindstrom, 2003), and economic growth (Opper, 2004). Using these measures of
national governance allows this study to gauge the extent of implementation of the
anti-corruption measures by country in order to explore their impact on the
relationship between corruption and national economic performance. Research by
Gertz (2006) provides a conceptual framework for understanding the effectiveness of
anti-corruption regimes, where the relationship is moderated by the regime attributes
measured by the clarity of the legislation, the allocation of resources, and the balanced

4

An empirically based index, as opposed to a perception-based measure from the Heritage Foundation
(2010) measuring and aggregating the extent of economic freedom in 186 countries constructed from
multi-national institutional data including the World Bank and the IMF. A more detailed discussion of a
number of economic freedom indices ensues below.
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implementation of the measures. The application of the governance measures utilizing
the IEF index, in determining the economic effectiveness of national ACL regimes
(Apergis et al., 2012; Graeff, 2003; Yamarik & Redmon, 2010) allows this study to
determine the impacts of these measures on the research question relationships.5
This study therefore expands on the literature providing support for the
relationship between governance and perceptions of corruption, as measured by
economic performance.

Corruption
“Corruption is an outcome – a reflection of a country's legal, economic,
cultural and political institutions.” (Svensson, 2005)
Modern research on the economics of corruption began with Rose-Ackerman
(1975, 1978). Corruption, including bribery and money laundering, is a worldwide
phenomenon, presenting serious social, moral, economic, and political challenges,
undermining good governance, impacting development, and distorting competition
(ISO, 2016). Corruption erodes justice, undermines human rights, and is a major
obstacle to the economic upliftment of impoverished societies engaged in poverty
relief (Transparency International, 2017). Corruption also increases the cost of
conducting business, both domestically and internationally (Pietra & Melis, 2016).
5

The Apergis, Dincer and Payne study (2012) examined the relationships between corruption,
economic freedom, and macro-economic variables, including economic growth, across US states.
Whilst their study determined causality between the variables researched, their research sample was
limited to US states and may have limited applicability to countries with wide ranges of corruption and
economic freedom outcomes. The Yamarik and Redmon (2017) study included a much larger sample of
160 countries, limiting sample selectivity bias and increasing the relevance of the results obtained.
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Extensive studies by economists and policy makers recognize the importance
of institutions in determining economic policy impacting economic growth (Mauro,
2004), whilst modern economic literature identifies the relationship between rent
seeking behavior and economic inefficiencies resulting from inefficient governance
including corruption (Krueger, 1974). Research by North (1990) indicates the
importance of strong property rights and resultant impact on a country's economic
performance. Shleifer and Vishny (1999) suggest that countries record slower
economic growth where talented people are allocated to rent-seeking activities.
Jointly, this would indicate the relationship between levels of governance, the
incidence of corruption, and economic efficiencies impacting economic performance
and its component parts, including economic growth, foreign investments, and trade.
The availability of corruption indices (Transparency International, 2017) has
enabled numerous studies to empirically analyze the relationships between corruption
and governance and economic performance. Research suggests that a material
relationship exists between the economic costs of corruption and weak governance
(Kaufmann, Kraay, & Zoido-Lobaton, 1999; Knack & Keefer, 1995; and Mauro,
1995).
In addition to the expanded research into the field and relationships, policy
makers have also taken several initiatives in an effort to reduce corruption (Heineman
& Heiman, 2006). These include the 1997 OECD Convention6 on Combating Bribery

6

Convention is defined as ‘International and regional agreements signed or formally adopted through
ratification by multiple states that establish rules, laws and standards on issues which are typically
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of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions (OECD, 2010) and
the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UN, 2004).
Many countries have legislated laws punishing corruption, aimed at reducing
the demand for bribes, particularly amongst civil servants and including politicians
(Cuervo-Cazurra, 2008). However, ACL legislation is often ineffective in countries
with high corruption, due to poorly drafted laws and inconsistent interpretation and
enforcement (Getz, 2006). Additionally, measures aimed at impacting the supply of
bribes to foreign investors may include laws against bribery abroad in foreign
countries with higher quality governance and institutions (Keefer & Knack, 2007;
Rose-Ackerman, 1996). These measures may therefore reduce incentives to corrupt by
increasing the risk and cost of detection, more effective where such investments
originate from countries with higher-level governance and low corruption levels.
However, addressing the supply of bribes may not be sufficient, since research
indicates limited additional sensitivity to corruption, which suggests the
implementation of effective ACL requires international coordination (Wei, 2000).
Little evidence exists on the extent of the interactions and interdependencies
existing between international anticorruption mechanisms, which enables empirical
testing of theories that “institutionalized networks function as such or have any
relationship with reduced corruption” (Heinrich & Brown, 2017). Whilst research by
the authors points to the possible importance of interactions and interdependencies

cross-border in nature and require a common approach for effective, multilateral cooperation’
(Transparency International, 2016).
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between anti-corruption regimes and institutions, their study indicates a significant gap
in the development and implementation of a coordinated methodology, facilitating
both in-country analysis, as well as cross-country comparisons and frequent
monitoring (Heinrich & Brown, 2017). In order to reinforce monitoring, research
suggests monitoring programs should be implemented and monitored by parties
committed to lowering corruption and reinforced with an incentive program, either
financial or non-financial (Hanna et al., 2011).
As a result of the increased awareness of the detrimental effects, both social
and economic, of the effects of corruption on economic performance, nations across
the world are increasingly prioritizing the development of strategies and policies to
combat corruption (Persson et al., 2013; Mungiu-Pippidi, 2006; Médard, 2002).
Governments have, in addition to their national measures, increasingly
coordinated their ACL efforts internationally through international multi-lateral
agreements including the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International
Business Transactions (OECD, 2010), the United Nations Convention against
Corruption (UN, 2004), other multi-lateral agreements including The Financial Action
Task Force (FATF, 1989) and through their national laws.
International Anti-Corruption Developments
“Corruption has been identified as one of the most important problems facing
the world today and has led to a renewed emphasis on corruption issues within the
international community” (Gaspar & Hagan, 2016).
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Understanding anti-corruption reform is central to explaining how
governments can effectively reduce their levels of corruption, despite dissatisfaction
with the outcome of non-transparency reforms. Research by Kaufmann (2005)
provides an overview of the relatively poor performance to date of anti-corruption
reform campaigns. Whilst research supports the premise that economic development
and long-term democracy are critical to reducing corruption (Treisman, 2000; Gerring
& Thacker, 2004), less is known about the relevant causal mechanisms. The
development of national anti-corruption measures can best be understood by
reviewing the basis on which countries have legislated their ACL measures, the degree
to which these have been adequately and sustainably resourced as well as the extent,
breadth, and depth, to which implementation has been introduced in a sustainable
manner.
Countries legislating their ACL policies have had the benefit of substantial
guidance from multi-national institutions, including the UN and OECD amongst other
international regimes, as well as a number of influential national measures including
but not limited to the USA’s FCPA and the UK’s ABAC anti-corruption bodies of
legislation (Getz, 2006).
As may be expected, ACL regimes impose fiscal demands on countries,
needing to develop the administrative compliance and regulatory capacities ensuring
effective enforcement. As with domestic governmental policies, adequate funding is
necessary to achieve these anti-corruption policy objectives. Despite inadequate
attention in academic literature to the important question of anti-corruption regime
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resourcing, practitioners have acknowledged its critical importance (Chayes &
Chayes, 1993; Getz, 2006).
Effective implementation of anti-corruption measures also requires coordinated
administrative and technical capabilities, both within and across countries, addressing
both a transparent and accessible process and structure. Implementation therefore
requires coordinated international and national action by both public and private
sectors (Getz, 2006).
Most anti-corruption regimes rely on the country’s legal and financial
institutions, including the judiciary, police, and financial auditors, to enforce and
strengthen public sector accountability (Svensson, 2005). Governments and multilateral institutions have made significant progress in addressing corruption through
international agreements and regimes – some voluntary and others binding – as
summarized from the literature reviewed, in Table 1. The summary and subsequent
insights into selected international and influential national ACL regimes are a useful
representation of the development of these coordinated measures as a basis from which
to gauge the dimensions of governance addressed and implemented. Linking these
pillars of governance to the efforts against corruption permits this study to objectively
explore the relationship between the effectiveness of the anti-corruption measures and
their impact on economic performance.
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Table 1. ACL Regime Summary (1990-2017)
Date
Ratified
1990

1997
1993
1994

1996

Organization

Measures & Bodies

Financial Action Task
Force (FATF)

Inter Governemental Body - Financial
Action Task Force on Money
Laundering Revised 1996
USA Congress
Foreign Corrupt Pratcices Act (FCPA)
Revised 2010
Transparency
Perceptions of Corruption Index (CPI)
International
measurement internationaly
Organization for
Recommendations on combatting
Economic Cooperaton bribery in international business
and Development
transactions
(OECD)

Binding

European Union (EU)

Binding

2003

Convention on the fight against
corruption involving EU officials
Organization of
Inter-American convention against
Anerican States (OAS) corruption
World Bank (WB)
Procurement rules
Council of Europe
Convention on combating active and
passive corruption of officials. Revised
1998 for private sector
OECD
Convention on Combatting Bribery of
Foreign Public Officials in International
Business Transactions
Council of Europe
Civil Law Convention on Corruption
Global Coalition for
Twenty-five principles to combat
Africa
corruption
Network of 110 Non- Publish what you pay
Governmental
Organizations
United Nations (UN)
Convention against Corruption

2003

African Union (AU)

1996
1996
1997

1997

1999
1999
2003

2009
2010
2014
2014

2014
2015
2016
2017

Enforcement

Convention on Preventing and
Combating Corruption and Related
OECD
Convention - Revised recommendation
adopted
United Kingdom (UK) United Kingdom’s Bribery Act of 2010
(ABAC, 2010)
Brazil
Clean Company Act
UK Joint Money
Task Force - UK Gov, British Bankers
Laundering Intelligence Assoc., Law enforcement, > 40 major
Task Force (JMLIT)
UK & Int. Banks
OECD
China
France
United Kingdom (UK)

OECD Foreign Bribery Report (2014)
Anti-Unfair Competition Law (AUCL)
Anti-Corruption Law: SAPIN II
Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering
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Binding
Voluntary
Voluntary

Binding
Binding
Binding

Binding

Binding
Voluntary
Voluntary

Binding
(partially)
Binding
Binding
Binding
Binding
Voluntary

Voluntary
Binding
Binding
Binding

OECD Convention against Corruption (OECD)
The OECD Anti-Bribery Convention (OECD, 2010) establishes legally
binding standards, criminalizing the bribery of foreign public officials in international
transactions and provides for a range of related measures to ensure their effectiveness.7
The Convention represents the enhancement of legal measures to combat the scourge
of bribery of foreign public officials by individuals or corporations and remains the
initial and only international anti-corruption regime focused on the ‘supply side’ of the
bribery transactions. The Convention obligates signatory nations to make bribery of
foreign public officials a criminal act on an extraterritorial basis and requires a set of
uniform enforceable and enforced rules (Pacini et al., 2002; Moran, 2002).
In his research into the evolution of anti-corruption regimes and their uncertain
impact, Getz (2006), analyzed the effectiveness of corruption and anti-bribery
conventions. His research concluded that regime effectiveness is a function of the
complexity of the issue and that the incidence and magnitude of corruption and bribery
could be reduced by careful design of formal regime policies.
Previously the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), which applied only to
United States individuals or corporations, “stood alone in the world as a legal barrier
to transnational bribery” (Moran, 2002. p.141).

7

The OECD Convention on Combating the Bribery of Foreign Public Officials (OECD, 2010), was
signed and adopted by 44 countries on 17 December 1997 and implemented on 15 February 1999.
These included all 36 OECD countries and 8 non-OECD countries – Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria,
Colombia, Costa Rica, Peru, Russia and South Africa. As of 2017, 43 countries have ratified or acceded
to the convention.
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UN Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC)
The General Assembly of the United Nations (UN, 2004) adopted the United
Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC)8, which entered into force in
December 2003 with the purpose of preventing and combating corruption.
The Convention was ratified to address the growing need for international
cooperation between the efforts and measures taken by many nations on the anticorruption front. UNCAC was aimed at recognizing the individual nations’ efforts at
combating corruption, ensuring the measures adopted were consistent and fair whilst
establishing an equitable framework for fostering international relations and economic
efficiency (Argadoña, 2007). The Convention also addressed the important challenge
of ensuring that countries had access to the resources required to effectively tackle
their national anti-corruption priorities. This initiative was the first truly global
instrument aimed at preventing and combating corruption, built on a broad
international consensus (Argadoña 2007).
Whilst the Convention strongly condemned all forms of corruption, many
weaknesses remained. The forms of corruption identified including active and passive,
public and private corruption, combined prevention and criminalization provisions,
also identified viable mechanisms for the repatriation of ill-gotten gains (Webb, 2005).

8

UNCAC was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 31 October 2003 by Resolution
58/4 and signed by 140 countries. As of August 2018, there were 186 parties to the Convention,
Including 181 UN member states, the Cook Islands, Niue, the Holy See, the State of Palestine, and
the European Union. Only Andorra, Barbados, Eritrea, Monaco, North Korea, St Kitts, St Vincent, San
Marino, Somalia, Suriname, Syria and Tonga have not ratified the convention.
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Many of its weaknesses reflect the lack of political will, perhaps understandable
within such a broad-based body, attempting overarching measures in this challenging
field. In particular the provisions, monitoring and implementation mechanisms
attracted the most criticism.9 Argadoña’s research (2007) supplemented Webb’s
(2005) insights into the Convention’s progress and relevance by aptly summarizing its
strengths and weaknesses including its attempts to distinguish itself from other similar
international instruments such as the OECD measures in 1997 (OECD, 2010). Both
studies suggest relevant improvements with regards to the enforcement of the
provisions so as to strengthen the voluntary recommendations into mandatory
legislative actions within signatory countries and to effectively assist implementation
with advice and resources, whilst establishing formal monitoring responsibilities.
The responsibility of effective governance, as suggested in this international
multi-lateral convention, but also through the legislation of national, but
internationally-coordinated measures, effective resourcing, and sustainable
implementation is therefore paramount, as set out in the literature (Getz, 2006; Keefer
& Knack, 1997; Treisman, 2000; Yamarik & Redmon, 2017) and in this study.

9

Argadoña’s (2007) research highlighted the need to “1) transform the recommendations into
obligations, 2) extend the provisions to private corruption, 3) expand the scope to include corruption in
political party funding 4) criminalize the bribery of officials working for international organizations and
5) toughen provisions on extortion and solicitation” (p. 491).
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Regional Anti-Corruption Regimes
The Financial Action Task Force (FATF)10
The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) is an independent inter-governmental
policy-making body, established in 1989 by the Ministers of its Member jurisdictions.
It aims to develop and promote policies protecting the global financial system
primarily against money laundering. The FATF Recommendations are recognized as
the global anti-money laundering (AML) standard.11
The objectives of the FATF are to establish standards and to promote effective
implementation of ‘legal, regulatory, and operational measures’ for combating money
laundering and other related challenges to the integrity of the international financial
system. The FATF, is a policy-making body, and aims to generate the necessary
political will to bring about ‘national legislative and regulatory reforms’ in these areas
of anti-corruption and anti-money laundering (FATF, 2018).
Major National Anti-Corruption Legislative Measures
In addition to these and other international measures and regimes signed,
ratified, and sometimes enforced, the challenge against corruption has also benefited
from a number of explicit initiatives. The first such development was the 1977 Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act by the United States, followed some years later by the United

10

http://www.fatf-gafi.org

11

The Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (FATF) was established by the G-7 Summit
in 1989, in response to growing concern over money laundering and the threat posed to the global
banking system and financial institutions. It has since been expanded into numerous regional task forces
including the Financial Action Task Force of Latin America amongst other regional task forces. (FATF,
2018).
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Kingdom’s Anti-Bribery Act of 2010. Both regimes, although national, have been
recorded as having significant international influence and reach (Cuervo-Cazurra,
2008; Marquardt et al., 2017).
U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA)
The US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 (FCPA), a United States federal
law, primarily addresses accounting transparency requirements under the Securities
Exchange (SEC) Act of 1934 and the bribery of foreign officials. The FCPA makes it
illegal for individuals and organizations to make payments to foreign government
officials to solicit or retain business. Since 1977, the anti-bribery provisions of the
FCPA have applied to all US persons and to some foreign issuers of securities. The
Act was amended in 1998 to bring it into line with the OECD Convention. These
amendments extended the definition of foreign officials to ‘include those of public
international organizations and their application to foreign firms and persons who
cause, directly or through agents, an act in furtherance of such a corrupt payment to
take place within the territory of the United States’ (FCPA, 1977). Critically, the
FCPA also requires companies whose securities are listed in the United States and
who operate both domestically and internationally to meet accounting provisions of
the Act, coordinated with the anti-bribery provisions included. These far-reaching
measures served to extend the monitoring and international enforceability of corrupt
transactions involving not only US citizens or entities but anyone dealing with them
(Marquardt et al., 2017).
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United Kingdom’s Anti-Bribery Act (ABAC)
The ABAC was introduced by the United Kingdom in 2010 to ‘update and
enhance UK laws on bribery, and foreign bribery so as to align with the requirements
of the 1997 OECD anti-bribery Convention. ABAC is now viewed as one of the
strictest anti-bribery legislations internationally, with severe consequences for
offending entities who fail to prevent bribery. This serves to place the burden of proof
on entities to demonstrate they maintain adequate procedures in place to prevent such
bribery. The UK Bribery Act goes even further with a broader scope and
extraterritorial reach than the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (Pietra & Melis,
2016). Residents in the UK can be prosecuted for bribery offences committed
internationally, and any entity conducting business in the UK, wherever it is based,
can be prosecuted for bribery. This means that strict penalties, for active and passive
bribery by individuals and entities are covered by this legislation. The ABAC defines
and provides remedies for four corruption related offences: ‘(1) offering, promising, or
giving of an advantage; (2) requesting, agreeing to receive or accept an advantage; (3)
the bribery of a foreign public official; and (4) the failure by an organization to
prevent bribes being paid to solicit or retain business or advantage’ (Marquardt et al.,
2017).
These far reaching national anti-corruption regimes increment the international
frameworks and measures adopted and sometimes enforced as elaborated above. They,
however, also address important governance challenges, including the development
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and promulgation of internationally coordinated legislation and the adequate
resourcing of the laws in order to ensure effective and sustainable implementation.
Corruption and Economic Performance
In order to understand the context and impact of these anti-corruption
measures, a review of the literature, researching the relationships between corruption
and economic performance variables, is presented below. Economic performance, for
the purposes of this study, is meant to include foreign investments and international
trade flows contributing to and impacting economic growth, as described in macroeconomic theory (Dowrick et al., 2004). A review of the theories contributing to the
relationships between corruption and economic performance follows.
Corruption and Foreign Direct Investment
Transparency International (TI) suggests corruption is the “abuse of entrusted
power for private gain” and defines the impact of corruption as ‘constituting a major
obstacle to democracy and the rule of law’ (Transparency International, 2010).
Research also indicates that corruption significantly impacts economic performance,
specifically reducing the effectiveness of FDI on economic growth for about 70
percent of non-OECD countries and supports the premise that returns to FDI may be
the principal channel through which the corruption sands the wheels (Delgado et al.,
2014).12

12

The sand-in-the-wheels concept (Shleifer & Vishny, 1993; Rose-Ackerman, 1999) is in stark contrast
to the greasing-the-wheels concept (Leff, 1964; Dreher & Gassebner, 2007).
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Corruption, including bribery, is a worldwide phenomenon, presenting serious
social, moral, economic, and political challenges, undermining good governance,
impacting development, and distorting competition (ISO, 2016). Corruption erodes
justice, undermines human rights, and is a major obstacle to the economic upliftment
of impoverished societies engaged in poverty relief. Corruption also increases the cost
of conducting business, both domestically and internationally. This in turn impacts
trust in organizations and institutions, introduces heightened levels of uncertainty into
commercial transactions, which increases the cost of goods and services, and interferes
with efficient market functioning (Bryant & Javalgi, 2016). Corruption increases
uncertainty for investors 13 and research indicates it reduces foreign direct investment
and hence economic growth (Gaspar & Hagan, 2016).
This study is guided by the theory of foreign direct investment (FDI)14
(Dunning, 1988, 1980; Rugman, 2010, 2001). Additionally, this study relies on an
extensive review of the extant and recent research into the impacts of corruption on
economic growth, foreign investment (Mauro, 1998, 1997, 1995; Habib & Zurawicki,

13

Research by Campos et al. (1999) indicates that while high levels of corruption result in a negative
impact on investment, the impact is reduced when higher corruption certainty exists.
14

Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) flows record ‘the value of cross-border transactions related to
direct investment during a given period of time, typically a quarter or a year. Financial flows consist of
equity transactions, reinvestment of earnings, and intercompany debt transactions. Outward flows
represent transactions increasing investments that investors in the reporting economy have in
enterprises in a foreign economy, less any transactions decreasing the investment that investors in the
reporting economy have in enterprises in a foreign economy, such as sales of equity or borrowing by
the resident investor from the foreign enterprise. Inward flows represent transactions that increase the
investment that foreign investors have in enterprises resident in the reporting economy less transactions
that decrease the investment of foreign investors in resident enterprises. FDI creates stable and longlasting links between economies and is measured in USD and as a share of GDP’ (OECD, 2014).
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2002), and trade flows (Ades & DiTella, 1999; Akter, 2004; Norbet, 2015) and into
the economic impact of anti-corruption measures legislated and implemented
internationally (Norbet, 2015; Treisman, 2000; Wei, 2000).
FDI, the level of investment flows between countries, impacts the economic
performance of the related economies in function of the level of economic integration
of the respective economies (Rugman 2001). FDI implies levels of control, which are
less in joint ventures and more in wholly owned subsidiaries representing differing
levels of risk associated with the level of control (Hennart, 1988). Hence developing
countries seek to encourage economic integration through bilateral and multi-lateral
trade treaties, liberal trade policies, as well as stable economic and political policies.
This in turn attracts higher levels of international trade of goods and services and FDI
and results in higher and broader levels of economic growth. This study establishes
that these developments are closely related to the introduction and implementation of
ACL measures.
FDI theory, built on the economic foundations of research and findings by
Coase (1937) and Bain (1956), was conceptualized in Hymer’s (1976) seminal work,
in which FDI flows, both inward and outward, were seen as a function of MultiNational Enterprise (MNE) investment decisions, (Dunning & Rugman 1985), rather
than the previous neo-classical economic view, where it was assumed that the
international investment flows resulted from interest rate differentials. Far more than
interest rate differentials, countries need to attract FDI by presenting a conducive
investment climate to foreign investors, who assess a broader viability of a potential
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investment climate through the level of perceived corruption in the country and its
government (Mauro 1997). Investors’ perceptions of the levels of corruption can thus
be expected to have a material and determining impact on foreign investment
decisions and hence FDI flows. Corruption therefore has the capacity to impact levels
of investment, both domestic and foreign, and hence economic growth.
Dunning’s research (1980) focused on the nature and reasons justifying
outward foreign direct investments (FDI) by proposing an eclectic paradigm,
identifying factors determining international expansion by multinational enterprises
(MNEs), engaging in FDI in their quest for additional resources, markets, efficiency,
and assets. These industry-level factors/advantages identified as Ownership (O),
Location (L) and Internalization (I), known as an OLI paradigm, suggest a number of
reasons justifying outward FDI.
Ownership advantages (O), according to Dunning (1980), are derived from
both technological or physical, and intangible knowledge advantages and incorporate
transaction cost advantages accruing to MNEs through internationalization, including
global market knowledge and the significant benefits of risk-diversification (Dunning,
1993). Locational (L), or country specific advantages, are derived from specific hostcountry endowments in which MNEs operate (Dunning 1980). These economic,
political, and social location-specific endowments generate comparative advantages
resulting from the host country’s specific characteristics in which MNEs invest.
Internalization (I) advantages result when MNEs choose wholly owned methods of
entry to secure ownership advantages rather than joint-venture structures, licensing, or
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outright selling to local market firms. MNEs are expected to develop competitive
domestic ownership advantages prior to international expansion, which is in turn
dependent on location advantages to internalize ownership advantages through FDI.
The OLI paradigm therefore seeks to link ownership and internalization
theories through a location advantage, where MNEs decide on the location of their
investment to internalize the ownership advantages available. Often these decisions
are influenced by natural and other endowments of the country, including the
institutional, legal, political, and cultural environments (Dunning 1993). Dunning
therefore provides a bridge between the emerging and modern transactional related
theories of Teece (1986) and Casson (1985, 1987), who apply Dunning’s eclectic
paradigm as a ‘holistic model’, expanding the OLI paradigm to include dynamic
markets and advantages and alternative modalities of international production.
Building on the resource-based view (Barney, 1956), Voyer and Beamish
(2004) suggest that the trust and commitment required for building international
operations through foreign investments including FDI are impacted by perceptions of
corruption in host countries.15
This introduction of the notion of corruption and its influence on FDI serves to
extend Dunning’s OLI paradigm, whilst Boddewyn (1988) suggests that MNEs can

15

The study conducted by Voyer and Beamish (2004) included an econometric study analyzing some
30,000 Japanese investments in 59 countries. Primary objectives were to “examine the extent to which
corruption exists and how it impacts FDI in an economy,” and “to analyze if the type of economy
(emerging / industrialized) made an impact on the level of Japanese investment in light of the level of
corruption.”
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reduce risk associated with FDI by researching and developing a better understanding
of corruption generally and in the host countries. Additional research by Habib and
Zurawicki (2002) found that corruption materially influences levels of FDI, therefore
impacting MNE decisions on where to locate (L). Overall the relationship between
corruption and FDI has been well documented in the literature (Bryant & Javalgi,
2016; Habib & Zurawicki, 2002; Mauro, 1997; Voyer & Beamish, 2004), although
research has also found evidence in favor of greasing the wheels, resulting in
beneficial economic activity, under certain conditions.
Research also suggests that economies in transition, record both higher levels
of corruption and also high levels of foreign direct investment, since investors in
transition economies prefer to deal with arbitrary, rather than “pervasive corruption”
(Cuervo-Cazurra 2008. p.12).
Anti-corruption laws are designed to impact the supply of bribes by foreign
investors, through increasing the costs of bribing abroad (OECD, 2010). These have
the impact of increasing costs and which result in foreign investors being increasingly
sensitive to corruption. This may in turn impact their investment decisions and result
in a reduction in investments into corrupt countries.
To be effective and sustainable, the legislation, resourcing, and implementation
of these ACL measures needs to be coordinated with other countries and multi-lateral
international organizations including the OECD and the UN (Getz, 2006; OECD,
2010).
In the absence of such coordination, investors would have incentives to
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circumvent these uncoordinated regulatory measures, when investors from
other countries would not be subject to similar regulatory constraints.
Méndez and Sepúlveda (2006) and Aidt (2009) suggest, in their empirical
studies, that in countries with high levels of governance and low levels of corruption,
the beneficial effects of corruption in fact outweigh the impacts. Their analysis
suggests that investors from countries which have implemented the OECD Convention
on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business
Transactions of 1997 (OECD, 2010), actually reduced their investments in countries
whose corruption levels were measured as “corrupt” (p. 634). Equally US investors,
bound by the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, as amended, similarly reduced
their investments in countries that were deemed corrupt, after the OECD Anti-Bribery
Convention was ratified and implemented.
Research provides evidence in favor of greasing-the-wheels view, by testing
whether corruption reduces the impact of regulations on entrepreneurship in highly
regulated economies (Dreher, 2007). Results found that corruption, within the sample,
is beneficial in highly regulated economies, where “at the maximum level of
regulation among the sample of countries, corruption significantly increased
entrepreneurial activity” (p. 3). Dreher’s results thus provide support for the greasethe-wheels hypothesis. Studies by Méon and Sekkat (2005) and Méon and Weill
(2010) also stress the “potential importance of corruption in greasing the wheels of an
economy.” However, the majority of the literature reviewed and summarized above,
finds no evidence in favor of the greasing the wheels hypothesis. Corruption is found
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to adversely impact economic growth by impairing domestic investment, discouraging
foreign direct investment, resulting in increased government deficits, impacting the
composition of government spending Wei (2000). It may therefore be difficult to find
broad support for the notion that corruption increases economic growth, although
focusing on the modes of entry of firms, may provide some support, as discussed
below.
Leff (1964) suggests that, where governments have erred in their policy
decisions or are too rigid in their administrations, corruption may in fact present better
alternatives in the choices made by individuals and companies. A society with a rigid,
over-centralized, dishonest bureaucracy is seen as preferable to one with a “rigid,
over-centralized, honest bureaucracy” (Huntington, 1968). However, notwithstanding
these findings, the large majority of the literature reviewed finds little or no evidence
in favor of the greasing the wheels hypothesis, as demonstrated aptly by the metaanalysis of Campos et al. (1999). Arguably, while it might be difficult to conclude that
corruption increases economic growth sustainably, focusing on the type of market
entry may provide a different conclusion, since the effect would be directly
determinable for a smaller unit of observation.
Research by Egger and Winner (2006) found that a relationship exists between
corruption and FDI, suggesting that the helping-hand effects of corruption are
outweighed by the grabbing-hand effects (p. 460). In addition, whilst corruption is
important for intra-OECD FDI rather than for extra-OECD FDI, growth of FDI in
non-OECD economies is driven primarily “by economic growth and a change in factor
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endowments and to a lesser extent by corruption and its underlying grabbing-hand and
helping-hand effects”.16 Perhaps surprisingly, they find that the impact of corruption
has in fact “declined over the years,” and suggesting that other factors including
market growth have played a more influential role than corruption.
Understanding the broader role of FDI demands an insight into the framework
guiding governance in the economies in which the investments occur. For example,
international FDI policies may be more relevant to developing countries where
stipulations are included, mandating host countries to reduce corruption levels to
specific targets and hence maximize the effectiveness of the investment (Delgado et
al., 2014). Research by Norbet (2015) suggests that the effect of FDI on levels of
corruption is impacted by the quality of the rule of law present in that a country’s
economy and that FDI flows may have material impacts on levels of corruption.
Research into bilateral FDI flows found that corruption negatively impacts FDI
when considering government regulations (Wei, 2000). These studies are further
supported by research by Habib and Zurawicki (2002), Lambsdorff (2003), and Voyer
and Beamish (2004), all suggesting the same negative relationship between levels of
corruption and FDI.
However, other studies by Delios et al. (2005) and Hines (1995) were unable to
confirm a relationship between corruption and foreign direct investment, whilst Peng

16

These concepts are referred to as the greasing-the-wheels (Leff, 1964; Dreher & Gassebner, 2007)
where corruption seen as beneficial to economic performance under certain conditions and sand-in-thewheels (Méon & Sekkat, 2005; Shleifer & Vishny, 1993; Rose-Ackerman, 1999) where it is suggested
that corruption inhibits economic performance, under certain conditions.
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and Beamish (2008) note that despite these findings, the foreign investment decisions
exercised by companies may not have been impacted, notwithstanding the levels of
national corruption in host countries. Research by Hines (1995) into levels of
corruption in host countries suggests that levels of inward foreign investment are not
affected, with the exception of United States investors.
When researching the ability of countries to attract foreign direct investment,
Wei (2000) found that US investors “were no more averse to corruption than investors
in countries without anti-corruption legislation” (p. 21) and outside the reach of the
US’s FCPA regime.
High levels of corruption and FDI have been shown to coexist, where the
impact of FDI on corruption is dependent on the quality of governance Norbet (2005),
particularly the rule of law, as indicated in the research by Cuervo-Cazurra (2008).
However, Habib and Zurawicki’s (2002) empirical study, analyzing the
relationships between corruption and bilateral foreign investment flows on the one
hand, and on the impact of the home vs host country corruption levels on foreign
investment on the other, suggest the level of perceived corruption is strongly
significant with regard to bilateral FDI flows. Their study further suggests that the
greater the variance in the levels of perceived corruption, measured by CPI, between
the home vs host country, the greater the significant impact on bilateral investments
between the countries.
Research suggests that FDI flows directly impact economic growth and where
levels of corruption impact FDI flows, these will result in an impact on economic
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growth (Mauro, 1997, 1995)17, indicating that the large magnitude of the effects on
economic growth occur through the effects of investments. Of particular relevance to
this study, research by Keefer and Knack (1995) indicates that governance, or
institutional variables, have a significant direct effect on economic growth, in addition
to the indirect effects though foreign investments, suggested by Mauro (1995).
Corruption and Economic Growth
Countries with higher levels of corruption show lower levels of economic
growth (Mauro, 1995) and distorted government expenditure (Mauro, 1998); hence
introducing measures aimed at reducing corruption is important for the development
of a country’s economy. (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2008).
However, research on the economic growth consequences of corruption
suggest the relationship between economic growth and corruption is not necessarily
linear (Mauro, 1995; Paldam, 2002; Wei, 2000) and in fact is conditional on the
quality of governance and is regime specific (Aidt et al., 2008). Their study indicates
that in countries with higher quality government institutions and hence levels of
governance18, corruption was found to have a “substantial negative impact” on growth
(p. 213). Those countries with lower quality institutions and hence lower levels of

17

Mauro’s study (1995) observed that in an analysis using corruption indices, a one standard deviation
increase in the CPI (a reduction in perceived corruption) resulted in an increase in investments equal to
5% of GDP and the annual rate of GDP growth to increase by 0.5 %.
18

Whilst governance is difficult to measure empirically, a number of widely utilized indices exist. The
study utilizes an established measure of governance, the Heritage Foundation’s Index of Economic
Freedom (IEF) (Olson, 2014), in the determination of the levels of governance as detailed in the
Methodology section in Chapter 3.
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governance were found to have experienced no impact on their economic growth. In
addition, countries with higher levels of governance and quality of their institutions,
and who experienced rapid economic growth recorded reduced levels of corruption
when compared with countries with lower levels of governance.
These anomalies are also relevant to the research on the greasing- or sand-thewheels19 views of the relationships between levels of corruption and the resultant socio
and economic impacts. Studies suggest that the relationship between levels of
corruption and economic growth is in fact quadratic and dependent on the degree of
governance and political freedom (Méndez & Sepúlveda, 2006). Their empirical study
indicates that low levels of corruption benefit long-run economic growth, whereas in
cases of higher corruption levels, long term economic growth is impacted, suggesting
that a growth maximizing threshold of corruption levels may exist.20 When evaluating
the relationship between levels of corruption and governance, corruption was found to
be harmful to growth when governance was weak (Méon & Sekkat, 2005).

19

Mauro (1995), like previous studies, found a negative effect of corruption on both growth and
investment suggesting a sand-the-wheels view, reflecting the negative economic impact of corruption.
Méon and Sekkat (2005) found that corruption has a negative impact on growth independently from its
impact on investment. However, these impacts were found to vary depending on the quality of
governance, where the impact worsened when governance deteriorated. This also supports the sand-thewheels view on corruption. The grease-the-wheels view (Leff, 1964; Dreher & Gassebner, 2007)
postulates that corruption may help compensate for bad governance and may result in higher levels of
economic growth under certain conditions.
20

Research by Okada and Samreth (2014) into the effect of FDI on economic growth in 130 countries
between 1995-2008 suggests that “whilst FDI alone does not promote economic growth, it has a
significant effect on economic growth when considering the interaction term” (p.215). Specifically, the
existence of a corruption threshold suggests that FDI negatively impacts economic growth in countries
below the threshold but positively impacts growth in countries above the threshold.
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Studies on the relationship between economic growth and corruption indicate
that economic growth, measured by GDP per capita, is one of the most important
economic factors influencing corruption (Ades & DiTella, 1996, 1999). Yet further
studies have found a negative relationship between economic development and
corruption (Treisman, 2000; Getz & Volkema, 2001; Paldam, 2002), whilst other
studies have determined that economic development reduces corruption by increasing
the benefits of education and literacy (Treisman, 2000). Research has, however, found
that economic growth actually increases corruption in the short term before decreasing
it in the long term (Brown & Shackman, 2007).
When relating corruption and phases of modernization, research indicates that
corruption is most prevalent during the intense phases of modernization, primarily as a
result of the conflict between modern and traditional modes of behavior, resulting in
“the developing society being lost in in the absence of a legitimate norm” (Gillespie &
Okruhlik, 1991). This resultant vacuum opens opportunities for behavior that is not
based on any particular norm and without reference to a particular set of values. In
addition, as was evident in Russia in the early 1990s (Brock, 2005), modernization
gives rise to corruption through the creation of new economically empowered groups
seeking to exchange money for political power.
Furthermore, Gillespie and Okruhlik (1991) found that the increase in
government regulations increases the opportunities for corruption, particularly where
effective political parties are absent in the political system. However, it appears that
prioritizing economic development, as an important economic condition, may be less
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efficient in reducing levels of corruption unless it also addresses other economic
factors.
Research by Mauro (1997) on the impact of host country corruption on
economic growth concluded that corruption, as measured by Transparency
International’s Business International Index (2010), lowered private investment and
negatively impacted economic growth. In addition, corruption that lowered profits on
capital invested was found to be strongly and negatively correlated with the rate of
investment, irrespective of the level of host country bureaucracy.
Despite some contradictory research findings on the extent of the impact of
corruption on FDI (Bryant & Javalgi, 2016, p. 441), the case appears conclusive in
supporting the view that corruption impacts the nature and determination of foreign
investment flows, impacting economic growth in the host country. Countries and
institutions, having recognized this relationship and its broader impacts, have therefore
instituted numerous far ranging measures to begin addressing the challenges faced as a
result of international corruption.
Macro-economic theory describes economic growth to also include the value
of international trade flows in addition to consumption and investment expenditure
(Dowrick et al., 2004). The impact of corruption on investment and economic growth
can therefore also be expected to impact trade flows.
Corruption and Trade
International trade has been found to reduce corruption (Treisman, 2000)
“while long-lived aspects of countries’ cultural or institutional traditions affect the
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level of perceived corruption even more than current state policies”
(Friedman, 2010. p.17)
Research into the relationship between nation’s levels of corruption and
international trade (Lambsdorff, 1998) indicates that certain countries enjoy a
competitive advantage when trading with countries perceived to be corrupt.21 This
may be due to the differences in the willingness of exporters to offer bribes whilst
taking advantage of the lack of coordination in the implementation of anti-corruption
measures, as was evident following the imposition of the US’s FCPA in 1977 (Hines,
1995). The results of these studies therefore indicate that exporting countries must
share part of the responsibility for the level of bribery in international trade (Norbet,
2015, p. 283). Research focusing on the relationship between levels of corruption and
international trade by de Jong and Bogmans (2011) suggests strong support for the
view that corruption reduces the volume of international trade, where corruption is
found to be correlated with corrupt activities at the border (p. 386). However,
empirical support for the relationship between the extension of international trade and
corruption remains tenuous (Treisman, 2000).
Corruption and Governance
“…a country’s degree of perceived corruption is correlated with determinants
of the institutional environment…” (Egger & Winner, 2005).

21

Lambsdorff’s study (1998) on bilateral trade data (1992-1995) for the leading 18 exporting and 87
importing countries found that, under certain conditions, Belgium, France, Italy, The Netherlands, and
South Korea all had competitive advantages in countries perceived to be corrupt. Australia, Sweden,
and Malaysia were found to have competitive disadvantages in corrupt countries.
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Empirical research suggests that the relationship between the role of
governance, defined as the process of making decisions which define expectations,
systems, and management (Hakimi, 2014) and corruption, is consistently correlated
(Butkiewicz & Yanikkaya, 2006). Anti-corruption attempts are based on the premise,
largely shared in the literature, that good governance mechanisms have a positive
effect on economic performance but can also reduce the risk of fraud (Pietra & Melis,
2016).
Studies also indicate a relationship between corruption and economic growth,
including foreign investments and trade, and which is directly dependent on
governance (Dzhumashev, 2014; Qerimi & Sergio, 2012; Shleifer & Vishny, 1993).
Additionally, the studies reviewed suggest that determining the effectiveness of
corruption requires an insight into the economic impacts and demands an
understanding of the system of governance in which the economy and society operates
(Dzhumashev, 2014; Egger & Winner, 2005; Getz, 2006).
The important role of governance in determining the efficiency of ACL
measures provides the framework and resources for the efficient development and
implementation of anti-corruption measures (Dzhumashev, 2014). Aidt (2003)
suggests that institutional structures determine the degree of organization corruption
and where governance structures drive the incidence of corruption. Yet other
researchers suggest that corruption alters the effectiveness of institutions on an
economy and hence impact economic growth and economic freedom (Acemoglu &
Verdier, 2000; Aidt, 2009; Keefer & Knack, 1997).
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Whilst definitions of governance vary, three common characteristics are
generally agreed to as principles of governance (Ruhanen et al., 2010). Governance
and government are seen as distinct, where the former implies less government control
and predictability and involves multiple stakeholders and their relationship
management (Kooiman, 1993; Rhodes, 1997). Key elements of governance identified
in the Ruhanen study (2010), suggest effectiveness, efficiency, accountability,
transparency, and rule of law as key dimensions.22 This study establishes the
relationship between these elements of governance and the dimensions of the
economic freedom index utilized so as to measure the extent of anti-corruption
legislation and implementation.23
Research also indicates a positive relationship between the component
dimensions of governance, measured by economic freedom and economic growth
(Ayal & Karras,1998; Gwartney et al., 2000; Carlsson & Lindstrom, 2002). However,
these studies did not extend their analysis to include the effects of economic freedom
on corruption.
Research into the relationships between economic freedom, corruption, and
economic growth (Swaleheen & Stansel, 2007), indicates, ceteris paribus, that when

22

The study (Ruhanen, 2010) reviewed 53 published governance articles and identified a total of 72
dimensions, eventually reduced to 40 separate definitions, defining the concept of governance. The
authors concluded that although the concept is multi-dimensional, its primary characteristics adequately
represented the field and its research.
23

Utilizing the Heritage Foundation (2018) Index of Economic Freedom (IEF) and its key dimensions
of rule of law and property rights, government capability and regulatory efficiency, as well as the extent
of market freedom permits the study to relate to the extent of ACL implementation in countries for
which data is obtained.
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levels of economic freedom are low, corruption has the effect of reducing economic
growth. However, when levels of economic freedom are high, economic growth
increases in response to the circumvention of government control24, supporting Leff’s
(1964) helping hand views. Therefore, in this view, the level of economic freedom is
found to moderate the relationship between corruption and economic growth.
The IMF has on numerous occasions advised countries to reduce regulatory
onus and improve transparency, thus improving their business climates (Gaspar &
Hagan, 2016). Hence, an anti-corruption strategy is seen to be only as effective as the
institution supporting it and the governance structure in which it functions.
When determining the impact of corruption on economic growth, research
indicates that the impact of corruption on economic growth worsens when indicators
of the quality of governance, and hence economic freedom, deteriorate (Méon and
Sekkat, 2005). An increase in the quality of institutions and governance reduced the
propensity for corruption is also indicated in research by Acemoglu et al. (2001).
Empirical research by Shleifer and Vishny (1993) suggests that the structure of
governance drives corruption and that low levels of governance impact levels of
corruption. Countries, in their efforts to legislate and implement anti-corruption
measures will need to address their levels of governance so as to provide the
supportive framework required to ensure the effectiveness and sustainability of the
24

Data from Transparency International (2017), Perceptions of Corruption Index (CPI), suggests that
although developing countries record higher perception of corruption, this is also true for advanced
economies where the bottom 15% of economies ranked lower than the top 15% of developed countries.
This would suggest that some developed countries, with higher levels of governance and economic
freedom, score lower on perceptions of corruption than some developing countries with lower levels of
governance and economic freedom (Gaspar & Hagan, 2016).
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ACL regime. Improving government institutions and the effectiveness of governance
is therefore a key component of structural reforms and a critical factor in the
sustainability of effective ACL measures (Kopits & Craig, 1998).
Empirical evidence reflects that, based on corruption index measures, richer
countries are perceived as having lower levels of corruption (Mauro, 1995), whilst
larger public sectors and extensive government intervention can be associated with
increased corruption (Tanzi, 1998). Other studies indicate that policies aimed at
improving transparency also help curb corruption and improve growth (Mauro, 2004).
Whilst transparency is a necessary condition for the proper functioning of the markets,
it is equally a core component of an effective anti-corruption policy (Kopits & Craig,
1998).
The question is therefore to what extent the effectiveness of anti-corruption
legislative measures, as part of governance, impacts the relationship between
corruption and economic performance, and whether these economic impacts can be
determined, in function of the extent of the ACL implementation.
Market opportunities are created when governments intervene in the markets
either as regulators or principal buyers (Rose-Ackerman, 1999). The reduced
opportunity cost and hence increased economic rent available to individuals and firms,
by circumventing bureaucratic regulatory environment, are presented in the form of
bribery payments, resulting in corruption. When economies prosper, these resultant
rents can be expected to grow, as regulations are increasingly circumvented (Glaeser
& Saks, 2006).
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Paldam (2002) in his research, found that the economic transition of nations
from poor to rich strongly reduces corruption, following a transition-trend toward less
corruption (p. 238). Periods of high inflation were found to result in increased
corruption, whilst differences between levels of economic growth in similar cultural
areas was smaller than the (relative) difference between the levels of corruption.
However, governance or the regulatory regime was found to be an important
component of the economic system, impacting inflation and the cultural variables in
this study. Countries with excessive regulation were found to exhibit low levels of
economic freedom, increased potential for rent seeking, and high levels of corruption.
These findings also concur with Treisman’s conclusions in his 2000 research,
discussed above.
Graeff and Mehlkop (2003) indicate that the magnitude and coefficient of
economic freedom varies depending upon the level of development, but that
corruption lowers economic freedom across all income groups, while economic
freedom levels only have a marginal impact on corruption in rich countries.25 Studies
by Goel and Nelson (2005) also identified a negative relationship between dimensions
of governance and corruption whilst research by Yamarik and Redmon, (2017)
suggests that the relationship between corruption and economic freedom is robustly
negative for all development and income levels.

25

The researchers performed a cross-sectional regression using 1995 World Bank income classification
data delimitated into countries into poor (low and low-middle-income) and rich (high-middle and highincome).
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Research also suggests a link between governance, size of government, and
levels of corruption, specifically where the ability of government to contain corruption
is driven by the quality of governance (Blackburn et al., 2006; Haque & Kneller,
2009). Empirical studies by Butkiewicz and Yanikkaya (2006) further indicates that
the relationship between corruption and the different measures of the quality of
governance is consistently negative, including compliance and bribery. Similarly, they
found that the quality of governance also drives public sector efficiency and therefore
impacts the optimal size of public spending.26 Yet further studies lend additional
support to this notion by suggesting that corruption distorts both the burden of the
public sector driven by the quality of the institutions, that is governance, and the
productive inputs generated by the public sector (Mauro, 1995; Keefer & Knack,
2002). These findings therefore suggest that corruption affects economic performance
through inefficient government spending, an important component of governance, as
will be discussed below.
These findings, seen jointly, thus suggest the existence of a relationship
between governance and corruption (Blackburn et al., 2006; Butkiewicz & Yanikkaya,
2006; Haque & Kneller, 2009). Equally, the findings suggest the relationship between
corruption and economic growth is directly dependent on the level of governance,

26

Research findings on the relationship between corruption and government size appear inconsistent.
On the one hand, studies suggest that where government size is related to the degree and inefficiency of
regulation, increases in government result in increased rent-seeking and corruption (Goel & Nelson,
1998; Rose-Ackerman, 1999). However, where size of government is indicative of its ability to control
corruption and accountability, increases in government can be expected to reduce corruption (La Porta
et al., 1999)
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given its link to corruption, and indirectly dependent on public sector expenditure, as
impacted by corruption (Dzhumashev, 2014).27
Anti-Corruption Legislation Implementation
Determining the extent of the implementation of a country’s anti-corruption
regime and measures requires an understanding of the process followed by countries
as they deploy their resources, policies, and procedures aimed at tackling corruption
(Olson, 2014). Countries have had the benefit of the development of international
multi-lateral frameworks, including the UN (2004) and OECD (2010) Conventions as
well as major national ACL regimes, such as the US’s FCPA (1997, 2017) and the
UK’s ABAC (2017), from which to develop and frame their national ACL measures.
In order to develop and implement sustainable measures, these need to be adequately
resourced (Mauro, 1995) and implemented (Transparency International, 2017).
Countries can therefore be expected to follow the process of legislating anticorruption laws in response to growing national and international corruption
developments and following international guidelines and measures (Svensson, 2005).
Once legislated, countries will need to then resource these legislated measures through
appropriate national budget allocations in order to provide the means through which
the measures can be implemented. It is however the implementation of these legislated
and resourced measures that ultimately determines the extent of the impact on the

27

The author in his 2014 study suggests that, where government size and hence the extent of
government expenditure reflects its control of corruption and accountability, an increase in government
expenditure “should curb corruption” (p. 203). However, it is conceded that this inconsistency may
result from the interaction between the quality of governance with both corruption and the size of
government and fiscal expenditure.
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established relationship between a nation’s corruption levels and economic
performance and governance (Getz, 2006; Pietra & Melis, 2016).
Levels of corruption have been found to be strongly correlated to levels of
economic freedom, as a measure of governance (Graeff & Mehlkop, 2003). However,
research indicates the existence of a strong relationship between the degree of
economic freedom and the ability of governments to legislate, oversee, and implement
policies (Getz, 2006). Identifying the component dimensions of governance though the
measurement of economic freedom, as outlined above, assists this study to gauge the
extent of the implementation of a nation’s ACL measures.
Measures of Governance
Measures of governance gauging the extent of economic freedom principally
focus on the critical dimensions of the extent of the rule of law, and of government
resources, the efficiency of the regulatory framework in which society functions, and
the openness or accessibility of the financial and trade markets (Olson, 2014).
The quality of governance has been determined using a number of different
indices and methods (Butkiewicz & Yanikkaya, 2006; Keefer & Knack, 2007;
Dzhumashev, 2014). Keefer and Knack (2007) analyzed the efficiency of governance
using measures of bureaucratic quality, corruption, and law and order where
bureaucratic quality measures ‘the extent to which the bureaucracy is immune from
changes in government policy, while law and order assess the strength and
impartiality of the legal system and the extent to which the law is observed’ (p.566). It
is argued that a composite governance indicator is a direct measure of governments’
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incentives to seek rents and to avoid establishing institutions that would inhibit their
ability to seek rents.
A number of governance indices including the World Bank Governance Index
(WGI), the World Economic Forum Global Competitiveness Index (GCI), The Frazer
Institute Economic Freedom Index (EFI), and the Heritage Foundation Index of
Economic Freedom (IEF) measure governance and its component parts, including
those factors directly related and impacting the legislation, resourcing, and
implementation of anti-corruption legislation. Literature support for these governance
indices is also prevalent (Altman, 2013; Norbet, 2015; Olson, 2014; Peterson, 2013;
Qerimi, 2014).
The two indices of economic freedom most utilized as independent 28 measures
of economic freedom are the Heritage Foundation’s Index of Economic Freedom29 and
the Fraser Institute’s Economic Freedom of the World Index.30 A review of each
Institute’s reports for the period researched, 2011-16, indicates that both governance
indices are comparable in their definitions, whilst their measures of economic freedom
may vary.

28

Independent signifying research is not associated with the institution from where the index originates
i.e., World Bank and Word Economic Forum.
29

Heritage Foundation (2011-18) Index of Economic Freedom, first published in 1995, analyzes
economic policy developments related to economic freedom in 186 economies.
30

Fraser Institute (2018), Economic Freedom of the World Index, first published in 1996, measures the
degree to which the policies and institutions of countries are supportive of economic freedom.

61

This study utilizes the Heritage Foundation’s Index of Economic Freedom31
(IEF) due to greater country coverage and a more consistent aggregation procedure
(Heckelman & Stroup, 2005). The index also has broad literature support as a measure
of the extent of governance as indicated by its authors (Olson, 2016) and as further
indication of the extent of the legislation, resourcing, and implementation of anticorruption laws (ACL) in countries. The dimensions of economic freedom as measured
and aggregated by the IEF index, the Rule of Law, Government Size, Regulatory
Efficiency, and Openness of Markets have been shown to be relevant to the
implementation of legislation (Altman, 2013; Apergis et al., 2012; Carlsson &
Lundstrom, 2002; Goel, 2005; Graeff & Mehlkop, 2003; Norbet, 2015; Opper, 2004;
Olson, 2014; Peterson, 2013; Qerimi & Sergi, 2014; Yamarik & Redmon, 2017).
The IEF Index analysis and data are useful in measuring and benchmarking
economic and institutional impacts as laws and policies, including anti-corruption
measures, are implemented (Peterson, 2013). Research by Graeff and Mehlkop (2003)
into the impact of state regulation on the incidence of corruption indicates that the IEF
index measures “forms of regulations in order to describe economic freedom as the
absence of regulation” (p.614). Their findings indicate that regulations decrease
corruption by increasing the “transaction costs of corruption” (p.615); however, since
the size of government cannot be equated with the level of corruption, research needs

31

The IEF index measure four dimensions and ten components of economic freedom, grading each
component from 0-100, where 100 indicates maximum freedom. The ten components are then averaged
for each country (Qerimi & Sergi, 2012).
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to address government’s legal and institutional capacity to legislate, oversee, and
implement anti-corruption measures.
Economic freedom, as a measure of governance, should be a guiding principle
for policy makers (Olson, 2014). The Index of Economic Freedom (Heritage
Foundation, 2011-18) permits researchers to gauge the effectiveness of governance
and to determine whether policies are successful or not, whilst also assisting in
measuring the progress of the establishment of effective and efficient institutions. The
index has value as a statistical measurement tool, but also as an objective and detailed
research material for reference and analysis on governance across the world.
Governance indices have played a major role in the measurement and determination of
public and private policy outcomes, including the rule of law and control of
corruption, regulatory efficiency, government expenditure and resource efficiency, and
the openness of the markets (Olson, 2014).
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Table 2. Index of Economic Freedom (IEF) Dimensions and Components
ACL degree of
Implementation
ACL
Status

ACL measurement

Description
1.

ACL1

Legislated

3.
1.

ACL2

Legislated &
Resourced

2.
3.
1.
2.

ACL3

Legislated,
Resourced &
Implemented

IEF Sub-Components of broad
governance
Rule of Law
Property Rights
Business Freedom
Regulatory Efficiency Labor Freedom
Monetary Freedom
Rule of Law
Property Rights
Government Spending
Government Size
Fiscal Freedom
Business Freedom
Regulatory Efficiency Labor Freedom
Monetary Freedom
Rule of Law
Property Rights
Government Spending
Government Size
Fiscal Freedom
Business Freedom
Regulatory Efficiency Labor Freedom
Monetary Freedom
Trade Freedom
Open Markets
Investment Freedom
Financial Freedom
IEF Dimensions

3.

4.

Source: Heritage Foundation (2011-16).

Research by Goel and Nelson (2005) analyzes how governance, measured by
levels of IEF economic freedom, including the four dimensions, impacts corruption.
Their research suggests a negative relationship between governance, measured by
economic freedom and corruption.
The IEF Index captures a number of institutional aspects impacting economic
freedom in countries. The index focusses on four dimensions of economic freedom
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ranging from the rule of law, regulatory efficiency, the extent of government size and
resources, to the openness of markets.
Rule of law
The rule of law dimension of governance represents a measure of the extent to
which a country’s laws protect private property rights and the extent to which these
laws are respected. The more effective the legal protection of property rights, the
greater the adherence to the rule of law (Olson, 2014). Where, for example, increased
propensity for government expropriation of property and assets exists or where the
independence of the judiciary is impaired, the lower the adherence, economic
freedom, and hence efficiency of governance.
One of the most important factors stimulating corruption is the poor regulation
of the property rights system, where a lack of governance and government regulations
results in increased corruption in less developed countries. (Pieroni & D’Agostino,
2013). In many developing countries, informal systems exist where a complex set of
mutual relationships between public actors, including politicians, law enforcement,
and the judiciary, replaces one of functional property rights (Cheloukhine & King,
2007).
The ability of the legal system to protect property rights is suggested to impact
corruption, whereas its failure to enforce contracts, in fact undermines the efficient
operation of the markets whilst reducing incentives and potential economic rents to
participating agents (Senior, 2006; Opper, 2005). Governance, which provides for
efficient property rights, therefore not only limits the scope for corruption but also
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strengthens incentives for private monitoring and provides instruments of selfregulation (Opper, 2005).
The increased transaction costs of corruption, resulting from improved drafted
and resourced regulations, were also found to be related to government’s ability to
legislate, oversee, and implement policies, including anti-corruption regulations
(Graeff & Mehlkop, 2003), providing additional support for the existence of a strong
relationship between governance, economic freedom, and corruption.32
The relationship between a nation’s legal system to effectively protect property
rights and the resultant reduction in levels of corruption is established (Acemoglu &
Verdier, 1998). However, the failure of the same legal system to effectively enforce
the rule of law and hence contracts, undermines the free market and increases the
incentives for agents to participate in rent-seeking activities resulting in increases in
corruption (Pieroni & D’Agostino, 2013). The inclusion of institutional variables in
the study of governance has its theoretical basis in the premise that property rights are
key to the effective channeling of resources towards investment rather than towards
unproductive rent-seeking activities (North, 1990). This transaction cost approach
stresses the indirect effect of promoting economic growth through investment,
complemented by the direct effect of changes in factor productivity, being derived
from a reduction in transaction costs (Fabro & Aixala, 2012).

32

The 2003 study using the IEF index measured “forms of regulations in order to describe economic
freedom as the absence of regulation” to support the relationship between rule of law and regulatory
efficiency and corruption (p.614).
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Research into the relationship between the rule of law and levels of foreign
investment (FDI) suggests corruption may either increase or decrease depending on
the interaction of FDI and the rule of law (Norbet, 2015) and where the effect of FDI
on corruption is moderated by the quality of the rule of law. Opper (2004) found that
the perceived level of national corruption (CPI) is significantly constrained by
efficient property rights and government intervention.33 In their study into the
relationship between the rule of law, public investments, and economic growth, Keefer
and Knack (1997) determined that levels of public investment are significantly higher
in countries with low-quality governance, specifically the rule of law, corruption, and
bureaucratic quality. Their evidence suggests that the institutional variables, as
proxies for limited government, are associated with lower levels of corruption and
public investment, consistent with conclusions in Acemoglu’s (2005) study on the
effects of limited government. Their conclusion that the quality of governance, as
measured using their composite index34, can be seen as a direct measure of the
incentives of governments to seek rents rather than establishing institutions limit their
ability to seek these rents (p. 567).
Empirical research into the relationships between corruption and governance
indicate a large and significant relationship between the ability of a nation’s legal

33

Opper’s study (2004) concluded that levels of perceived of national corruption (CPI) were
significantly constrained at the 1% level by efficient property rights and government intervention at the
10% level, measured using the Heritage Foundation’s Index of Economic Freedom.
34

The author’s study created an additive index of the “quality of governance” including bureaucratic
quality, risk of expropriation and contract repudiation, corruption, and law and order.
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system to protect property rights and enforce contracts (Pieroni & D’Agostino, 2013).
Improvements in the quality of governance were identified where the confiscation of
property or the repudiation of contracts was effectively controlled and which resulted
in positive externalities (Pieroni & D’Agostino, 2013).
Size of Government
The second dimension, relating the extent of government resources and the
fiscal burden of taxation, is an important measure in determining capacity for policy
implementation. The extent of fiscal freedom, resulting from overall direct and indirect
taxation levels and the burden of government expenditure, determines the efficiency of
the deployment of public finances and resources (Olson, 2014). As such, the greater
burden of taxation and levels of government expenditure result in unsustainable budget
deficits, the accumulation of expensive public debt, and impaired economic growth
and investment opportunities for foreign investors. Monetarist economists refer to this
phenomenon as the crowding out effect, where increased deficits result in higher
interest rates, thus reducing or crowding out private investment and reducing economic
growth (Hudson, 2011).35

35

An increase in the deficit, either from an increase in government spending or a reduction in taxation,
results in an increase in aggregate demand, impacting output, employment, and growth. Where an
economy operates at close to full capacity, increased government borrowing required to finance
increased deficits results in higher interest rates, crowding out, private investment, and reducing
economic growth. Deficits thus have the impact on growth and capital formation, being costlier. In the
case of excess capacity, rather than full capacity, increased government borrowing to finance higher
deficits does not lead to higher interest rates, nor the crowding out of private investment, since higher
aggregate demand arising from the increased deficit boosts employment and output directly, increasing
income and economic activity, in turn attracting or crowding in additional private investment and
expenditure (Hudson, 2011).
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Additional support can be found in research indicating that the size of
government is robustly negatively related to economic growth where a nation’s legal
structure is found to be strongly and positively related, suggesting the economic
benefits of efficient government resources and regulatory efficiency (Carlsson &
Lundstrom, 2003). Government size can also be regarded as an indicator of fiscal
regulation and hence governance, although corruption is more affected by the legal
structures in a country and therefore by the manner in which the state supports the rule
of law (Tanzi, 2000). As can be expected, the organization of the regulatory framework
and infrastructure benefits for centralized resources, assisting the coordination efforts
and reducing duplication (Heineman & Heiman, 2006).36 Qerimi and Sergi (2014)
found that a higher degree of economic freedom, including the efficient
implementation of the rule of law and a sustainable size of government, is positively
related to regulatory efficiency, improving the effectiveness of anti-corruption
legislation measures.37
Regulatory efficiency
The third dimension of the governance measured by the IEF, regulatory
efficiency, measures the levels of the business, labor, and monetary freedom
dimensions of governance, guiding the legal, regulatory, and infrastructure

36

The 2006 study found that only 13 out of 24 countries surveyed (54%) in the corruption study, using
CPI, had centralized resources, whilst major countries – Germany, Italy, UK, and Japan – did not.
37

The authors include the following definitions in their study: severity of corruption, efficiency of tax
administration, and overall bureaucratic efficiency, the rule of law, the extent of civil liberties, and the
predictability of policymaking, including other measures such as the need to maintain a balanced budget
(p. 69).
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environments as well as the extent of price stability and inflationary pressures
impacting economic activity. The interaction between the effects of the convergence
between the rule of law and contract enforceability, in an effective regulatory
framework, was found to be both statistically and economically significant (Keefer &
Knack, 1997), suggesting the important role of regulatory efficiency is relevant to
effective legislation and implementation of anti-corruption laws.
Protection of employment, measured within labor freedom, a sub-index of
regulatory efficiency, was found to have the highest correlation to levels of corruption,
where employment regulations impact the process of agreement and expedite
corruptive practices (Pieroni & D’Agostino, 2013). These findings also support the
suggestion that other government regulations, including sales regulations and price
measures, were found to significantly impact the reduction in the levels of corruption,
suggesting that corruption can be explained by the variation in policies and
regulations. (Svensson, 2003).
Whereas research suggests a significant relationship between corruption and
state intervention (Treisman, 2000), additional findings indicate that policy decisions
may have little significant impact on corruption or that they work more slowly where a
distinct legal culture exists, governing the way laws are administered and enforced
(p.439).
Market openness
The fourth dimension of governance measured by the IEF index brings
together the trade, investment, and financial freedoms, essential for the efficient
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functioning of economies. The extent of market openness is measured by the barriers
to trade, including tariff and non-tariff barriers affecting both imports and exports of
goods and services.38 The ability to freely invest without constraints in the flows of
capital is represented by the investment freedom component, measuring the extent of
free movements of financial resources without restrictions. Many countries protect
their economies through a wide array of rules and restrictions on foreign and domestic
investments, including foreign exchange, aimed at protecting the current account of
their balance of payments (BOP) and others at the capital transfers, aimed at
protecting the capital account of the BOP. The stability and efficiency of a country’s
banking system makes up the third element of this financial freedom measure,
determining the extent of independence from government interference and control of a
nation’s financial sector.
Research indicates that the extent of current and capital controls, investment,
and land ownership restrictions is directly related to economic growth (Carlsson &
Lundstrom, 2003) and that the level of perceived corruption (CPI) is significantly
constrained by the extent of the freedom of trade (Opper, 2004). Using the IEF index,
further research (Pieroni & D’Agostino, 2013) suggests a relationship between the
extension of international trade and corruption, where the extent of trade regulation
increases corruption, as suggested by Ades and di Tella (1997, 1999). Openness to

38

The extent of non-tariff barriers includes quantity, price, regulatory, and customs restrictions as well
as direct government intervention, such as subsidies and other related aid. Tariff rate information is
sourced from the data published by the World Bank (Olson, 2014).
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trade was also found to be endogenous where exposure to imports is expected to
reduce corruption (Treisman, 2000).39
This study sets out to determine the impact of anti-corruption legislation on the
researched relationship between corruption and economic growth as well as foreign
investment and trade, whilst determining the extent of anti-corruption legislation
implementation using measures of economic freedom indices of governance. This
review of the literature supporting the relationships between governance, economic
freedom, and levels of corruption, serves to support the research questions posited,
specifically, the relationship between a nation’s extent and quality of governance, as
measured by the levels of economic freedom, including relevant ACL implementation
sub-components40, provide support for the proposed methodology in Chapter 3.

Questions that guide the research
Hypotheses
The hypotheses test the relationship between a nation’s levels of perceived
corruption (CPI) and its national economic performance in Hypothesis 1. The impact
of the legislation, resourcing, and implementation of a nation’s anti-corruption
measures on the relationships between CPI and economic performance, tested in

39

Although corrupt officials can be expected to create rent-seeking barriers to trade. The study found
that an increase from 0 to10% in the share of imports in Gross National Product resulted in a decrease
of between 0.1-0.2 points in levels of perceived corruption (CPI) (p. 435).
40

These sub-components of the four principal dimensions of the IEF Index include the extent of the rule
of law, efficiency of the regulatory framework, capacity of government to implement policy, and the
ability of the economy to effectively interact and trade with international trade and financial markets as
outlined in Table 2.
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hypotheses 1, are then tested in hypotheses 2, 3, and 4, utilizing the ACL constructs
proposed and described below.

Hypothesis 1
A nation’s level of corruption as measured by CPI is related to economic growth
(GDP) (H1A), foreign direct investment (FDI) (H1B), and trade (NTB) (H1C).
Hypothesis 1A (H1A) – CPI and GDP
The higher the level of perceived corruption in an economy, the lower the level of
economic growth, in that economy, as measured by GDP.
The relationship between CPI and GDP has extensive literature support (Getz &
Volkema, 2001; Mauro, 199541, 1996; Nguyen & Van Dijk, 2012; Paldam, 2002;
Rose-Ackerman, 1978, 1996, 1999; Treisman, 2000; Wei, 2000; Wilhelm, 2002)
indicating the existence of a relationship, mostly negative, save for the greasing-the
wheels theories (Dreher, 2013), suggesting that, under certain conditions, a positive
relationship may occur.
Equation GDP = c+x1+x2+e (DV=c+CPI+CV1+CV2+Cv3+e...)

_

CPI

GDP

Figure 1. Hypothesis 1A

41

An example of Mauro’s study (1995) observed that, in an analysis using CPI and GDP, a one
standard deviation increase in CPI (a reduction in perceived corruption) resulted in an increase in
investments equal to 5% of GDP and the annual rate of GDP growth to an increase of 0.5 %.
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Hypothesis 1B (H1B) – CPI and FDI
The higher the level of perceived corruption in an economy, the lower the level of
foreign direct investment as measured by FDI.
Research indicates the existence of a relationship between CPI, either using the
WGI or CPI indexes and FDI (Barassi & Zhou, 2012; Campos & Lien, 1999; Cuervo
Cazurra, 2008; Delgado et al., 2014; Habib & Zurawicki, 2002; Egger & Winner,
2005; Mauro, 1995, 1997, 1998; Mudambi et al., 2013; Wei, 1997, 2000). Research
indicates that using either the World Bank index of corruption (WGI) introduced by
Kaufmann, Kraay, and Zoido-Lobato (1999) and Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi
(2004) or using the CPI index results in the same conclusions with respect to the
relationship between corruption and FDI (Egger & Winner, 2005).
Equation FDI = c+x1+x2+e (DV=c+CPI+CV1+CV2+Cv3+e...)

_

CPI

FDI

Figure 2. Hypothesis 1B

Hypothesis 1C (H1C) – CPI and NTB
The higher the level of perceived corruption in an economy, the lower the level of
international trade as measured by NTB.
The relationship between corruption (CPI) and trade (NTB) is equally widely
researched and reported either as part of studies into the economic impacts of
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corruption including FDI and economic growth (Mauro, 1998) or as specific studies
on the impact of CPI on trade (Ades & DiTella, 1996, 1999; de Jong & Bogmans,
2011; Souza, 2012; Treisman, 2000). These studies confirm the relationship between
corruption and trade flows where corruption is predicted to impact the level of
international trade (de Jong et al., 2011)42.
Equation FDI = c+x1+x2+e (DV=c+CPI+CV1+CV2+Cv3+e...)

_

CPI

NTB

Figure 3. Hypothesis 1C

Hypothesis 2
The legislation of national anti-corruption legislative measures (ACL)
moderates the relationship between a nation’s level of corruption, as measured by CPI,
and its economic performance measured by GDP, FDI, and NTB.
Anti-Corruption Legislation Measures
Most national anti-corruption measures are built around international multilateral institutional regimes and adapted to national legal infrastructure and policies,
including the judiciary, law enforcement, and financial oversight authorities to enforce

42

The authors suggest that this relation may be impacted where the quality of customs is poor and the
tariff structure complicated resulting in parallel international trade, circumventing the regulations and
benefitting from the low opportunity costs. However, notwithstanding these opportunity cost incentives,
the overall uncertainty of corruption reinforces the view that corruption has an important negative
impact on trade.
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and strengthen public sector accountability (Svensson, 2005). Once legislated, these
national Anti-Corruption Laws (ACL), regulations, and policies need to be fully
resourced, both financially and operationally, to be effective and sustainable. This
resourcing typically requires appropriation within national budgets and the
appointment of the key oversight and monitoring resources (World Bank, 2013b). This
effective and sustainable implementation of the measures also requires complete and
coordinated deployment to avoid the loopholes explained above and to effectively
monitor activities and transactions under the ambit of the ACL regulations. This
deployment of the ACL regulatory framework and infrastructure benefits from
centralized resources, assisting the coordination efforts, and reduction of duplication
(Heineman & Heiman, 2006).

ACL Constructs
It is this combination of the specific steps in the legislation, followed by the
resourcing and implementation of Anti-Corruption Legislation (ACL) which
demarcates the important steps in the full development and deployment of ACL
measures in a country, as supported in the literature review of this study. This study
proposes three ACL constructs, relative to the level of their implementation, as
follows:
ACL1 - Anti-corruption laws legislated.
ACL2 - Anti-corruption laws legislated and resourced.
ACL3 - Anti-corruption laws legislated, resourced, and implemented.
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These three constructs are intended to be understood as supplementary to each.
That is, ACL2 represents an additional step to ACL1, being the resourcing of the
legislated measures taken by governments. Similarly, construct ACL3 supplements the
legislative steps in ACL1, the subsequent resourcing steps taken in ACL2 and the
crucial implementation steps required to give effect to the measures legislated and
resourced.
The impact of the legislation, resourcing, and implementation of anticorruption laws in a country is expected to moderate the relationships between
corruption and economic performance, depending on the extent and magnitude of the
ACL implementation, as suggested in the ACL1, 2, and 3 constructs below. It is
expected that the impact of the phased introduction and implementation of these ACL
measures on the relationship between corruption and national economic variables can
be measured and determined through testing the following three constructs:

Construct ACL 1
Legislation of Anti-Corruption Legislation
This measures the impact that a nation’s legislated ACL1 measures have on the
relationship between its level of corruption and economic performance, as measured by
economic growth (GDP), foreign investment (FDI) and trade (NTB). The relationships
between CPI and GDP (H1A), CPI and FDI (H1B), and CPI and NTB (H1C) are
outlined in Hypotheses H1A, H1B, and H1C above.
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Construct ACL1 measures a nation’s ability to legislate ACL measures aimed
at reducing levels of corruption (CPI) and its impact on the relationship between levels
of corruption and economic performance, as measured by the economic growth (GDP),
foreign investment (FDI), and trade (NTB) economic variables. The elements of this
construct are tested in Hypotheses H2A, H2B, and H2C.
The ACL1 construct, being the relationship between levels of governance,
measured by the governement’s ability to legislate laws, has literature support (Graeff
& Norbet, 2003) as summarized in Table 3 below. Government’s ability to legislate
and enforce these ACL laws, as measured by the extent of regulatory efficiency, is also
indicated in the research. Studies by Graeff and Mehlkop (2003) and Keefer and Knack
(1997) suggest that the effects of convergence of the rule of law and contract
enforceabilty are both statistically and economically significant.
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Table 3. ACL1 Construct, definitions & research support
Degrees of ACL
Implementation

IEF Component
measuring ACL
implementation

Construct
Relationships

Research validity for relationships Governance, Corruption & Economic
Performance

Authors

Rule of Law

Governance
(Rule of Law),
CPI, GDP, FDI &
NTB

• Graeff & Mehlkop (2003): Research suggests Altman ( 2013);
strong relation between economic freedom Apergis et al. (2012);
link to government's ability to legislate,
Carlsson & Lundstrom
oversee and implement ACL.
(2003); Goel et al.
Strong correlation between CPI & economic (2005); Graeff et al.
freedom, using IEF.
(2003); Keefer &
• Norbet (2015): Corruption increases or
Knack (1997); Norbet
decreases depending on the interaction of
(2015); Opper (2004);
FDI and rule of law. Government increases
Peterson (2013);
revenue from corruption by increasing the
Pieroni & D'Agostino
level of investor protection, i.e rule of law.
(2013); Qerimi et al.
Concludes effect of FDI on Corruption is
(2014); Yamarik &
moderated by the quality of the rule of law Redmon (2017); Wei
(p.281).
(2000).
• Keefer & Knack (1997): Found impact of rule
of law on GDP through property rights.
• Opper (2004): Confirms CPI significantly
constrained by efficient property rights and
government intervention, using IEF.
• Pieroni & D’Agostino (2013). Research
suggests, lack of government regulations
yields more corruption in less developed
countries, whereas standard recipes for
greater freedom can be applied in developed
countries (p.70).

Regulatory
Efficiency

Governance
(Regulatory
Efficiency), CPI,
GDP, FDI & NTB

• Graeff & Mehlkop (2003): Research suggest
strong relation between economic freedom
link to government's ability to legislate,
oversee and implement ACL.
• Keefer & Knack (1997): Effects of
convergence of the rule of law and contract
enforceabilty, interaction both statistically
and economically significant (p.597).
• Treisman (2000) Research, using Freedom
House ratings, policy decisions have little
significant impact on CPI, distinct 'legal
culture' governing the way laws administered
& enforced linked to heritage (p.439).
corruption.
• Yamarik & Redmon (2017) Research
indicates that each of the regulatory
parameters measured corresponded to
component of economic freedom using IEF.

Construct ACL1.
Legislation of
Anti-Corruption
Measures
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Abed & Gupta (2002),
Ades & DiTella (1996),
Keefer & Knack (1997,
1995), Lambsdorff
(2007), Mudambi et
al. (2013 p.496),
Treisman (2000).

Hypothesis 2A (H2A) – ACL1, CPI, and GDP
The legislation of anti-corruption laws (ACL1), moderates the relationship
between a nation’s levels of corruption and economic growth, as measured by GDP,
such that the relationship is weakened.
Equation GDP = c+x1+x2+x3x4+e (DV=c+CPI+MV1+ CV1+CV2+Cv3+e...)

ACL 1

CPI

_

GDP

Figure 4. Hypothesis 2A

Having measured the impact of ACL1 on the relationship between CPI and GDP
in Hypothesis 2A, the impact of ACL1 on the relationship between CPI and FDI is
measured in Hypothesis 2B and on the relationship between CPI and NTB in Hypothesis
2C below.
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Hypothesis 2B (H2B) – ACL1, CPI, and FDI
The legislation of anti-corruption laws (ACL1), moderates the relationship
between a nation’s levels of corruption and foreign investment, as measured by FDI,
such that the relationship is weakened.
Equation FDI = c+x1+x2+x3x4+e (DV=c+CPI+MV1+CV1+CV2+Cv3+e...)

ACL 1

CPI

_

FDI

Figure 5. Hypothesis 2B

Hypothesis 2C (H2C) – ACL1, CPI, and NTB
The legislation of anti-corruption laws (ACL1), moderates the relationship
between a nation’s levels of corruption and trade, as measured by NTB, such that the
relationship is weakened.
Equation NTB = c+x1+x2+x3x4+e (DV=c+CPI+MV1+CV1+CV2+Cv3+e...)
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ACL 1

CPI

_

NTB

Figure 6. Hypothesis 2C

Construct ACL 2
Legislation and resourcing of Anti-Corruption legislation
The legislation and resourcing of ACL measures impacts the relationship
between a nation’s levels of corruption (CPI) and economic performance – economic
growth (GDP), foreign investment (FDI), and trade (NTB).
The relationship between CPI and GDP, CPI and FDI, and CPI and NTB are
outlined in Hypotheses 1A, 1B, and 1C, respectively above.
The ACL2 construct measures the impact of the extent of government
resources on the relationship between corruption and economic performance. More
specifically, the ACL2 construct measures the extent and efficiency of government
resources and its regulatory efficiency in effectively resourcing the legislated anticorruption measures. This measurement is then applied to the relationships between
CPI and economic performance as analyzed in Hypothesis H2 above, in order to
measure the moderating impact of the introduction of ACL2 on the relationship
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between levels of corruption and economic growth (GDP), foreign investment (FDI),
and trade (NTB) economic variables, which are tested in Hypotheses H3A, H3B, and
H3C, respectively.
The ACL2 construct, representing the the relationship between levels of
governance, as measured by economic freedom, and specifically the government’s
ability to resource the legislated laws, as measured by the extent of government
resources and fiscal capacity, is supported in the literature. Carlsson and Lundstrom
(2003) suggest that size of government is robustly related to growth, and legal
structure robustly and positively related. Heineman and Heiman (2006) indicate further
that effective ACL enforcement requires proper organization and resources, including
centralized specialized resources. Treisman (2000) found in his research that a
significant relationship exists between corruption and state intervention, in function of
its fiscal capacity and efficiency. Government’s regulatory efficiency to legislate and
enforce these laws, measured by the extent of regulatory efficiency, is also indicated in
research by Graeff and Mehlkop (2003) as well as by Keefer and Knack (1997). These
authors indicate that the effects of convergence of the rule of law and contract
enforceabilty are both statistically and economically significant.
Table 4 provides a summary of the ACL2 construct, relationships, and
research support.
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Table 4. ACL2 Construct, definitions & research validity
IEF Component
Degrees of ACL
measuring ACL
Implementation
implementation
Rule of Law

ACL2 Construct
Legislation &
Resourcing of
Anti-Corruption
Measures

Construct
Relationships

Research validity for relationships Governance, Corruption & Economic
Performance

Authors

Governance
(Rule of Law),
CPI, GDP, FDI
& NTB

• Graeff & Mehlkop (2003): Strong relation
between economic freedom link to
government's ability to legislate, oversee and
implement ACL. Strong correlation between
CPI & economic freedom, using IEF.
• Norbet (2015): Corruption increases or
decreases depending on the interaction of FDI
and rule of law. Government increases
revenue from corruption by increasing the
level of investor protection, i.e rule of law.
Concludes effect of FDI on Corruption is
moderated by the quality of the rule of law
(p.281).
• Keefer & Knack (1997): Impact of rule of
law on GDP through property rights.
• Opper (2004): CPI significantly constrained
by efficient property rights and government
intervention, using IEF.
• Pieroni & D’Agostino (2013). Lack of
government regulations yields more
corruption in less developed countries,
whereas standard recipes for greater freedom
can be applied in developed countries (p.70).

Altman ( 2013);
Apergis et al. (2012);
Carlsson &
Lundstrom (2003);
Goel et al. (2005);
Graeff et al. (2003);
Keefer & Knack
(1997); Norbet
(2015); Opper (2004);
Peterson (2013);
Pieroni & D'Agostino
(2013); Qerimi et al.
(2014); Yamarik &
Redmon (2017); Wei
(2000).

Government Size Governance
(Size of
Government),
CPI, GDP, FDI
& NTB

• Treisman (2000): Significant relationship
between corruption and state intervention (p.
417).
• Carlsson & Lundstrom (2003): Size of
government is robustly negatively related to
growth, and legal structure robustly and
positively related, using IEF index. (p. 342).
• Heineman & Heiman (2006): Effective ACL
enforcement requires proper organization and
resources, including centralized specialized
resources.

Graeff & Mehlkop
(2003), Hillman
(2004), Mudambi et
al. (2013), Mauro
(1998, 1997)

Regulatory
Efficiency

• Graeff & Mehlkop (2003): Strong relation
between economic freedom link to
government's ability to legislate, oversee and
implement ACL.
• Keefer & Knack (1997): Effects of
convergence of the rule of law and contract
enforceabilty, interaction both statistically and
economically significant (p.597).
• Treisman (2000) Research, using Freedom
House ratings, policy decisions have little
significant impact on CPI, distinct 'legal
culture' governing the way laws administered
& enforced linked to heritage (p.439).
corruption.
• Yamarik & Redmon (2017) Every regulatory
parameter measured corresponded to
component of economic freedom using IEF.

Abed & Gupta
(2002), Ades &
DiTella (1996),
Keefer & Knack
(1997, 1995),
Lambsdorff (2007),
Mudambi et al. (2013
p.496),Treisman
(2000).

Governance
(Regulatory
Efficiency),
CPI, GDP, FDI
& NTB
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Hypothesis 3
The resourcing of the legislated anti-corruption laws (ACL2) moderates the
relationship between a nation’s level of corruption (CPI) and its economic performance
as measured by economic growth (GDP), foreign investments (FDI), and trade (NTB).
Hypothesis 3A (H3A) – ACL2, CPI, and GDP
The resourcing of legislated anti-corruption laws (ACL2), moderates the
relationship between a nation’s levels of corruption and economic growth, as measured
by GDP, such that the relationship is weakened.
Equation GDP = c+x1+x2+x4x5+e (DV=c+CPI+MV2+CV1+CV2+Cv3+e...)

ACL 2

CPI

_

GDP

Figure 7. Hypothesis 3A

Having measured the impact of ACL2 on the relationship between CPI and GDP
in Hypothesis H3A, the impact of ACL2 on the relationship between CPI and FDI is
measured in Hypothesis H3B and on the relationship between CPI and NTB in
Hypothesis H3C below.
85

Hypothesis 3B (H3B) – ACL2, CPI, and FDI
The resourcing of legislated anti-corruption laws (ACL2), moderates the
relationship between a nation’s levels of corruption and foreign investment, as
measured by FDI, such that the relationship is weakened.
Equation FDI = c+x1+x2+x4x5+e (DV=c+CPI+MV2+CV1+CV2+Cv3+e...)

ACL 2

CPI

_

FDI

Figure 8. Hypothesis 3B

Hypothesis 3C (H3C) – ACL2, CPI, and NTB
The resourcing of legislated anti-corruption laws (ACL2), moderates the
relationship between a nation’s levels of corruption and trade, as measured by NTB,
such that the relationship is weakened.
Equation NTB = c+x1+x2+x4x5+e (DV=c+CPI+MV2+CV1+CV2+Cv3+e...)
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CPI

_

NTB

Figure 9. Hypothesis 3C

Hypothesis 4
The relationship between the implementation of a nation’s legislated and
resourced anti-corruption laws (ACL3) moderates the relationship between its level of
corruption (CPI) and economic performance, as measured by economic growth (GDP)
(H4A), foreign investments (FDI) (H4B), and trade flows (NTB) (H4C).

Construct ACL 3
Legislation, resourcing and implementation of Anti-Corruption measures.
ACL3 measures the impact of legislated, resourced, and implemented anticorruption measures on the relationships between levels of corruption (CPI) and
economic performance – economic growth (GDP), foreign investment (FDI), and trade
(NTB).
The IEF index dimensions being rule of law (RL), government size (GS),
regulatory efficiency (RE), and openness of markets (OM) indices are expected to
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provide a suitable measure to determine the extent of a nation’s government’s
combined ability to sustainably implement the legislated and resourced ACL measures.
These are aimed at reducing national levels of perceived corruption and its economic
consequences, measured by the economic growth, foreign investment, and
international trade economic variables. The economic impact of ACL3 is tested in
Hypotheses H4A, H4B, and H4C.
The relationship between CPI and GDP, CPI and FDI, and CPI and NTB are
outlined in Hypotheses 1A, 1B, and 1C above. Hence, levels of CPI are expected to
continue to impact and predict levels of GDP, FDI, and NTB
ACL3 therefore measures the relationship between a nation’s government
ability to implement (I) the legislated (L) and resourced (R) ACL measures, aimed at
reducing national levels of corruption and the impact on economic performance. CPI is
expected to also predict the overall level of ACL legislation, resourcing, and
implementation, which, if significant, can be expected to predict and moderate the
levels of economic performance.
The ACL3 construct represents the impact of levels of governance, as measured
by economic freedom, specifically government’s ability to implement the legislated
and resources laws, measured by the extent of the rule of law, regulatory efficiency,
the extent of government resources and fiscal capacity, and the extent of market
openness,. This construct also has research support as outlined in the literature review
of this present research.
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Research by Carlsson et al. (2003) into the relationship between governance,
trade, and growth suggests trade is negatively related to corruption. Opper (2004)
indicates that CPI is significantly constrained by freedom of trade measured using IEF
whereas Pieroni & D’Agostino (2013) suggest the existence of a negative relationship
between extension of international trade and CPI, using the Frazer Institute’s
Economic Freedom Index (EFI).43
Table 5 provides an overview of the ACL3 construct, variables, and authors
providing literature support.

43

(Gwartney & Lawson, 1999)
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Table 5. ACL3 Construct, definitions, and research support
Degrees of ACL IEF Component
Implementation measuring ACL
implementation

Construct
Relationships

Research validity for relationships Governance, Corruption & Economic
Performance

Literature support

Governance
(Rule of Law),
CPI, GDP, FDI
& NTB

• Graeff & Mehlkop (2003): Strong relation
between economic freedom link to
government's ability to legislate, oversee and
implement ACL.
Strong correlation between CPI & economic
freedom.
• Norbet (2015): Corruption increases or
decreases depending on the interaction of FDI
and rule of law. Government increases
revenue from corruption by increasing the
level of investor protection, i.e rule of law.
Concludes effect of FDI on Corruption is
moderated by the quality of the rule of law
(p.281).
• Keefer & Knack (1997): Impact of rule of
law on GDP through property rights.
• Opper (2004): CPI significantly constrained
by efficient property rights and government
intervention.
• Pieroni & D’Agostino (2013). Research
suggests, lack of government regulations
yields more corruption in less developed
countries, whereas standard recipes for
greater freedom can be applied in developed
countries (p.70).

Altman ( 2013);
Apergis et al. (2012);
Carlsson &
Lundstrom (2003);
Goel et al. (2005);
Graeff et al. (2003);
Keefer & Knack
(1997); Norbet
(2015); Opper (2004);
Peterson (2013);
Pieroni & D'Agostino
(2013); Qerimi et al.
(2014); Yamarik &
Redmon (2017); Wei
(2000).

Government Size Governance
(Size of
Government),
CPI, GDP, FDI
ACL3 Construct
& NTB
Legislation,
Resourcing &
Implementation
of AntiCorruption
Measures

• Treisman (2000): Significant relationship
between corruption and state intervention (p.
417).
• Carlsson & Lundstrom (2003): Size of
government is robustly negatively related to
growth, and legal structure robustly and
positively related, using IEF index. (p. 342).
• Heineman & Heiman (2006): Effective ACL
enforcement requires proper organization and
resources, including centralized specialized
resources.

Graeff & Mehlkop
(2003), Hillman
(2004), Mudambi et
al. (2013), Mauro
(1998, 1997)

• Graeff & Mehlkop (2003): Strong relation
between economic freedom link to
government's ability to legislate, oversee and
implement ACL.
• Keefer & Knack (1997): Effects of
convergence of the rule of law and contract
enforceabilty, interaction both statistically and
economically significant (p.597).
• Treisman (2000) Research, using Freedom
House ratings, policy decisions have little
significant impact on CPI, distinct 'legal
culture' governing the way laws administered
& enforced linked to heritage (p.439).
• Yamarik & Redmon (2017) Each of the
regulatory parameters measured corresponded
to component of economic freedom using IEF.

Abed et al. (2002),
Ades et al. (1996),
Keefer et al. (1997,
1995), Lambsdorff
(2007), Mudambi et
al.(2013
p.496),Treisman
(2000).

Rule of Law

Regulatory
Efficiency

Governance
(Regulatory
Efficiency),
CPI, GDP, FDI
& NTB

Market Openness Governance
• Carlsson et al. (2003): Relationship between
(Openness of
governance, trade and growth. Trade
Markets), CPI & negatively related to CPI using IEF (p.342).
GDP, FDI &
• Opper (2004): CPI) is significantly
NTB
constrained by freedom of trade measured
using IEF.
• Pieroni & D'Agostino (2013): Negative
relationship between extension of
international trade & CPI using IEF.
• Treisman (2000): Openess to trade
endogenous where imports reduce corruption.
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Carlsson et al. (2002)
Ades at el. (1999,
1996), Egger at al.
(2005), Friedman
(2010), Hines (1995),
Mudambi et al.
(2013), Qerimi et al.
(2014), Treisman
(2000), Wei (2000).

Hypothesis 4A (H4A) – ACL3, CPI, and GDP
The implementation of legislated and resourced anti-corruption laws (ACL3),
moderates the relationship between a nation’s levels of corruption and economic
growth, as measured by GDP, such that the relationship is weakened.
Equation GDP = c+x1+x2+x3x4 (DV=c+CPI+CV1+CV2+Cv3+e…)

ACL 3

CPI

_

GDP

Figure 10. Hypothesis 4A

Having measured the impact of ACL3 on the relationship between CPI and GDP
in Hypothesis 4A, the impact of ACL3 on the relationship between CPI and FDI is
measured in Hypothesis 4B and on the relationship between CPI and NTB in Hypothesis
4C below.
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Hypothesis 4B (H4B) – ACL3, CPI, and FDI
The implementation of legislated and resourced anti-corruption laws (ACL3),
moderates the relationship between a nation’s levels of corruption and foreign
investment, as measured by FDI, such that the relationship is weakened.
Equation FDI = c+x1+x2++x3 (DV=c+CPI+CV1+CV2+Cv3+e…)

ACL 3

CPI

_

FDI

Figure 11. Hypothesis 4B

Hypothesis 4C (H4C) – ACL3, CPI, and NTB
The implementation of legislated and resourced anti-corruption laws (ACL3),
moderates the relationship between a nation’s levels of corruption and trade, as
measured by NLB, such that the relationship is weakened.
Equation NTB = c+x1+x2++x3 (DV=c+CPI+CV1+CV2+Cv3+e…)
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ACL 3

CPI

_

NTB

Figure 12. Hypothesis 4C

Having reviewed the extant literature and established the hypotheses posited to
test the research questions asked, this study progresses to detail the proposed research
design and methodology in Chapter 3.
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Chapter 3
Research Design and Methodology
Research Questions
Theory and research into the impacts of corruption suggest that it impacts
foreign investment flows, as measured by FDI, further impacting trade flows and
economic growth (Rugman, 2001). Perceptions of corruption in nations as measured
by Transparency International (2017) reflect pervasive and constant levels of
corruption across the majority of countries in the world and can be expected to impact
investor perceptions. A review of this corruption data suggests the majority of the
countries measured have, since 2011, introduced and or updated their anti-corruption
legislation. The question is whether these measures have impacted the relationship
between corruption and economic performance, and if so, how.
The empirical portion of this study focuses on determining the economic
impact of the legislation, and the resourcing and implementation of anti-corruption
measures on foreign investor perceptions of corruption. Corruption perceptions were
measured using Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index (CPI). The
impact on economic performance measures foreign direct investment flows, trade
flows, including exports and imports, and national economic growth. Measuring the
legislating, resourcing and implementation of anti-corruption legislation in the
specified countries allows this study to research the impact of these legislative
developments on the performance of the economic variables selected and measured.
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Country income groups
The World Development Indicators (WDI) published by the World Bank
(2019b) classifies 189 countries and 28 other economies into geographical regions and
by income groups.44 Economies are divided into four income groupings: low, lowermiddle, upper-middle, and high income, using gross national income (GNI) per capita,
in US dollars, converted from local currencies.45 This study also analyzed these
country income groups as classified as of 1 July for each year in the 2011-2016 period
under study. The World Bank uses these income classifications primarily in World
Development Indicators data (WDI) and for which the main purpose is analysis. This
classification is also widely used by other international organizations and bilateral aid
agencies for both analytical and operational purposes, including resource allocation
policy decisions and in the determination and application of preferential trade rules.
These classifications are therefore also regarded as highly influential (World Bank,
2019b).
This study, for the purposes of additional analysis into possible variances in the
significance of the posited hypotheses, initially grouped countries into three simplified
income groups: low, medium, (composed of lower-middle and upper-middle
countries), and high income. For the purposes of this research, all countries

44

The WDI data uses the term country interchangeably with economy and refers to any territory for
which authorities report separate social or economic statistics. GNI estimates are determined by World
Bank economists in the respective country units. (www.worldbank.org/knowledgebase/articles/378834)
accessed on 08/17/2019
45

Local currencies are converted to US dollars using a three-year moving average of marker exchange
rates, utilizing the Atlas method (World Bank, 2019b).
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representing all the income groups, form part of the target sample and are included in
the statistical analysis, subject to the condition of data compatibility and completeness.
The additional analysis described in Chapter 4 below, was conducted as a tangential
piece of research into possible alternative scenarios and future research questions and
does not form part of this current study. Recommendations are made in Chapter 5 as to
the possible areas for future research based on this more narrowly defined and
conditioned sample for further analysis.

Quantitative Research Approach and Design
Variables
Dependent Variables (DV): GDP, FDI, NTB
Dependent Variable 1, Economic Growth is measured by GDP per capita46
using published economic data from the World Bank. The relationship between levels
of corruption as measured by CPI and economic growth as measured by GDP have
wide literature support (Getz & Volkema, 2001; Mauro, 199547, 1996; Nguyen & Van
Dijk, 2012; Paldam, 2002; Rose-Ackerman, 1978, 1996, 1999; Treisman, 2000; Wei,
2000; Wilhelm, 2002). Hypothesis 1 (H1A, H1B, and H1C), measuring the

46

GDP per capita is defined by the World Bank (2018) as “gross domestic product divided by midyear
population. GDP is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy plus any
product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products. It is calculated without
making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of natural
resources.” Data are in constant 2010 U.S. dollars.
47

An example of Mauro’s study (1995) observed that, in an analysis using CPI and GDP, one standard
deviation increase in CPI (a reduction in perceived corruption) resulted in an increase in investments
equal to 5% of GDP and caused the annual rate of GDP growth to increase by 0.5 %.
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relationship between CPI and GDP, uses updated economic data for the period 201116, using published World Bank data.
Dependent Variable 2, Investment flows, measured by foreign direct
investment inflows as a percentage of GDP48 uses published economic data from the
World Bank.
Research suggests that using the World Bank index of corruption (WGI)
introduced by Kaufmann, Kraay, and Zoido-Lobato (1999) and Kaufmann, Kraay, and
Mastruzzi (2004), rather than CPI, results in the same conclusions with respect to the
relationship between corruption and FDI (Egger & Winner, 2005). Research by Mauro
(1995, 1997, 1998) on the economic impacts of corruption (CPI) includes the CPI
measure in determining the impact on FDI. Other studies using WGI or CPI also
suggest a relationship between CPI and FDI (Barassi & Zhou, 2012; Campos & Lien,
1999; Cuervo Cazurra, 2008; Delgado et al., 2014; Habib & Zurawicki, 2002; Egger &
Winner, 2005; Mudambi et al, 2013; Wei, 1997, 2000).
Dependent Variable 3, National Trade Balance (NTB), measures the national
net trade flows as a percentage of GDP49, using published economic data from the

48

Foreign direct investment is defined by the World Bank (2018) as “the net inflows of investment to
acquire a lasting management interest (10 percent or more of voting stock) in an enterprise operating
in an economy other than that of the investor. It is the sum of equity capital, reinvestment of earnings,
other long-term capital, and short-term capital as shown in the balance of payments. This series shows
net inflows (new investment inflows less disinvestment) in the reporting economy from foreign investors
and is divided by GDP.”
49

Defined by the World Bank (2018) as “Merchandise trade as a share of GDP is the sum of
merchandise exports and imports divided by the value of GDP, all in current U.S. dollars.”
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World Bank (2018) and Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD).
The relationship between corruption (CPI) and trade (NTB) is equally widely
researched and reported either as part of studies into the economic impacts of
corruption, including FDI and economic growth (Mauro, 1998), or as specific studies
on the trade impacts (Ades & DiTella, 1996, 1999; de Jong & Bogmans, 2011; Souza,
2012; Treisman, 2000). These studies confirm the relationship between corruption and
trade flows.
Macro-economic data on economic growth, foreign investment, and trade is
sourced from published tables from the World Bank and OECD for the period 20112016.
Independent Variable (IV): CPI
Perceptions of Corruption (CPI)50 is measured using Transparency
International’s corruption perception index for the period 2011-2016 (TI, 2017).
The CPI index summarizes the degree to which corruption is perceived by the
public and business executives to exist in the public sector (Egger & Winner, 2005).
CPI51 is a composite index, drawn from 14 different surveys from seven different
institutions undertaken (Transparency International, 2010) and aggregates data derived

50

The Corruption Perception Index is produced by the University of Passau in Germany and by
Transparency International. A full description of the composition and methodology of the Corruption
Perceptions Index is available on www.transparency.de (Transparency International, 2017).
51

Although these perception-based indices, including CPI, may not provide robust estimates of incountry corruption, they are considered informative when used for cross-country comparisons of
corruption (Pieroni & D’Agostino, 2013, p. 55).
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from its surveys. It is considered to be a substantially valid measure of aggregate
country-level corruption (Wilhelm, 2002).
Research studies indicate broad support for the Corruption Perception Index, as
a measure of national corruption levels, in over 180 countries across the world. The
CPI index has been utilized in research studies by international researchers including,
but not limited to, Beamish (2004), Bryant and Javalgi (2016), Habib and Hofstede
(1999), Husted (1999, 2002), Mauro (1996, 1997, 1998), Paldam (2002), Peng and
Beamish (2008), Treisman (2000), Voyer and Wei (2000), and Zurawicki (2002).
Whilst the index reflects perceptions and may be at variance to actual levels of
corruption, it has been published annually since 1993 and has established a measure of
consistency based on the information obtained, even being described as “the best
source of cross-country corruption data” (Paldam, 2002, p. 2-3).
Whilst other indices of the measure of corruption exist, research support for
CPI as a measure of perceptions of corruption is based on its concentration on
corruption, excluding other related determinants of the institutional environment, and
the source of its information and data. The composite index sources its information
from reputable multi-lateral institutions including the World Bank, The International
Monetary Fund, the World Economic Forum, and respected research institutions
including the European Intelligence Unit and the Political and Economic Risk
Consultancy (PERC).52

52

For a full description of the composition and methodology of the Corruption Perceptions Index, see
www.transparency.de (Transparency International, 2017).
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When comparing related corruption indices, an extensive and robust analysis
by Egger and Winner (2005) indicates that utilizing the World Bank Index of
Corruption introduced by Kaufmann, Kraay, and Zoido-Lobato (1999) and Kaufmann,
Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2006) rather than Transparency International’s CPI Index
resulted in the same conclusions related to the relationship between corruption and
FDI.
Almost all indices, including the perception of corruption index, face an
inherent problem related to variances with respect to the individual respondents (Egger
& Winner, 2005). Residents with their strong cultural backgrounds and home country
standards may harbor misleading perceptions, where international comparisons on the
intensity of corruption are absent. When polled, external country experts, including
expatriates, may have opposite views based on their access to related international data
and information. The CPI index overcomes this possible bias by polling the
perceptions of both residents and expatriates.
Researchers have expressed doubts regarding perception-based data when
compared to experienced-based measures of corruption, citing the lack of correlation
between to two sets of data (Treisman, 2007). Notwithstanding this caution, many
studies indicate a relationship between corruption and judicial effectiveness
(Treisman, 2000).
Table 6 provides an overview of the predictor economic variables (GDP, FDI,
and NTB) and independent CPI variables, including a summary of the literature
support.
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Table 6. Independent & Dependent variables & literature support
Variables Description Index
Corruption Corruption Corruption
(CPI)
Perceptions
Index (CPI)

GDP

FDI

NTB

Economic
Growth
(GDP)

Gross
Domestic
Product per
Capita
(GDP/Cap)
Investment Foreign
Flows (FDI) Direct
Investment.
(FDI/GDP)

Net Trade
Flows
(NTB)

Source
Description
Transparency Annual measure of
International corruption perceptions
in 180 countries since
1993. Scaled 0 (most)100 (least) corrupt.
Inverted in this study
World Bank GDP per capita
(constant 2010 USD).

International
Monetary
Fund

Merchandise World Bank
Trade/GDP

Net inflows from
foreign investors,
divided by GDP.

Literature support
Beamish (2004), Bryant & Javalgi
(2016), Habib & Hofstede (1999),
Husted (1999, 2002), Mauro (1996,
1997, 1998), Paldam (2002), Peng &
Beamish (2008), Voyer & Wei (2000).
Zurawicki (2002),

Getz & Volkema (2001), Mauro
(1995, 1996), Nguyen & Van Dijk
(2012), Paldam, (2002), RoseAckerman (1978, 1996, 1999),
Treisman (2000), Willhelm (2002),
Wei,
(2000)
Barassi
& Zhou, (2012), Campos &
Lien, (1999), Cuervo-Cazurra (2008),
Delgado et al., (2014), Egger &
Winner (2005), Habib & Zurawicki
(2002), Mauro (1995), Mudambi et al,
(2013), Peng & Beamish (2008),
Rugman & Verbeke (2004), Voyer &
Beamish (2004), Wei (2000), Wu
(2004).
Ades & DiTella, (1996, 1999); de

Merchandise trade as a
Jong & Bogmans, (2011); Mauro
share of GDP.
(1996), Rugman & Verbeke (2004)
Souza, 2012; Treisman, (2000)

Source: Transparency International, World Bank, IMF.
Moderating Variables (MV)
Governance
The Governance Index (IEF) measures the extent of ACL implementation as a
moderating variable.
Market opportunities are created when governments intervene in the markets
either as regulators or principal buyers (Rose-Ackerman, 1999). The reduced
opportunity cost and hence increased economic rent available to individuals and firms
of circumventing bureaucratic regulatory environment are presented in the form of
bribery payments, resulting in corruption. When economies prosper, these resultant
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rents can be expected to grow, as regulations are increasingly circumvented (Glaeser
and Saks, 2006). These statements, seen jointly, would indicate that a relationship
exists between economic freedom and corruption as suggested by the studies
conducted by Chafuen and Guzman (2000), Paldam (2002), Graeff and Mehlkop
(2003), and Goel and Nelson (2005), whose research identified a negative relationship
between governance, as measured by economic freedom, and corruption (Yamarik &
Redmon, 2017).
Research suggests that a lack of governance and government regulations also
results in more corruption in less developed countries (Pieroni & D’Agostino, 2013).
Complementing the impact of limited market competition and government regulation
on corruption, is the critical role played by the political economy of countries and
institutions on different aspects of economic freedom. The poor regulation of property
rights has been shown to be an important factor stimulating corruption, particularly
where informal relationships between actors, function in parallel to formal structures
(Cheloukhine & King, 2007).
Countries, in their efforts to counter corruption and introduce anti-corruption
measures, can be expected to initially legislate anti-corruption laws in response to
growing national and international corruption and bribery developments and to
following international guidelines and measures, described above. Once legislated,
nations will need to then resource these legislated measures through appropriate
national budget allocations in order to provide the means through which the measures
can be implemented. It is, however, the implementation of these legislated and
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resourced measures that ultimately determines the extent of the impact on the
relationship established between a nation’s corruption levels and economic
performance.
Measures of governance
The use of governance indices in measuring economic freedom has broad
support as outlined in the literature reviewed in Chapter 2 (Altman, 2013; Norbet,
2015; Olson, 2014; Peterson, 2013; Qerimi, 2014). These include the World Bank’s
World Governance Index (WGI), the World Economic Forum’s Global
Competitiveness Index (GCI), the Frazer Institute’s Economic Freedom Index (EFI),
and the Heritage Foundation’s Index of Economic Freedom (IEF), who broadly
measure governance and its component parts. These components include those factors
directly related to and impacting the legislation, resourcing, and implementation of
anti-corruption legislation. Data from these indices also adequately covers the six-year
period 2011-16, of this study.
This study utilizes the Heritage Foundation’s Index of Economic Freedom53
(IEF) as its measure of governance, due to greater country coverage and a more
consistent aggregation procedure (Heckelman & Stroup, 2005), as is discussed and
supported below.

53

The IEF index measures, four dimensions and ten components of economic freedom, grading each
component from 0-100, where 100 indicates maximum freedom. The ten components are then averaged
for each country (Qerimi & Sergi, 2012).
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Importantly, the IEF Index data has been found to be useful in measuring and
benchmarking economic and institutional impacts, as laws and policies are
implemented (Peterson, 2013).
Economic freedom, as a measure of governance, should be a guiding principle
for policy makers (Olson, 2014). The Index of Economic Freedom (Heritage
Foundation, 2011-18) permits researchers to gauge the effectiveness of governance
and to determine whether policies are successful or not, whilst also assisting in
measuring the progress of the establishment of effective and efficient institutions. The
index has value as a statistical measurement tool, but also as objective and detailed
research material for reference and analysis on governance across the world.
Governance indices have played a major role in the measurement and determination of
public and private policy outcomes, including the rule of law and control of
corruption, regulatory efficiency, government expenditure and resource efficiency, and
the openness of the markets (Olson, 2014).
Research by Goel and Nelson (2005) analyzes how governance, measured by
levels of IEF economic freedom, including the four dimensions, impacts corruption.
Their study suggests that a negative relationship exists between governance, measured
by economic freedom, and corruption. The four pillars of the IEF index aggregate
quantitative measures of nine specific components of governance, covering the rules
of law, the efficiency of the regulatory framework, the extent of government, and the
openness of the financial and goods and services markets. These four dimensions are
then detailed into respective freedoms corresponding to each component. Table 7
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provides an overview of Index of Economic Freedom, the dimensions and components
for the six-year period of research 2011-16.
Table 7. IEF Governance Indices 2011-2016
IEF Indices

Rule of
Law

IEF 20112016

Property
Rights

Government Size
Government
Spending

Regulatory Efficiency

Fiscal
Freedom

Business
Freedom

Labor
Freedom

Open Markets

Monetary
Freedom

Trade
Freedom

Investment
Freedom

Financial
Freedom

Restrictions on
investments.
Includes
treatment of
Foreign Inv,
Foreign Inv
Code, Land
Ownership &
Sectoral
investment
restrictions,
Expropriation
of inv without
compensation,
Forex &
Capital
controls

Measures
banking
efficiency &
independence
from Gov
control &
interference in
financial
sector. 5 broad
areas - extent
Gov regulation
& intervention
in fin services,
fin & cap mkt
development,
gov influence
on credit
allocation,
openness to
foreign
competition.

Degree of
Government
Tax burden
country's
expenditure % imposed by
laws to
of GDP
Gov. Includes
protect
Ind & Corp
private
direct tax &
property
total tax
rights &
revenue %
Government
GDP.
enforcement.
Fiscal Health Source: IEF
Measures
Methodology
weighted
per year
average deficit
Measures:
% GDP last 3
yrs. (80%) and
debt % GDP
(20%)

Quantitative Quantitative
measure of
measure of
starting,
legal &
operating & regulatory
closing a
framework
business.
of nation's
Represents
labor market.
overall burden 6 quantitave
of regulation factors of
and
labor
government freedom.
efficiency in
regulatory
process

Combines
measure of
price stability
and price
controls.
Based on
weighted
average
inflation rate
for last 3 yrs.
& Price
controls

Composite
measure of
absence of
tariff and
non-tariff
barriers
impacting
imports and
exports of
goods &
services.
Based on
Trade
weighted
average tariff
rate & NonTariff
Barriers

Score

0-100

0-100

0-100

0-100

0-100
0-100
(Wghtd Avg
Tariff)

IMF, EIU

Word Bank
(WB)

WB, EIU

IMF, EIU

WB

0-100

0-100

Data Sources Economist OECD, IMF
Intillengence
Unit (EIU)

0-100

National Gov. EIU, IMF
publications,
EIU

Source: Heritage Foundation (2011-16).
Governance and corruption
Governance is defined as the process of making decisions that define
expectations, systems, and management (Hakimi, 2014). Empirical research suggests
that the relationship between the role of governance and corruption is “consistently
negatively correlated” (Butkiewicz and Yanikkaya, 2006, p. 206).
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Studies also indicate a relationship between corruption and economic growth,
including foreign investments and trade, which is directly dependent on governance
(Dzhumashev, 2014; Shleifer & Vishny, 1993). This study set out to determine the
impact of anti-corruption legislation on the researched relationship between corruption
and economic growth, foreign investment, and trade. Thus, is measured the extent of
anti-corruption legislation implementation using the IEF measure of governance index.
The impact of corruption on the different dimensions of the measure of
governance and each component’s influence on corruption was tested in the Yamarik
and Redmon (2017) study. Their extensive empirical research found support for the
helping-hand theory (Leff, 1964; Dreher and Gassebner, 2007; Huntington, 1968),
where a benevolent government legislates and implements regulatory policies serving
to curtail corruption by its actors, suggesting that improved governance results in lower
levels of corruption in the case of limited government. In contrast, under the grabbinghand theory suggested by Shleifer and Vishny (1993) and Rose-Ackerman (1999), a
non-benevolent government utilizes its regulatory framework to increase its economic
rents, resulting in increased levels of corruption and impaired governance (Yamarik &
Redmon, 2017).
Property rights define the range of asset uses, determine the authority of who
has decision-making power, and identify the recipients of the associated rewards and
costs of those decisions (Libecap, 2014). Efficient governance requires clarity,
structure, and protection of property rights as core determinants, given that impaired
governance results in increased opportunities for rent-seeking activities and corruption
106

(Opper, 2004). Noticeably, Kaufmann (2001) stresses the causal link between property
rights and corruption, where his research suggests that the reduced rule of law
including the enforcement of property rights leads to increased corruption.
Research conducted by Norbet (2015) shows that corruption may increase or
decrease depending on the interaction of FDI and rule of law, where variables are
significant in the regression analysis. This led Norbet to conclude that policy
intervention causes corruption (p. 283), where governments can, for high levels of FDI
and the rule of law, increase revenue from corruption by improving the level of
investor protection through the rule of law (Norbet, 2015).
Corrupt governments have an incentive to impair the efficient functioning of
the markets by introducing market restrictions in their quest to increase rent-seeking,
which expectedly impacts the proper functioning of open markets and reduces the rule
of law and regulatory efficiency (Yamarik & Redmon, 2017). The impact of limited
government can also be expected to be negative as government seeks to increase its
rent-seeking activities (Goel & Nelson, 1998).
Due to the risk of multi-collinearity between the variables, this study removed
the control of the corruption sub-component included in the rule of law grouping.
A Variance Inflation factor (VIF) analysis was performed on the remaining
variables, grouped into four categories as outlined in Table 2, and indicated by the
factor analysis performed. This methodology is consistent with that used by the
Heritage Foundation.
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Moderating Variable 1
The legislation of Anti-Corruption measures (ACL1)
Research by Swaleheen and Stansel (2007) analyzed the relationships between
governance, measured by economic freedom, corruption, and growth, and suggested
that “all else being equal, corruption lowers growth when the economic agents have
very few choices (i.e., when economic freedom is low); but, if people face many
choices (i.e., where economic freedom is high), corruption helps growth by providing
a way around government controls” (Swaleheen & Stansel, 2007, p. 354).
The ACL1 construct defines the impact of legislated ACL measures on the
relationship between corruption and economic growth, foreign investment, and trade.
ACL1 (MV1) was measured by using the IEF Rule of Law and Regulatory Efficiency
dimensions of economic freedom and was expected to moderate the relationship
between CPI and the economic predictor variables.
The ACL1 construct, the relationship between levels of governance, as
measured by economic freedom, and specifically the governement’s ability to
formulate and legislate laws, as measured by the extent of the rule of law, is supported
(Graeff & Norbet, 2003). Government’s regulatory efficiency to legislate and enforce
these laws, as measured by the extent of regulatory efficiency, is also suggested in
research by Graeff and Mehlkop (2003) and Keefer and Knack (1997), suggesting that
the effects of convergence of the rule of law and contract enforceabilty are both
statistically and economically significant.
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Additional support for the relationship between the rule of law and the extent
of legislation is indicated in the research conducted by Altman (2013); Apergis et al.
(2012); Carlsson and Lundstrom (2002); Goel (2005); Graeff and Mehlkop (2003);
Norbet (2015); Opper (2004;) Olson (2014); Peterson (2013); Pieroni and D’Agostino
(2013); Qerimi and Sergi (2014); as well as Yamarik and Redmon (2017). The
relationship between ACL legislation and the extent of regulatory efficiency is also
suggested in research by Treisman (2000) and Yamarik and Redmon (2017), as
reviewed in Chapter 2.
These indices are expected to provide a suitable measure to determine the
government’s ability to legislate these ACL measures aimed at reducing levels of
perceived corruption and its economic consequences, as measured by economic
performance – economic growth, foreign investment, and international trade economic
variables. The economic impact of the ACL1 construct was tested in Hypotheses H2A,
H2B and H2C.

Moderating Variable 2
Anti-Corruption legislation and resourcing (ACL2)
The ACL2 construct defines the impact of legislated and resourced ACL
measures on the relationship between corruption and economic growth, foreign
investment, and trade. The extent of ACL2 was measured using the IEF dimensions of
rule of law, government size, and regulatory efficiency and was expected to further
moderate the relationship between CPI and the impacted economic variables.
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These indices were expected to provide a suitable measure to determine the
government’s ability to sustainably resource these legislated ACL measures, aimed at
reducing levels of perceived corruption and their economic consequences, measured by
the economic growth, foreign investment, and trade economic variables. The economic
impact of the ACL2 construct was measured in Hypotheses H3A, H3B, and H3C.
Support for the relationship is found in research by Carlsson and Lundstrom
(2003), who suggest that the size of government and extent of resources is robustly
related to growth, and legal structure robustly and positively related, using the IEF
index. Heineman and Heiman (2006) indicate that effective ACL enforcement requires
proper organization and resources, including centralized specialized resources.
Treisman (2000) suggests a significant relationship between corruption and state
intervention, in function of its fiscal capacity and efficiency. Government’s regulatory
efficiency to legislate and enforce these laws, as measured by the extent of regulatory
efficiency is also indicated in research by Graeff and Mehlkop (2003) and Keefer and
Knack (1997) who suggest that the effects of convergence of the rule of law and
contract enforceabilty are both statistically and economically significant.

Moderating Variable 3
Anti-Corruption legislation, resourcing and implementation (ACL3)
The ACL3 construct defines the impact of legislated, resourced, and
implemented ACL measures on the relationship between corruption and economic
growth, foreign investment, and trade. ACL3 was measured by using the IEF
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dimensions of rule of law, government size, regulatory efficiency, and open markets
and is expected to moderate the relationship between CPI and the impacted economic
variables.
These indices are expected to provide a suitable measure to determine the
government’s combined ability to sustainably implement the legislated and resourced
ACL measures, aimed at reducing levels of perceived corruption and their economic
consequences, measured by the economic growth, foreign investment, and
international trade economic variables. The economic impact of these ACL3
relationships was tested in Hypotheses H4A, H4B, and H4C.
The ACL3 construct measures the relationship between a nation’s
government’s ability to implement the legislated and resourced ACL measures, aimed
at reducing national levels of perceived corruption and the impact on economic
performance, measured by the economic growth (GDP), foreign investment (FDI), and
trade (NTB) economic variables. CPI is expected to also predict the level of ACL
legislation, resourcing, and implementation, which, if significant, can be expected to
predict and moderate the levels of economic performance.
Construct ACL3, the relationship between levels of governance, as measured
by economic freedom, and specifically the governement’s ability to implement the
legislated and resource laws, as measured by the extent of the rule of law, regualtory
efficiency, the extent of government resources and fiscal capacity, and the extent of
market openness, is also supported. Support for the relationship between rule of law,
regulatory efficiency, and government size is outlined above. Research into the
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relationship between governance, trade, and growth is suggested by Carlsson et al.
(2003), where trade was found to be negatively related to corruption, using IEF. Opper
(2004) indicates that CPI is significantly constrained by freedom of trade measured
using IEF whereas Pieroni and D’Agostino (2013) indicate the existence of a negative
relationship between extension of international trade and CPI using the Economic
Freedom Index (EFI).
Table 8 summarizes the moderator and mediator variables including the
literature support.
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Table 8. Moderator variables, definitions, and authors
Variables
Moderator
Variables

Description
Anti-Corruption
Legislation
implementation -

Index
Index of
Economic
Freedom
(IEF) 20112016

Source
Heritage
Foundation 20112016

Property
Rights (PR)

World Economic
Forum, World
Bank, WCR

AntiCorruption
Legislation
(ACL)

Rule of Law

Government Size

Fiscal
Deloitte. IMF
Freedom (FF) Country Reports.
PWC. EIU,
Country
Commerce &
finance (CCF)
Gov.
Spending
(GS)

Description
IEF aggregates 4 main
dimensions of Economic
Freedom
Rule of Law
Gov. Size
Regulatory Efficiency
Measures 10 governance
components:
· Business Freedom
· Trade Freedom
· Fiscal Freedom
· Gov. Spending
· Monetary Freedom
· Investment Freedom
· Financial Freedom
· Property Rights
· Freedom from
Corruption
· Labor Freedom
Physical, Intellectual,
Investor Protection,
Expropriation Risk, Land
Admin Quality

Literature Support

Total Individual +
Corporate tax burden %
GDP

Hillman (2004), Mudambi,
Navarra & Delios (2013
p.497), Mauro (1998, 1997)

OECD, EuroStat
Gov. Expenditure %
data. IMF Country GDP
Reports, World
Eco Data Base
(WEOD)

Business
WB: Doing Bus.
Freedom (BF) EIU, CCF.
National Gov.
reports (NGR)

Index of
Economic
Freedom
(IEF)

Regulatory
Efficiency

Regulatory &
infrastructure
environment constrain
business operation
efficiency
Labor
WB, Doing Bus & Quantitative measure of
Freedom (LF) World
legal & regulatory
Development
framework of nation's
Institute (WDI).
labor market. 6 quant
EIU, CCF.
factors of labor freedom.
International
Labour
Organisation
(ILO); Stats &
data base. NGR
Monetary
Freedom
(MF)
Investment
Freedom (IF)

Open Markets

IMF: Int. Fin
Stats, WEO. EIU,
Data tool. WB,
NGR
EIU, Country
Commerce. WB,
Investing across
borders. OECD,
Services Trade
Restriction Index.

Acemoglu & Verdier (1998),
Cheloukine & King (2007),
Knack & Keefer (1995),
Libecap (2001), Opper (2005),
Pieroni & D’Agostino (2013),
Rodrick (1996), Senior (2006),
Wei (2000)

Hillman (2004), Mudambi,
Navarra & Delios (2013
p.497), Mauro (1998, 1997)

Ades & Di Tella (1999, 1996),
Altman 2013; Apergis et al.
2012; Carlsson & Lundstrom
(2002), Egger & Winner
(2005), Friedman (2010), Hines
(1995), Mudambi, Navarra &
Delios (2013 p.497), Treisman
(2000), Wei (2000) Goel 2005;
Graeff & Mehlkop 2003;
Norbet 2015; Opper 2004;
Olson 2014; Peterson 2013;
Qerimi (2014); Yamarik &
Redmon (2017).

Inflation (Price stability)
& price controls

Investment restrictions,
Forex & Capital Controls Ades & Di Tella (1996, 1999),
Egger & Winner (2005),
Friedman (2010), Hines (1995),
Mudambi, Navarra & Delios
(2013 p.497), Treisman (2000),
p.401), Wei (2000, p.4) --Financial
IMF, Country
Extent of Gov. control &
Ades & Di Tella (1999, 1996),
Freedom (FF) report. EIU.
involvement in fin
Altman 2013; Apergis et al.
OECD, Eco
markets
2012; Carlsson & Lundstrom
survey. WB,
(2002), Egger & Winner
Trade
WB, WDI
Quantitative measure of
(2005), Friedman (2010), Hines
Freedom (TF) WTO: Trade
Import tariffs & barriers
(1995), Mudambi, Navarra &
Policy review.
Delios (2013 p.497), Treisman
WB: Doing
(2000), Wei (2000) Goel 2005;
Business.
Graeff & Mehlkop 2003;
EIU: Country
Norbet 2015; Opper 2004;
Commerce. WEF:
Olson 2014; Peterson 2013;
Global Enabling
Qerimi (2014); Yamarik &
Trade Report.
Redmon (2017).
Nat Gov reports

Source. Heritage Foundation (2011-16) and literature review.
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Control Variables
The control variables for the model proposed in this research are guided by the
literature and allow for the important interactions identified in the literature between
CPI and GDP as well as FDI and NTB. Since CPI can be expected to impact economic
performance, it was necessary to control for the effects of other variables impacting
economic performance and its component parts as indicated in macroeconomic theory
(Barro, 1996). The following control variables are suggested and are summarized in
Table 9 and described more fully below.
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Table 9. Control variables
Control Variable
Inflation Rate

Code
INF%

Source
Definition
World Bank Inflation is measured by the
(2018) WDI consumer price index reflects the
annual percentage change in the
cost to the average consumer of
acquiring a basket of goods and
services. The Laspeyres formula
is generally used.

Literature support
Graeff et al., 2003 p.
617. Delgado et al.,
2014

Unemployment Rate

UNEMP%

World Bank Unemployment refers to the
(2018) WDI share of the total labor force that
is without work but available for
and seeking employment.

Godinez, 2015, p. 38.
Dreher, 2011, p.29.
Lavena, 2013, p. 351.
Voyer & Beamish,
2004.

Population Growth Rate

POP%

World Bank Annual population growth rate
(2018) WDI for year t is the exponential rate
of growth of midyear population
from year t-1 to t, expressed as a
percentage . Population is based
on the de facto definition of
population, which counts all
residents regardless of legal
status or citizenship.

GDP Growth Rate

GDP%

Human Development Index

HDI

World Bank Annual percentage growth rate Graeff & Mehlkop,
(2018) WDI of GDP at market prices based 2003, p. 613. Delgado et
on constant local currency.
al., 2014. Arregle, 2013.
Aggregates are based on constant
2010 U.S. dollars.
UNDP
HDI is a summary measure of
Mariyono, 2012.
(2019)
average achievement in key
dimensions of human
development: a long and healthy
life, being knowledgeable and
have a decent standard of living.

Relationship to Variable
Neg rel to GDP, FDI. High
INF neg impacts eco growth
& Inv confidence. Control
for inflation impacting FDI
& GDP.

Neg rel to GDP, FDI. High
UNEMP negatively impacts
eco growth & Inv
confidence. Control for
unemployment impacting
eco growth.
Graeff & Mehlkop,
Neg rel to GDP, FDI & CPI.
2003, p. 613. Delgado et High POP% has negative
al., 2014. Arregle, 2013. impact on GDP, FDI. Robust
rel to CPI in low income
countries. Control for
extreme pop. growth rate.

Neg to CPI. Higher GDP neg
rel to CPI.
Control for extreme eco
growth rate.
CPI neg rel to HDI. Higher
inequality neg rel to CPI.
Corr has neg impact on
welfare, measured by HDI.
Control for inequality

Inflation rate (INF%)
Inflation54 rates negatively impact economic performance (Durlauf et al., 2008;
Delgado et al., 2014). As this study analyzes economic performance by measurements

54

Inflation is defined by World Bank (2018): “. . . measured by the consumer price index reflects the
annual percentage change in the cost to the average consumer of acquiring a basket of goods and
services that may be fixed or changed at specified intervals, such as yearly. The Laspeyres formula is
generally used.”
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of economic growth (GDP), investment (FDI), and trade flows (NTB) in determining
the impact of perceptions of corruption (CPI) and anti-corruption legislation (ACL),
inflation is controlled for. Paldam (2002) in his research, found that periods of high
inflation resulted in increased corruption, whilst differences between levels of
economic growth in similar cultural areas was smaller than the (relative) difference
between the levels of corruption.
Unemployment rate (UNEMP%)
The current study controlled for rate of unemployment55, expressed as a
percentage of the total labor force, given that GDP, FDI, and NTB may be influenced
by the degree of unemployment (Voyer & Beamish, 2004). Research indicates that
the degree of economic growth as measured by GDP and FDI is negatively related to
high unemployment rates (Godinez, 2015; Dreher, 2011; Lavena, 2013).
Population growth rate (POP%)
Population annual growth rate56 expressed as a percentage, has been shown to
negatively impact economic growth rates (Delgado et al., 2014) and levels of
investment as measured by FDI (Arregle et al., 2013). Research by Graeff and
Mehlkop (2003) indicates a robust positive relationship between population growth
rates and CPI in low income countries. Population growth rates were controlled for.

55

Total unemployment, as a percentage of the total labor force (modeled by ILO estimate). Defined by
the World Bank (2018) as “the share of the labor force that is without work but available for and
seeking employment.”
56
Annual population growth rate is defined by the World Bank (2018): “The growth rate for year t is
the exponential rate of growth of midyear population from year t-1 to t, expressed as a percentage.
Population is based on the de facto definition of population, which counts all residents regardless of
legal status or citizenship.”
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Domestic economic growth rate (GDP%)
Domestic annual economic growth rates57, expressed as a percentage are also
shown to be negatively correlated with perceived levels of corruption (CPI) (Graeff &
Mehlkop, 2003), and were therefore controlled for.
Human development index (HDI)
Research suggests that corruption impacts welfare levels negatively, where
“higher levels of economic growth are associated with higher rates of poverty
reduction and where the impact of corruption slows economic growth and hence
poverty reduction” (Mariyono, 2012, p. 64).
The HDI was created to emphasize that economic growth should not be seen as
the only primary criteria for assessing countries.58 It suggests that the development of
a country should ultimately be determined by its people and their capabilities, as well
as economic growth. The HDI index provides insights into national policy choices and
stimulates relevant debate on anti-corruption measures by indicating possible reasons
for disparate economic performances resulting in differing human development
outcomes and possible remedies. Paldam (2002) in his research, found that differences

57

Defined by the World Bank (2018) as “Annual percentage growth rate of GDP at market prices
based on constant local currency. Aggregates are based on constant 2010 U.S. dollars. GDP is the sum
of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any
subsidies not included in the value of the products. It is calculated without making deductions for
depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of natural resources.”
58

The Human Development Index (HDI) published by the United Nations Development Program
(UNDP, 2019) is a “summary measure of average achievement in key dimensions of human
development: a long and healthy life, being knowledgeable and having a decent standard of living. The
HDI is the geometric mean of normalized indices for each of the three dimensions.” (p.1).
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between levels of economic growth in similar cultural areas was smaller than the
(relative) difference between the levels of corruption.
The Human Development Index is a summary measure of average
achievement in three key dimensions of human development: quality of life,
education, and standard of living. The index is a geometric mean of normalized
indices for each of the three dimensions. The index does measure gross national
income as a measure of standards of living but equally measures the other two
dimensions of human development outcomes and thus presents a suitable measure to
control for unequal human development outcomes in the face of similar macroeconomic performance. Literature suggests that increased corruption results in lower
economic rents and increased poverty levels, related to unequal human development
outcomes (Mariyono, 2012). Therefore, controlling for these inequalities assisted this
study in identifying the predictability of the hypotheses on the relationships between
CPI and macroeconomic performance, particularly in the case of the phased
introduction of anti-corruption legislation.
Multicollinearity
Data for this study is secondary and sourced from multiple international
sources focused on macro-economic conditions. Given that two or more predictor
variables may be correlated and hence affect calculations for individual predictors,
possibly resulting in unreliable and unstable estimates of individual predictor
variables, multi-collinearity is a concern. This study accordingly tested for
multicollinearity by examining the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) (Maddala, 1992)
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for each variable (Voyer & Beamish, 2004), where VIF is functionally the inverse of
tolerance and where linear dependence with other predictor variables exists. The VIF
was calculated for each variable where a high VIF value (approximately 5) implies
that the significance of the other variables is sensitive to the inclusion of the variable
(Carlsson & Lundstrom, 2003).

Data Selection, Population, and Sample
Sample size and averaged data
As the macro-economic and corruption data can be expected to exhibit both
sample size limitations and include a significant time-effect over the period under
investigation, this study used averaged data (Hubbard et al., 2010) for the period under
review, to account for fluctuations in the yearly data and which reduces the potential
impacts of single year abnormalities (Voyer & Beamish, 2004). Research studies into
macro-effects using averaged data is widely reported (Dreher & Gassebner, 2011;
Graeff & Mehlkop, 2003; Voyer & Beamish, 2004). This study therefore analyzed the
data for each variable using the average value computed over the research study period
of 2011-2016 and excluded countries with incomplete data.
Data collection
Variables
Corruption (CPI). Measured by Perceptions of Corruption Index. Sourced from
Transparency International (2017).
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Economic performance. (GDP, FDI, NTB). Sourced from published data from
the World Bank and OECD, using World Development Indices (WDI), grouped by
income groups as described above.
Anti-corruption legislation (ACL). Governance data derived from the Heritage
Foundation’s Index of Economic Freedom (2011-16), detailed in Table 7, used to
measure the extent of ACL implementation.
Control Variables
Five controls variables, consisting of the following four macro-economic
variables – inflation (INF%), unemployment (UNEMP%), population growth rate
(POP%) and economic growth rate (GDP%) as well the extent of human development
(HDI) – were controlled for. Data for the macro-economic variables is sourced from
the World Bank’s (2018) World Development Indicators (WDI) data base and the HDI
data from the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) (2019).
The number of nations selected is based on complete data publicly available
from the World Bank and OECD member countries. This totals 189 countries and 28
economies, for which the sample size was too large to allow for detailed research into
individual country ACL measures. Accordingly, the IEF governance index is used to
determine the extent of ACL implementation in the manner described above.
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Data Analytics
Researcher positionality
The researcher has extensive international experience in international finance
with multi-national corporations, including General Motors Corporation, The CocaCola Corporation, and the Tetra Pak Group. More recently, the author has advised the
International Court of Arbitration, as Forensic Expert witness, on economic and
financial matters, including corruption. During his professional career, he has
encountered numerous cases of corruption, both public and private. Searching for
understanding as to the causes and effects of this international scourge, has become a
passion, which has now expanded into the academic field. Understanding how anticorruption laws function at governmental level, what their economic impacts are, and
more importantly, how these measures can be enhanced to become more effective,
will serve to add value to the field, particularly to the authorities responsible for the
legislation, resourcing, and implementation of these measures.
As an experienced senior corporate executive, I maintain no bias as to the
present study’s research question nor the methodology utilized.
Validity
Data has been sourced from international accredited published entities and is
widely used in academic and practical research. Empirical testing followed established
quantitative procedures to maintain relative validity at the required statistical
significance levels.
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Generalizability.
Understanding the relationships and economic impacts between corruption
economic growth, FDI and trade and the impact of anti-corruption legislation on the
impact on these relationships can be expected to provide policy makers and
researchers with statistically valid evidence of the economic impacts of corruption, as
moderated by anti-corruption measures.

Strengths of Study Design
This study includes several key components in the design which increase the
odds that the results of this study may be applicable to additional research and to
policy makers. This empirical study relies on published data from internationally
reliable sources, which have been researched for more than fifty years and is widely
published internationally. This study has also researched the significant amount of
literature on the field, both past and present, and reflects the broad range of views and
findings on the topics of the economic impact of corruption and the effectiveness of
anti-corruption measures on the economic consequences of corruption at country
levels. This study has applied recognized empirical research methods in testing the
data as is consistent with that applied in the extant literature.
Finally, a number of relevant and published external experts in the field of
economics and governance have reviewed this study’s findings and provided
invaluable input on its objectivity and robustness.
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Chapter 4
Data Analysis

Overview
Research has established the relationship between corruption and economic
performance, as outlined above. However, a gap exists in the literature in researching
and determining the impact of anti-corruption measures on the relationship between
corruption and the resultant impact on national economic performance variables as
measured by economic growth, investment & trade flows.
A review of the extant literature on nation’s levels of corruption and the impact
on national economic factors, including economic growth, foreign direct investment
and trade flows, suggests a correlation between the perceived levels of corruption and a
nation’s economic performance.
Despite the increased number of countries developing and legislating anticorruption measures, following international frameworks and guidelines, research on
their effectiveness remains inconclusive (Friedman, 2010). The purpose of this study is
to explore, measure and therefore improve the understanding of the impact of anticorruption measures on the relationship between national levels of perceptions of
corruption and economic performance.
This study has proposed the following research questions tested in the
hypotheses outlined in Chapter 2.
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1. Do national levels of corruption impact levels of national economic
performance as measured by economic growth, investment and trade?
2. How does the legislating, resourcing and implementation of ACL laws
impact the relationship between a nation’s levels of perceived corruption
and economic performance?
Implementing the proposed research design, using specific regression
equations to test each relationship between perceived levels of corruption and
economic performance, as impacted by the introduction of ACL measures, provides a
detailed insight into the significance of each relationship as reported upon in the extant
literature.
Synthesis and Summary of Data
Data and methodology
The data employed in this study are macroeconomic data for six consecutive
years covering the period 2011-2016. In order to better comprehend the type of
methodology used in the analysis, the dataset was compiled and cleaned in the
following manner. First, the source data obtained was cleaned for missing cells, by
removing any countries from the sample with incomplete data for the full period and
for all twelve variables measured. Data reported in original format was analyzed for
compatibility with the appropriate literature support and the scores inverted59 where

59

CPI scores from Transparency International are reported on a scale of 0-100 where highest corruption
is ranked at 100 and lowest at 0. These scores were inverted (=100-value) to maintain the model
ranking methodology of 0 representing the lowest score and 100 the highest (Getz & Volkema, 2001).
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required so as to maintain the model rating of 0-100 where 0, being the lowest score,
and 100, the highest. All variable data values are presented in this consistent manner
with the exception of GDP per capita60 presented, as reported in its raw format. The
original data sourced for all countries and economies (n = 218) was cleaned for
missing data, by removing observations containing blank data cells, so as to arrive at a
complete dataset for all 12 variables totaling 145 countries and economies for the full
study period. The scrubbed data was then averaged (Dreher & Gassebner, 2011;
Graeff & Mehlkop, 2003; Voyer & Beamish, 2004) where each variable was averaged
for the 2011-2016 period.
Second, the complete dataset for the 145 countries was then analyzed for
possible outliers based on the SPSS methodology using the inter-quartile range rule
(Hoaglin & Iglewicz, 1987) and a multiple of 3 times the calculated inter-quartile
range.61 Analysis of the dataset, when applying the inter-quartile range rule, identified
4 countries as outliers62, which were then removed reducing the total number of
countries in the final dataset to 141 and which were utilized in the statistical analysis
process described in Chapter 4.

60

Additional analyses of the possible impact on the model significance, including GDP per capita data
in its raw format versus an indexed format using the 0-100 scale and the log-scale of the GDP data,
reported no material variances in the statistical analysis undertaken.
61

Hoaglin & Iglewicz (1987) identify the inter-quartile range as a measure of statistical dispersion,
being equal to the difference between 75th and 25th percentiles, or between upper and lower quartiles.
62

Four countries (Luxembourg, Norway, Qatar and Switzerland) were found to have variable values
beyond 3 * the inter-quartile range and excluded from the sample population.
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Third, the dataset comprising of the remaining 141 countries and economies
was then analyzed for correlation between the variables so as to identify and remove
any variables that may cause issues with multi-collinearity. Analysis of the dataset
reflected two significant correlations between the GDP/CAP and CPI (0.8380) and
CPI and HDI (0.7482) variables, as reflected in Table 10.
Table 10. Pearson Correlations

Variables
CPI
GDP/CAP
FDI/GDP
NTB/GDP
ACL1
ACL2
ACL3
INF%
UNEMP%
POP%
GDP%
HDI

CPI
1
0.8380**
0.2016*
0.2344**
0.8801**
0.5916**
0.7384**
-0.3995**
0.0254
-0.2804**
-0.2650**
0.7482**

Pearson Correlations
N=141
GDP/CAP FDI/GDP NTB/GDP ACL1
ACL2
ACL3
1
0.2841**
0.1660*
0.7344**
0.4446**
0.5943**
-0.3569**
-0.0673
-0.1270
-0.3119**
0.7206**

1
0.4014**
0.1760*
0.1702*
0.2309**
-0.0893
0.0940
0.0165
0.0886
0.1105

1
0.3129**
0.3653**
0.3645**
-0.1406
-0.0423
-0.1493
-0.0186
0.2875**

1
0.8143**
0.8929**
-0.4308**
0.0481
-0.3182**
-0.2709**
0.7799**

1
0.8946**
-0.3560**
-0.1298
-0.1111
0.0353
0.5316**

1
-0.4857**
0.0231
-0.2539**
-0.1501
0.6880**

INF% UNEMP% POP%

GDP%

1
-0.145
1
0.1195 -0.2972**
1
0.0621 -0.3266** 0.4169**
1
-0.3403** 0.1199 -0.4818** -0.4111**

HDI

1

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

The perceptions of corruption index (CPI) is a widely used index of corruption
and has extensive and relevant literature support. The strong correlation between
indices of corruption and economic growth as measured by GDP per capita is reported
upon (Mauro, 1997) and the use of instrumental variables suggested to avoid
endogeneity (p. 84).63 For example, Mauro suggests that corruption may affect

63

Mauro’s research preceded the CPI index and was based on a comparable Business International (BI)
indices of corruption. The comparisons between these indices is reviewed in Chapter 3.
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economic growth through other channels other than FDI, where corruption may lower
economic growth by reducing domestic investment.
The Human Development Index (HDI),64 which measures nations’ broad social
and economic variables, is a summary measure of average achievement in three key
dimensions of human development: (i) a long and healthy life, (ii) being
knowledgeable, and (iii) have a decent standard of living. The HDI is calculated as the
geometric mean of normalized indices for each of these three dimensions.
The health dimension is assessed by life expectancy at birth whilst the
education (knowledgeable) dimension is measured by mean of years of schooling for
adults aged greater than 25 years and expected years of schooling for children of
school entering age.
The third dimension, standard of living, is measured by gross national income
per capita. The HDI uses the logarithm of income, to reflect the diminishing
importance of income with increasing GNI. The resultant scores for the three HDI
dimension indices are then aggregated into a composite index using geometric mean.
The HDI therefore includes overlapping national economic data computed and
measured in the third, standard of living, dimension, in the determination of economic
growth using the GDP per capita measure. Since the HDI also measures two other
dimensions of human development, life expectancy and education levels, the index
provides a broader insight into the relationship between levels of perceived corruption
and economic performance.

64

UNDP (2019).
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Accordingly, these variables were confirmed in the data sample analyzed and
reported upon. The final data sample was confirmed at 141 countries and economies
(Appendix A).
This study tested for multi-collinearity by determining the Variance Inflation
Factor (VIF) (Maddala, 1992) for each variable (Voyer & Beamish, 2004), where a
high VIF value (>5) implies that the significance of the other variables is sensitive to
the inclusion of the variable introduced (Carlsson & Lundstrom, 2003). In this study,
no single VIF is calculated at a greater value than 2.93 for the data variables,
indicating that the predictors are not collinear.
Fourth, the sample size constraint prevented a Structural Equation Modeling
(SEM) approach from being utilized, since the values for all variables and countries
were averaged over the period 2011-16, as described above. Hence, the relationships
examined in this study were tested using a series of Multiple Linear Regression
(MLR) equations. The series of regression equations test each relationship, as
proposed in the Chapter 2, and follow the equations listed in Table 12. Each equation
independently tests the relationships between the variables, avoiding correlation and
multi-collinearity concerns between the variables, were they to be included in one
regression equation. The set of regression equations, and the set of relationships tested
therein, was dictated by the variable under investigation for that specific test and for
the moderating impact of the introduction of the ACL measures on the relationship
between nation’s levels of corruption and economic performance.
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The relationship between a nation’s levels of corruption and economic growth
as measured by GDP, was tested in each of the respective regression tests, H1A, H2A,
H3A and H4A, where the latter three equations test for the moderating impact of the
different levels of ACL legislation (ACL1), resourcing (ACL2) and implementation
(ACL3) on the relationship between CPI and GDP, respectively. The same
methodology is repeated to test the relationship between a nation’s levels of corruption
and foreign investment in hypotheses H1B, H2B, H3B and H4B and for the
relationship between levels of corruption and trade flows, as measured by NTB, in
hypotheses H1C, H2C, H3C and H4C, respectively as reflected in Table 12. All
regressions include the following control variables; inflation rate (INF%),
unemployment levels (UNEMP%), population growth rates (POP%), economic
growth rates (GDP%), and levels of human development (HDI)
The study’s descriptive statistics are summarized in Appendix B.
This study uses the multiple linear regression technique to test each hypothesis
as outlined in Tables 11 and 12.
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Table 11. Variables and Constructs

Variables
CPI
GDP
FDI
NTB
INF%
UNEMP%
POP%
GDP%
HDI

Measuring
Corruption Perceptions Index
Gross Domestic Product per Capita
Foreign Direct Investment percentage of GDP
Net Trade Flows percentage of GDP
Annual Inflation percentage
Annual Unemployment percentage of Total Labor Force
Annual Population percentage growth
Annual GDP percentage growth
Human Development Index

Constructs
ACL1
ACL2

Measuring
Legislated anti-corruption legislation
Legislated and resourced anti-corruption legislation
Legislated, resourced and implemented anti-corruption
legislation
Moderation of legislated anti-corruption laws on the
relationship between a nation's levels of corruption and
economic performance variables
Moderation of legislated and resourced anti-corruption
laws on the relationship between a nation's levels of
corruption and economic performance variables
Moderation of legislated, resourced and implemented anticorruption laws on the relationship between a nation's
levels of corruption and economic performance variables

ACL3
ACL1CPI

AC2CPI

ACL3CPI
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Table 12. Regression tests performed
Regression
test
1A
1B
1C
2A
2B
2C
3A
3B
3C
4A
4B
4C

Hypothesis Dependent
variables
H1A
GDP
H1B
FDI
H1C
NTB
H2A
GDP
H2B
FDI
H2C
NTB
H3A
GDP
H3B
FDI
H3C
NTB
H4A
GDP
H4B
FDI
H4C
NTB

Independent Moderating Control variables
variables
variable
INF%, UNEMP%,
POP%, GDP%, HDI

CPI

CPI, ACL1

ACL1CPI

INF%, UNEMP%,
POP%, GDP%, HDI

CPI, ACL2

ACL2CPI

INF%, UNEMP%,
POP%, GDP%, HDI

CPI, ACL3

ACL3CPI

INF%, UNEMP%,
POP%, GDP%, HDI

Research Findings
This study proposed to research and document the relationships between a
nation’s level of perceived corruption (CPI) and its macro-economic performance, as
measured by GDP, FDI and NTB, in two steps.
Firstly, this study researched the relationship between a nation’s levels of
corruption as measured by CPI and economic performance, as outlined in research
question 1, and proposed in hypotheses H1A, H1B and H1C, respectively.
Secondly, having researched the relationship between nation’s levels of
corruption (CPI) and economic performance, this study asks in research question 2,
how the phased legislating, resourcing and implementation of anti-corruption
legislation (ACL) impacts the relationship between levels of corruption and economic
performance tested in H1, in the following proposed hypotheses, H2, H3 and H4. The
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moderating interactive impact of the legislation of ACL1 measures on the relationship
between CPI and GDP was tested in hypothesis H2A, between CPI and FDI in
hypothesis H2B and between CPI and NTB in hypothesis H2C, respectively. The
moderating impact of legislated and resourced anti-corruption measures, on the
relationship between CPI and economic performance, was further tested in hypotheses
H3A for GDP, in H3B for FDI and in H3C for NTB, respectively. Finally, the
moderating impact of legislated, resourced and implemented anti-corruption measures,
on the relationship between CPI and economic performance, was tested in hypotheses
H4A for GDP, in H4B for FDI and in H4C for NTB as reflected in the Tables 13 to 25
below.
Testing these twelve hypotheses allowed this study to examine the impact of
the three different cumulative phased levels of ACL implementation, on the
relationship between perceived levels of corruption and economic performance and
provide insights into the two research questions tabled:
1. Do national levels of perceived corruption impact national economic
performance, as measured by economic growth, investment and trade?
2. Does the legislating, resourcing and implementation of anti-corruption laws
impact the relationship between a nation’s levels of perceived corruption
and economic performance?
In order to test the hypotheses, multiple linear regression tests were undertaken in a
hierarchical manner as outlined below.
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Regressions 1A, 1B, 1C and hypotheses H1A, H1B and H1C results
Regressions 1A, 1B and 1C examine the relationships between perceived
levels of corruption (CPI) and economic growth (GDP) in hypothesis H1A, foreign
direct investments (FDI) in hypothesis H1B and international trade flows in hypothesis
H1C, when controlled for inflation (INF%), unemployment levels (UNEMP%),
population growth rates (POP%), economic growth rates (GDP%), and levels of
human development (HDI).

H1A: The higher the level of perceived corruption in an economy, the lower the level
of economic growth, in that economy, as measured by GDP.
In hypothesis H1A, it is posited that a nation’s level of perceived corruption
(CPI) is related to national economic growth as measured by GDP. This suggests that
countries with higher levels of corruption are impacted economically through lower
levels of economic growth, as measured by GDP.
Testing H1A:
Regression 1A tests the relationship between levels of corruption as measured
by CPI as the independent variable, and economic growth, as measured by GDP, as
the dependent variable, and controls for the inflation rate (INF%), population growth
rate (POP%), unemployment rate (UNEMP%), economic growth rate (GDP%) and the
human development index (HDI).
Results from regression 1A (Table 13) indicate the following: R2 = 0.7791 and
adjusted R2 = 0.7692, F = 78.7555, p = <0.0001. In regression H1A, the following
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variables, CPI was a significant predictor of GDP at the 0.0001 level, and the
following control variables, POP% and HDI, significant at the 0.0001 level and
GDP% and UNEMP%, significant at the 0.05 level. These results indicate support for
levels of corruption (CPI) predicting the level of economic performance as measured
by economic growth (GDP), when controlled for inflation (INF%), unemployment
levels (UNEMP%), population growth rates (POP%), economic growth rates (GDP%),
and levels of human development (HDI), as indicated in the extant literature and for
the updated period 2011-2016.
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Table 13. Linear Regression 1A testing Hypothesis 1A
Beta Coeff.
Dependent Variable Gross Domestic Product per Capita (GDP)
Independent Variable
Corruption Perception Index (CPI)
Constant

-0.6237****
(9.7846)
-37860.34***
(-5.7956)

Control Variables
Inflation (INF%)
Unemployment (UMEMP%)
Population Growth Rate (POP%)
Economic Growth Rate (GDP%)
Human Development Index (HDI)

-0.0382
(-0.8455)
-0.1059**
(-2.3698)
0.2292****
(4.6209)
-0.1501**
(-3.1161)
0.3024****
(4.3505)

Model Statistics
R2

0.7791
2

Notes:

Adjusted R
Model F-Value
Significance
Sample Size
1. t-stats in parenthesis
2. *p <.10, **p <.05, ***p <.001, ****p <.0001
3. All betas except constant are standardized
4. CPI data inverted
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0.7692
78.7555
P=<0.0001
141

H1B: The higher the level of perceived corruption in an economy, the lower the level
of foreign investment, in that economy, as measured by FDI.
In hypothesis H1B, it is posited that a nation’s level of perceived corruption, as
measured by CPI is related to national levels of foreign direct investment, as measured
by FDI. This suggests that countries with higher levels of CPI are impacted
economically through lower levels of foreign direct investment.
Testing H1B:
Regression 1B tests the relationship between levels of corruption, as measured
by CPI as the independent variable, and levels of foreign investment, as measured by
FDI, as the dependent variable and controls for the following variables; inflation rate
(INF%), population growth rate (POP%), unemployment rate (UNEMP%), economic
growth rate (GDP%) and the human development index (HDI).
Results from regression 1B (Table 14) indicate the following: R2 = 0.0872 and
adjusted R2 = 0.0463, F = 2.1323, p = <0.10. In regression 1B, levels of corruption
(CPI) was significant at the 0.05 level and the control variables, GDP% and
UNEMP% significant at the 0.10 level. These results indicate support for levels of
corruption (CPI) predicting the level of economic performance as measured by
investments (FDI), when controlled for inflation (INF%), unemployment levels
(UNEMP%), population growth rates (POP%), economic growth rates (GDP%), and
levels of human development (HDI), as indicated in the extant literature and for the
updated period 2011-2016.
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Table 14. Linear Regression 1B testing Hypothesis 1B

Beta Coeff.
Dependent Variable Foreign Direct Investment/GDP (FDI)
Independent Variable
Corruption Perception Index (CPI)
Constant

-0.2741**
(2.1153)
-4.67
(-0.8940)

Control Variables
Inflation (INF%)
Unemployment (UMEMP%)
Population Growth Rate (POP%)
Economic Growth Rate (GDP%)
Human Development Index (HDI)

0.0266
(0.2889)
0.1715*
(1.8877)
0.0629
(0.6243)
0.1903*
(1.9438)
0.0024
(0.0171)

Model Statistics
R2

0.0872
2

Notes:

Adjusted R
Model F-Value
Significance
Sample Size
1. t-stats in parenthesis
2. *p <.10, **p <.05, ***p <.001, ****p <.0001
3. All betas except constant are standardized
4. CPI data inverted

0.0463
2.1323
P=<0.10
141

H1C: The higher the level of perceived corruption in an economy, the lower the level
of international trade, in that economy, as measured by NTB.
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In hypothesis H1C, it is posited that a nation’s level of perceived corruption as
measured by CPI, is related to international trade flows, as measured by NTB. This
suggests that countries with higher levels of CPI are impacted economically through
lower levels of international trade.
Testing H1C:
Regression H1C tests the relationship between levels of corruption as
measured by CPI as the independent variable and international trade as measured by
NTB, as the dependent variable and controls for the following variables; inflation rate
(INF%), population growth rate (POP%), unemployment rate (UNEMP%), economic
growth rate (GDP%) and the human development index (HDI).
Regression 1C (Table 15) indicate the following results: R2 = 0.1021 and
adjusted R2 = 0.0619, F = 2.5389, p = <0.05. In regression 1C, whilst the model was
found to be significant at the 0.05 level of significance, there was no support for the
hypothesized relationship between levels of corruption in predicting trade flows
(NTB).
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Table 15. Linear Regression 1C testing Hypothesis 1C
Beta Coeff.
Dependent Variable Net Trade Balance/GDP (NTB)
Independent Variable
Corruption Perception Index (CPI)
Constant

-0.0209
(0.1624)
16.57
(0.5710)

Control Variables
Inflation (INF%)
Unemployment (UMEMP%)
Population Growth Rate (POP%)
Economic Growth Rate (GDP%)
Human Development Index (HDI)

-0.0467
(-0.5126)
-0.0678
(-0.7523)
0.0716
(-0.7162)
0.1107
(1.1400)
0.2751*
(1.9636)

Model Statistics
R2

0.1021
2

Notes:

Adjusted R
Model F-Value
Significance
Sample Size
1. t-stats in parenthesis
2. *p <.10, **p <.05, ***p <.001, ****p <.0001
3. All betas except constant are standardized
4. CPI data inverted

0.0619
2.5389
P=<0.05
141

Hypotheses 1 Results summary: (Appendix C.)
These results for hypotheses 1A, 1B, and 1C, tested in regressions 1A, 1B and
1C, indicate that CPI, as a measure of nation’s levels of corruption, is a significant
predictor of a nation’s economic growth, as measured by GDP per capita, and foreign
investment, as measured by FDI. The lack of support for the predictive impact of CPI
on trade, as measured by NTB, was not expected, and will be expanded upon below.
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Regressions 2A, 2B & 2C and hypotheses H2A, H2B and H2C results
Hypotheses 2 test the second research question in order to examine the impact
of the phased introduction of anti-corruption laws (ACL) on the relationship between a
nation’s levels of perceived corruption and economic performance.
These three regression equations examine the impact of the introduction of
legislated anti-corruption legislation (ACL1) on the relationships between levels of
corruption as measured by CPI and economic growth, measured by GDP, in
hypothesis H2A, foreign direct investments, as measured by FDI, in hypothesis H2B
and trade flows as measured by NTB, in hypothesis H2C.
The ACL1 construct measures a nation’s ability to legislate ACL measures,
aimed at reducing levels of corruption (CPI), and its impact on the relationship
between levels of corruption and economic performance, as measured by the
economic growth (GDP), foreign investment (FDI), and trade (NTB), when controlled
for the following variables; inflation rate (INF%), population growth rate (POP%),
unemployment rate (UNEMP%), economic growth rate (GDP%) and the human
development index (HDI).

H2A: The legislation of anti-corruption laws (ACL1), moderates the relationship
between a nation’s levels of corruption and economic growth, as measured by GDP,
such that the relationship is weakened.
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In hypothesis H2A, it is posited that a nation’s introduction of legislated anticorruption laws (ACL1) impacts the relationship between the level of perceived
corruption (CPI) and national economic growth, as measured by GDP. This suggests
that countries with legislated ACL laws, aimed at reducing perceived levels of
corruption, impact the relationship between levels of corruption and economic growth,
as measured by GDP.
Testing H2A:
Regression 2A tests the direct impact of ACL1 measures on economic growth
(GDP) and the moderating impact of ACL1 on the relationship between levels of
corruption (CPI) as the independent variable and economic performance, as measured
by GDP, as the dependent variable and controls for the following variables; inflation
rate (INF%), population growth rate (POP%), unemployment rate (UNEMP%),
economic growth rate (GDP%) and the human development index (HDI).
Regression 2A (Table 16) indicates the following results: R2 = 0.8061 and
adjusted R2 = 0.7943, F = 68.5941, p = <0.0001. In regression 2A, the direct impact of
the legislated ACL1 measures on economic growth (GDP%) was found to be
significant at the 0.0001 level, whilst the moderating impact of the legislation of
ACL1 measures, was also found to be significant at the 0.001 level. The following
control variables, POP% and HDI were significant at the 0.0001 level, and GDP%,
significant at the 0.05 level. These results indicate strong support for the moderating
impact of legislated anti-corruption legislation (ACL1) on the relationship between
CPI and economic growth (GDP), when controlled for inflation (INF%),
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unemployment levels (UNEMP%), population growth rates (POP%), economic
growth rates (GDP%), and levels of human development (HDI).
Table 16. Linear Regression 2A testing Hypothesis 2A
Beta Coeff.
Dependent Variable Gross Domestic Product per Capita (GDP)
Independent Variables
Corruption Perception Index
Anti-Corruption Legislation 1
Constant

-0.3454
(-1.2047)
0.5542****
(-4.1081)
7491.13
(0.6120)

Control Variables
Inflation
Unemployment
Population Growth Rate
Economic Growth Rate
Human Development Index
Moderating Variable
Anti-Corruption Legislation 1

-0.0569
(-1.3142)
-0.0643
(-1.4752)
0.2235****
(4.7706)
-0.1141**
(-2.4655)
0.4100****
(5.7001)
1.3955***
(3.9033)

Model Statistics
2

R

0.8061
2

Notes:

Adjusted R
Model F-Value
Significance
Sample Size
1. t-stats in parenthesis
2. *p <.10, **p <.05, ***p <.001, ****p <.0001
3. All betas except constant are standardized
4. CPI data inverted
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0.7943
68.5941
P=<0.0001
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H2B: The legislation of anti-corruption laws (ACL1), moderates the relationship
between a nation’s levels of corruption and foreign investment, as measured by FDI,
such that the relationship is weakened.
In hypothesis H2B, it is posited that a nation’s introduction of legislated anticorruption laws (ACL1) impacts the relationship between the levels of perceived
corruption (CPI) and foreign direct investment, as measured by FDI. This suggests
that countries with legislated ACL laws, aimed at reducing levels of corruption,
impact the relationship between levels of corruption and foreign investment.
Testing H2B:
Regression 2B tests the direct impact of ACL1 measures on foreign investment
(FDI) and the moderating impact of ACL1 on the relationship between levels of
corruption (CPI) as the independent variable and foreign investment, as measured by
FDI, as the dependent variable and controls for the following variables; inflation rate
(INF%), population growth rate (POP%), unemployment rate (UNEMP%), economic
growth rate (GDP%) and the human development index (HDI).
Regression 2B (Table 17) indicates the following results: R2 = 0.0952 and
adjusted R2 = 0.0404, F = 1.7369, p = <0.10. In regression 2B, whilst the model was
found to be significant at the 0.10 level, there was no support for the hypothesized
moderating impact of ACL1 on the relationship between levels of corruption and
foreign direct investment. Only the control variables, UNEMP% and GDP% were
found to be significant at the 0.05 level. This suggests that the introduction of
legislated anti-corruption laws (ACL1) is not significant in moderating the relationship
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between CPI and investment flows (FDI), when controlled for the inflation rate
(INF%), population growth rate (POP%), unemployment rate (UNEMP%), economic
growth rate (GDP%) and the human development index (HDI).
Table 17. Linear Regression 2B testing Hypothesis 2B
Beta Coeff.
Dependent Variable Foreign Direct Investment/GDP (FDI)
Independent Variables
Corruption Perception Index
Anti-Corruption Legislation 1
Constant

-0.3836
(-0.6194)
-0.1920
(-0.6591)
3.26
(0.3139)

Control Variables
Inflation
Unemployment
Population Growth Rate
Economic Growth Rate
Human Development Index
Moderating Variable
Anti-Corruption Legislation 1

0.7779
(0.2826)
0.0382**
(2.0934)
0.5529
(0.5950)
0.0383**
(2.0921)
0.8535
(0.1850)
0.8222
(1.0646)

Model Statistics
2

R

0.0952
2

Notes:

Adjusted R
Model F-Value
Significance
Sample Size
1. t-stats in parenthesis
2. *p <.10, **p <.05, ***p <.001, ****p <.0001
3. All betas except constant are standardized
4. CPI data inverted
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0.0404
1.7369
P=<0.10
141

H2C: The legislation of anti-corruption laws (ACL1), moderates the relationship
between a nation’s levels of corruption and international trade, as measured by NTB,
such that the relationship is weakened.
In hypothesis H2C, it is posited that a nation’s introduction of legislated anticorruption laws (ACL1) impacts the relationship between the level of perceived
corruption (CPI) and trade flows, as measured by NTB. This suggests that countries
with legislated ACL laws, aimed at reducing perceived levels of corruption, impact the
relationship between levels of corruption and international trade as measured by NTB.
Testing H2C:
Regression 2C tests the direct impact of ACL1 measures on international trade
(NTB) and the moderating impact of ACL1 on the relationship between levels of
corruption (CPI) as the independent variable and international trade, as measured by
NTB, as the dependent variable and controls for the following variables; inflation rate
(INF%), population growth rate (POP%), unemployment rate (UNEMP%), economic
growth rate (GDP%) and the human development index (HDI).
Regression 2C (Table 18) indicates the following results: R2 = 0.1344 and
adjusted R2 = 0.0820, F = 2.5628, p = <0.05. Whilst the model was found to be
significant at the 0.05 level, there was no support for the hypothesized moderating
impact of ACL1 on the relationship between levels of corruption and trade flows. No
variables were found to be significant, indicating no support for the introduction of
legislated anti-corruption laws having a moderating impact on the relationship
between CPI and trade flows (NTB), when controlled for the inflation rate (INF%),
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population growth rate (POP%), unemployment rate (UNEMP%), economic growth
rate (GDP%) and the human development index (HDI).
Table 18. Linear Regression 2C testing Hypothesis 2C
Beta Coeff.
Dependent Variable Net Trade Balance/GDP (NTB)
Independent Variables
Corruption Perception Index
Anti-Corruption Legislation 1
Constant

-0.7679
(-1.2678)
0.1762
(0.6182)
18.23
(0.3201)

Control Variables
Inflation
Unemployment
Population Growth Rate
Economic Growth Rate
Human Development Index
Moderating Variable
Anti-Corruption Legislation 1

-0.0191
(-0.2087)
-0.0426
(-0.4620)
-0.0723
(-0.7310)
0.1210
(1.2372)
0.2036
(1.3396)
0.7103
(0.9403)

Model Statistics
2

R

0.1344
2

Notes:

Adjusted R
Model F-Value
Significance
Sample Size
1. t-stats in parenthesis
2. *p <.10, **p <.05, ***p <.001, ****p <.0001
3. All betas except constant are standardized
4. CPI data inverted
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0.0820
2.5628
P=<0.05
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Hypotheses 2 results summary: (Appendix D.)
These results for hypotheses 2A, 2B, and 2C, tested in regressions 2A, 2B and
2C, indicate that the introduction of ACL1 legislation has a direct impact on GDP,
however this is not the primary focus of this study. The moderating impact of ACL1 is
found to reduce the impact of corruption on economic growth, as measured by GDP.
The impact of ACL1 was not found to be significant on foreign investment and trade.
Given that the literature reviewed highlights the importance of resourcing and
implementing these measures, this may provide additional clarity for these results.

Regressions 3A, 3B, 3C and hypotheses H3A, H3B and H3C results
Hypotheses 3 test the second research question in order to examine the impact
of resourcing the legislated anti-corruption laws (ACL) on the relationship between a
nation’s levels of perceived corruption and economic performance.
These three regression equations examine the impact of the introduction of
legislated and resourced anti-corruption legislation (ACL2) on the relationships
between CPI and economic growth (GDP) in hypothesis H3A, and foreign direct
investments (FDI) in hypothesis H3B and trade flows (NTB) in hypothesis H3C. The
ACL2 construct measures a nation’s ability to resource legislated ACL measures
aimed at further reducing levels of corruption (CPI) and its impact on the relationship
between levels of corruption and economic performance, as measured by the
economic growth (GDP), foreign investment (FDI), and trade (NTB) economic
variables, when controlled for the following variables; inflation rate (INF%),
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population growth rate (POP%), unemployment rate (UNEMP%), economic growth
rate (GDP%) and the human development index (HDI). The moderating impact of the
resourcing of the legislated ACL measures (ACL2) is calculated by multiplying CPI
and ACL2, in each regression.

H3A: The resourcing of legislated anti-corruption laws (ACL2), moderates the
relationship between a nation’s levels of corruption and economic growth, as
measured by GDP, such that the relationship is weakened.
In hypothesis H3A, it is posited that a nation’s resourcing of legislated anticorruption laws (ACL2) impacts the relationship between the level of perceived
corruption (CPI) and national economic growth, as measured by GDP. This suggests
that countries with resourced and legislated ACL laws, aimed at further reducing
perceived levels of corruption, impacts the relationship between levels of corruption
and economic growth, as measured by GDP.
Testing H3A:
Regression 3A tests the direct impact of ACL2 measures on economic growth
(GDP) and the moderating impact of ACL2 on the relationship between levels of
corruption (CPI) as the independent variable and economic growth, as measured by
GDP, as the dependent variable and controls for the following variables; inflation rate
(INF%), population growth rate (POP%), unemployment rate (UNEMP%), economic
growth rate (GDP%) and the human development index (HDI).
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Regression 3A (Table 19) indicates the following results: R2 = 0.7979 and
adjusted R2 = 0.7857, F = 65.1504, p = <0.0001. In regression 3A, the direct impact of
ACL2 on economic growth (GDP%) was found to be significant at the 0.05 level,
whilst the moderating impact of the resourced ACL2 measures was also found to be
significant at the same 0.05 level. In addition, the following control variables, GDP%
and UNEMP% were significant at the 0.05 level and POP% and HDI significant at the
0.0001 level. These results indicate support for the moderating impact of resourced
and legislated anti-corruption laws (ACL2) on the relationship between CPI and
economic growth (GDP), when controlled for unemployment levels (UNEMP%),
population growth rates (POP%), economic growth rates (GDP%), and levels of
human development (HDI).
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Table 19. Linear Regression 3A testing Hypothesis 3A

Beta Coeff.
Dependent Variable Gross Domestic Product per Capita (GDP)
Independent Variables
Corruption Perception Index
Anti-Corruption Legislation 2
Constant

-0.0745
(-0.2011)
-0.3679**
(-3.1196)
16202.36
(0.8312)

Control Variables
Inflation
Unemployment
Population Growth Rate
Economic Growth Rate
Human Development Index
Moderating Variable
Anti-Corruption Legislation 2

-0.0706
(-1.5844)
-0.1115**
(-2.5426)
02286****
(4.7619)
-0.1025**
(-2.1179)
0.3810****
(5.3944)
0.8744**
(2.0595)

Model Statistics
2

R

0.7979
2

Notes:

Adjusted R
Model F-Value
Significance
Sample Size
1. t-stats in parenthesis
2. *p <.10, **p <.05, ***p <.001, ****p <.0001
3. All betas except constant are standardized
4. CPI data inverted
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0.7857
65.1504
P=<0.0001
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H3B: The resourcing of legislated anti-corruption laws (ACL2), moderates the
relationship between a nation’s levels of corruption and foreign investment, as
measured by FDI, such that the relationship is weakened.
In hypothesis H3B, it is posited that a nation’s resourcing of legislated anticorruption laws (ACL2) impacts the relationship between the level of perceived
corruption (CPI) and foreign investment, as measured by FDI. This suggests that
countries with resourced and legislated ACL laws, aimed at further reducing perceived
levels of corruption, impacts the relationship between levels of corruption and foreign
investment as measured by FDI.
Testing H3B:
Regression 3B tests the direct impact of ACL2 measures on foreign investment
(FDI) and the moderating impact of ACL2 on the relationship between levels of
corruption (CPI) as the independent variable and foreign investment, as measured by
FDI, as the dependent variable and controls for the following variables; inflation rate
(INF%), population growth rate (POP%), unemployment rate (UNEMP%), economic
growth rate (GDP%) and the human development index (HDI).
Regression 3B (Table 20) indicates the following results: R2 = 0.1176 and
adjusted R2 = 0.0641, F = 2.1980, p = <0.05. In regression 3B, the moderating impact
of the resourced ACL2 measures was significant at the 0.05 level, levels of corruption
(CPI) significant at the 0.10 level and the following control variables, GDP%
significant at the 0.05 level and UNEMP% significant at the 0.001 level. These results
indicate support for the moderating impact of resourced and legislated anti-corruption
151

laws (ACL2) on the relationship between CPI and investment flows (FDI), when
controlled for inflation (INF%), unemployment (UNEMP%), population growth rates
(POP%), economic growth rates (GDP%) and unemployment levels (UNEMP%).
Table 20. Linear Regression 3B testing Hypothesis 3B
Beta Coeff.
Dependent Variable Foreign Direct Investment/GDP (FDI)
Independent Variables
Corruption Perception Index
Anti-Corruption Legislation 2
Constant

-1.3003*
(-1.6801)
-0.3754
(-1.5231)
20.70
(1.2926)

Control Variables
Inflation
Unemployment
Population Growth Rate
Economic Growth Rate
Human Development Index
Moderating Variable
Anti-Corruption Legislation 2

0.0104
(0.1118)
0.2034***
(2.2198)
0.0443
(0.4414)
0.2020**
(1.9979)
0.0295
(0.1996)
1.8095**
(2.0326)

Model Statistics
2

R

0.1176
2

Notes:

Adjusted R
Model F-Value
Significance
Sample Size
1. t-stats in parenthesis
2. *p <.10, **p <.05, ***p <.001, ****p <.0001
3. All betas except constant are standardized
4. CPI data inverted
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0.0641
2.1980
P=<0.05
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H3C: The resourcing of legislated anti-corruption laws (ACL2), moderates the
relationship between a nation’s levels of corruption and international trade, as
measured by NTB, such that the relationship is weakened.
In hypothesis H3C, it is posited that a nation’s resourcing of legislated anticorruption laws (ACL2) impacts the relationship between the level of perceived
corruption (CPI) and trade levels as measured by NTB. This suggests that countries
with resourced and legislated ACL laws, aimed at further reducing perceived levels of
corruption, impacts the relationship between levels of corruption and international
trade (NTB).
Testing H3C:
Regression 3C tests the direct impact of ACL2 measures on international trade
(NTB) and the moderating impact of ACL2 on the relationship between levels of
corruption (CPI), as the independent variable, and trade, as measured by NTB, as the
dependent variable and controls for the following variables; inflation rate (INF%),
population growth rate (POP%), unemployment rate (UNEMP%), economic growth
rate (GDP%) and the human development index (HDI).
Regression 3C (Table 21) indicates the following results: R2 = 0.2237 and
adjusted R2 = 0.1767, F = 4.7555, p = <0.0001. In regression 3C, the moderating
impact of the resourced ACL2 measures was significant at the 0.001 level, whilst the
direct impact of the ACL2 measures on the trade (NTB), significant at the 0.10 level.
Levels of corruption (CPI) was found to be significant at the 0.001 level and HDI at
the 0.10 level. These results indicate strong support for the moderating impact of
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resourced and legislated anti-corruption laws (ACL2) on the relationship between CPI
and trade flows (NTB), when controlled for when controlled for the inflation rate
(INF%), population growth rate (POP%), unemployment rate (UNEMP%), economic
growth rate (GDP%) and levels of human development (HDI).
Table 21. Linear Regression 3C testing Hypothesis 3C
Beta Coeff.
Dependent Variable Net Trade Balance/GDP (NTB)
Independent Variables
Corruption Perception Index
Anti-Corruption Legislation 2
Constant

-2.5302***
(-3.4858)
-0.3912*
(-1.6924)
186.48**
(2.2158)

Control Variables
Inflation
Unemployment
Population Growth Rate
Economic Growth Rate
Human Development Index
Moderating Variable
Anti-Corruption Legislation 2

-0.0458
(-0.5242)
0.0051
(0.0594)
-0.1101
(-1.1703)
0.0840
(0.8854)
0.2471*
(1.7852)
2.8515***
(3.4150)

Model Statistics
2

R

0.2237
2

Notes:

Adjusted R
Model F-Value
Significance
Sample Size
1. t-stats in parenthesis
2. *p <.10, **p <.05, ***p <.001, ****p <.0001
3. All betas except constant are standardized
4. CPI data inverted
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0.1767
4.7555
P=<0.0001
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Hypotheses 3 results summary: (Appendix E.)
These results for hypotheses 3A, 3B, and 3C, tested in regressions 3A, 3B and
3C, indicate that the resourcing of the ACL2 legislation has a direct impact on nations’
economic performance, as measured by GDP and NTB.
The moderating impact of ACL measures, the primary focus of this study,
specifically the resourcing of ACL2 measures was found to be significant in reducing
the impact of corruption on economic growth, as measured by GDP, foreign
investment (FDI) and trade (NTB).
These results support the literature reviewed indicating the importance of
resourcing anti-corruption measures.

Regressions 4A, 4B, 4C and hypotheses H4A, H4B and H4C results.
These three regression equations examine the impact of the introduction of
legislated, resourced and implemented anti-corruption legislation (ACL3) on the
relationships between levels of corruption and economic growth (GDP) in hypothesis
H4A, foreign direct investments (FDI) in hypothesis H4B and trade flows in
hypothesis H4C.
The ACL3 construct measures a nation’s ability to implement resourced and
legislated ACL measures, aimed at still further reducing levels of corruption (CPI) and
its impact on the relationship between levels of corruption and economic performance,
as measured by the economic growth (GDP), foreign investment (FDI), and trade
(NTB) economic variables, when controlled for the following variables; inflation rate
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(INF%), population growth rate (POP%), unemployment rate (UNEMP%), economic
growth rate (GDP%) and the human development index (HDI).

H4A: The implementation of resourced and legislated anti-corruption laws (ACL3),
moderates the relationship between a nation’s levels of corruption and economic
growth, as measured by GDP, such that the relationship is weakened.
In hypothesis H4A, it is posited that a nation’s implementation of resourced
and legislated anti-corruption laws (ACL3) impacts the relationship between the level
of perceived corruption (CPI) and national economic growth, as measured by GDP.
This suggests that countries implementing resourced and legislated ACL laws, aimed
at still further reducing perceived levels of corruption, impacts the relationship
between levels of corruption and economic growth, as measured by GDP.
Testing H4A:
Regression 4A tests the direct impact of ACL3 measures on economic growth
(GDP) and the moderating impact of ACL3 on the relationship between levels of
corruption (CPI) as the independent variable and economic growth, as measured by
GDP, as the dependent variable and controls for the following variables; inflation rate
(INF%), population growth rate (POP%), unemployment rate (UNEMP%), economic
growth rate (GDP%) and the human development index (HDI).
Regression 4A (Table 22) indicates the following results: R2 = 0.8048 and
adjusted R2 = 0.7930 F= 68.0472, p = <0.0001. In regression 4A, the moderating
impact of the implemented ACL3 measures was significant at the 0.001 level, whilst
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the direct impact of the ACL3 measures trade (NTB), significant at the 0.0001 level.
The following control variables, HDI and POP% were significant at the 0.0001 level,
GDP% significant at the 0.05 level and INF% and UNEMP% at the 0.10 level. These
results indicate strong support for the moderating impact of implemented, resourced
and legislated anti-corruption laws (ACL3) on the relationship between CPI and
economic growth (GDP), when controlled for inflation (INF%), unemployment levels
(UNEMP%), population growth rates (POP%), economic growth rates (GDP%), and
levels of human development (HDI).
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Table 22. Linear Regression 4A testing Hypothesis 4A
Beta Coeff.
Dependent Variable Gross Domestic Product per Capita (GDP)
Independent Variables
Corruption Perception Index
Anti-Corruption Legislation 3
Constant

-0.5496
(-1.5037)
-0.4967****
(-4.1723)
26023.13
(1.5513)

Control Variables
Inflation
Unemployment
Population Growth Rate
Economic Growth Rate
Human Development Index
Moderating Variable
Anti-Corruption Legislation 3

-0.0846*
(-1.8785)
-0.0800*
(-1.8519)
0.2248****
(4.7829)
-0.1137**
(-2.4461)
0.3938****
(5.5926)
1.4837***
(3.4424)

Model Statistics
2

R

0.8048
2

Notes:

Adjusted R
Model F-Value
Significance
Sample Size
1. t-stats in parenthesis
2. *p <.10, **p <.05, ***p <.001, ****p <.0001
3. All betas except constant are standardized
4. CPI data inverted
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0.7930
68.0472
P=<0.0001
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H4B: The implementation of resourced and legislated anti-corruption laws (ACL3),
moderates the relationship between a nation’s levels of corruption and foreign
investment, as measured by FDI, such that the relationship is weakened.
In hypothesis H4B, it is posited that a nation’s implementation of resourced
legislated anti-corruption laws (ACL3) impacts the relationship between the level of
perceived corruption (CPI) and foreign investment, as measured by FDI. This suggests
that countries implementing resourced and legislated ACL laws, aimed at still further
reducing perceived levels of corruption, impacts the relationship between levels of
corruption and foreign investment, as measured by FDI.
Testing H4B:
Regression 4B tests the direct impact of ACL3 measures on foreign investment
(FDI) and the moderating impact of ACL3 on the relationship between levels of
corruption (CPI) as the independent variable and foreign investment, as measured by
FDI, as the dependent variable and controls for the following variables; inflation rate
(INF%), population growth rate (POP%), unemployment rate (UNEMP%), economic
growth rate (GDP%) and the human development index (HDI).
Regression 4B (Table 23) indicates the following results: R2 = 0.1593 and
adjusted R2 = 0.1084, F = 3.1269, p = <0.05. In regression 4B, CPI was significant at
the 0.05 level whilst the GDP% and UNEMP% control variables significant at the 0.05
level. The moderating impact of the implementation of the ACL3 measures was found
to be significant at the 0.05 level, indicating support for the moderating impact of
implemented, resourced and legislated anti-corruption laws (ACL3) on the
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relationship between CPI and investment flows (FDI), when controlled for the
inflation rate (INF%), population growth rate (POP%), unemployment rate
(UNEMP%), economic growth rate (GDP%) and levels of human development (HDI).
Table 23. Linear Regression 4B testing Hypothesis 4B
Beta Coeff.
Dependent Variable Foreign Direct Investment/GDP (FDI)
Independent Variables
Corruption Perception Index
Anti-Corruption Legislation 3
Constant

-1.9998**
(-2.6365)
-0.3883
(-1.5716)
21.04
(1.5368)

Control Variables
Inflation
Unemployment
Population Growth Rate
Economic Growth Rate
Human Development Index
Moderating Variable
Anti-Corruption Legislation 3

0.0459
(0.4913)
0.2279**
(2.5426)
0.0519
(0.5321)
0.2011**
(2.0834)
-0.0072
(-0.0491)
2.6142**
(2.9223)

Model Statistics
2

R

0.1593
2

Notes:

Adjusted R
Model F-Value
Significance
Sample Size
1. t-stats in parenthesis
2. *p <.10, **p <.05, ***p <.001, ****p <.0001
3. All betas except constant are standardized
4. CPI data inverted
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0.1084
3.1269
P=<0.05
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H4C: The implementation of resourced and legislated anti-corruption laws (ACL3),
moderates the relationship between a nation’s levels of corruption and trade, as
measured by NLB, such that the relationship is weakened.
In hypothesis H4C, it is posited that a nation’s implementation of resourced
and legislated anti-corruption laws (ACL3) impacts the relationship between the level
of perceived corruption (CPI) and international trade, as measured by NTB. This
suggests that countries implementing resourced and legislated ACL laws, aimed at still
further reducing levels of corruption, impacts the relationship between levels of
corruption and international trade flows, as measured by NTB.
Testing H4C:
Regression 4A tests the direct impact of ACL3 measures on international trade
(NTB) and the moderating impact of ACL3 on the relationship between levels of
corruption (CPI) as the independent variable and international trade, as measured by
NTB, as the dependent variable and controls for the following variables; inflation rate
(INF%), population growth rate (POP%), unemployment rate (UNEMP%), economic
growth rate (GDP%) and the human development index (HDI).
Regression 4C (Table 24) indicates the following results: R2 = 0.2162 and
adjusted R2 = 0.1687, F = 4.5524, p = <0.0001. In regression 4C, CPI was significant
at the 0.001 level. The moderating impact of implemented ACL3 measures on the
relationship between CPI and trade (NTB) was significant at the 0.05 level, indicating
support for the moderating impact of implemented, resourced and legislated anticorruption laws (ACL3) on the relationship between CPI and trade flows (NTB), when
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controlled for inflation (INF%), unemployment levels (UNEMP%), population growth
rates (POP%), economic growth rates (GDP%), and human development (HDI).
Table 24. Linear Regression 4C testing Hypothesis 4C
Beta Coeff.
Dependent Variable

Net Trade Balance/GDP (NTB)

Independent Variables
Corruption Perception Index
Anti-Corruption Legislation 3
Constant

-2.4750***
(-3.3794)
-0.2757
(-1.1555)
140.89*
(1.9026)

Control Variables
Inflation
Unemployment
Population Growth Rate
Economic Growth Rate
Human Development Index

0.0032
(0.0351)
-0.0042
(-0.0489)
-0.0844
(-0.8959)
0.1069
(1.1469)
0.2157
(1.5285)

Moderating Variable
Anti-Corruption Legislation 3

2.8009**
(3.2426)

Model Statistics
R

2

0.2162
2

Notes:

Adjusted R
Model F-Value
Significance
Sample Size
1. t-stats in parenthesis
2. *p <.10, **p <.05, ***p <.001, ****p <.0001
3. All betas except constant are standardized
4. CPI data inverted

162

0.1687
4.5524
P=<0.0001
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Hypotheses 4 results summary: (Appendix F.)
These results for hypotheses 4A, 4B, and 4C, tested in regressions 4A, 4B and
4C, indicate that the implementation of the resourced ACL3 legislation has a direct
impact on nation’s economic growth, as measured by GDP.
The moderating impact of ACL measures, the primary focus of this study,
specifically the implementation of the of resourced ACL3 measures, was found to be
significant in reducing the impact of corruption on economic growth, as measured by
GDP, foreign investment (FDI) and trade (NTB).
These results support the literature reviewed indicating the importance of the
implementation of resourced anti-corruption legislation, as will discussed below.
Summary of Results
The twelve multiple linear regression were tested in four stages, for the three
predictor macroeconomic variables and for the phased introduction of the moderating
impact of the legislation, resourcing and implementation of anti-corruption legislation
measures, as summarized below and in Table 25.
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Table 25. Summary of Regression results
Regression

Hypothesis

Variables

STD Coeff Beta

t-value

p > [t]

Predicted

9.7846

0.0000

Yes

Dependent Variable=GDP
1A

H1A

CPI

-0.6237****

2A

H2A

CPI

-0.3454

-1.2047

0.2305

No

2A

H2A

ACL1

-0.5542****

-4.1081

0.0001

Yes

2A

H2A

ACL1CPI

1.3955***

3.9033

0.0002

Yes

3A

H3A

CPI

-0.0745

-0.2011

0.8409

No

3A

H3A

ACL2

-0.3679**

-3.1196

0.0022

Yes

3A

H3A

ACL2CPI

0.8774**

2.0595

0.0414

Yes

4A

H4A

CPI

-0.5496

-1.5037

0.1350

No

4A

H4A

ACL3

-0.4967****

-4.1723

0.0001

Yes

4A

H4A

ACL3CPI

1.4837***

3.4424

0.0008

Yes

2.1153

0.0363

Yes

Dependent Variable=FDI
1B

H1B

CPI

-0.2741**

2B

H2B

CPI

-0.3836

-0.6194

0.5367

No

2B

H2B

ACL1

-0.1920

-0.6591

0.5110

No

2B

H2B

ACL1CPI

0.8222

1.0646

0.2890

No

3B

H3B

CPI

-1.3003*

-1.6801

0.0953

Yes

3B

H3B

ACL2

-0.3754

-1.5231

0.1301

No

3B

H3B

ACL2CPI

1.8095**

2.0326

0.0441

Yes

4B

H4B

CPI

-1.9998**

-2.6365

0.0094

Yes

4B

H4B

ACL3

-0.3883

-1.5716

0.1184

No

4B

H4B

ACL3CPI

2.6142**

2.9223

0.0041

Yes

Dependent Variable=NTB
1C

H1C

CPI

-0.0209

0.1624

0.8713

No

2C

H2C

CPI

-0.7679

-1.2678

0.2071

No

2C

H2C

ACL1

0.1762

0.6182

0.5375

No

2C

H2C

ACL1CPI

0.7103

0.9403

0.3488

No

3C

H3C

CPI

-2.5302***

-3.4858

0.0007

Yes

3C

H3C

ACL2

-0.3912*

-1.6924

0.0929

Yes

3C

H3C

ACL2CPI

2.8515***

3.4150

0.0008

Yes

4C

H4C

CPI

-2.4750***

-3.3794

0.0010

Yes

4C

H4C

ACL3

-0.2757

-1.1555

0.2500

No

4C

H4C

ACL3CPI

2.8009**

3.2426

0.0015

Yes

*p <.10, **p <.05, ***p <.001, ****p <.0001
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The hypotheses proposed, testing the relationships between perceived levels of
corruption (CPI) and national macroeconomic performance (H1A, H1B, H1C), were
supported when predicting the impact on economic growth (GDP), significant at the
0.0001 level and the levels of foreign direct investment (FDI), significant at the 0.05
level, consistent with the extant literature (Aidt et al., 2008, 2009; Mendez &
Sepulveda, 2006; Mauro, 1995, 1997). Mauro (1995) in his research found strong a
negative correlation between corruption and economic growth as well as foreign
investment, irrespective of the level of bureaucracy, as does this study.
The predicted impact of corruption on trade flows was however not supported,
despite the model reporting levels of significance at the 0.05 level, as suggested in the
extant literature (Ades & DiTella, 1999; Mauro, 1996; Norbet, 2015; Rugman &
Verbeke, 2004; and Sanchez-Martin et al., 2014). The inclusion of 96
Mid/Low-income economies, out of a total of 141 countries and economies in this
study suggests support for the greasing the wheels hypothesis (Leff, 1964), where the
rule of law can be considered to be weak (Pieroni & D’Agostino, 2013). This suggests
an area for additional research on the impact of ACL measures on the relationship
between corruption and macro-economic performance, specifically in developing
economies, and where rule of law has been found to be weak
(Getz, 2006; Huntington, 1968).
Based on these results, there is evidence that the country level of corruption as
measured by CPI, is a significant predictor of macroeconomic performance, measured
by economic growth and foreign investment, when controlled for inflation,
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unemployment, population, and economic growth rates, as well as levels of human
development, as can be expected from the extant literature investigation of these
relationships (Aidt et al., 2008, 2009; Mendez & Sepulveda, 2006; Mauro, 1995,
1997).
The testing of the hypothesized moderating impact of the phased
implementation of anticorruption measures on the relationship between perceived
levels of corruption and macroeconomic performance (H2, H3 and H4), indicates
support for the prediction of these moderating impacts, as supported in seven of the
nine hypotheses proposed (H2A, H3A, H3B, H3C, H4A, H4B, H4C), when controlled
for the inflation, population growth, unemployment and economic growth rates and
the human development.
Hypothesis H2A posited that the introduction of legislated ACL measures
(ACL1) moderates the relationship between a nation’s level of corruption and its level
of economic growth. This study found strong support for the moderating impact of
ACL legislation on this relationship, despite Chafuen and Guzman (2000) not finding
theoretical support for the relationship between corruption and economic freedom, the
proxy variable utilized in this study to measure the extent of ACL introduction and
implementation. This study does however support the extant literature on this
relationship (Acemoglu and Verdier, 2000; Apergis et al., 2012; Campos, Lien and
Pradhan, 1999; Graeff and Mehlkop, 2003; Pieroni and D’Agostino, 2013; Shleifer
and Vishny, 1993) and provides further evidence of the significance of the relationship
between corruption and economic growth, as moderated by the legislating of ACL
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measures. The relationship indicates that the more prevalent the incidence of
corruption in an economy, the greater the moderating impact of the legislation of ACL
measures on the relationship between levels of corruption and economic growth.
Hypotheses H2B and H2C were not supported as might have be expected,
indicating the lack of support for the predictive impact of the legislation of anticorruption measures (ACL1) on the relationship between levels of corruption (CPI)
and foreign investment (FDI) and trade (NTB), respectively. This could have been
expected, given that legislated ACL measures need to be resourced and implemented,
as posited in H3 and H4, for the desired impact on macro-economic performance to be
effective and determinable, as suggested in the extant literature (Getz, 2006; Gaspar &
Hagan, 2016). This result may thus be an indication that, rather than a direct impact on
foreign investment and trade flows, the legislation of ACL measures, where
adequately resourced and implemented, has a moderating effect on these respective
macro-economic variables, as supported in the subsequent hypotheses.
The further strengthening of the legislated ACL measures, through the
resourcing of the legislation (ACL2), as posited in hypotheses H3, found significant
support for its moderating impact on the relationship between nations’ levels of
corruption and their macro-economic performances. This study found strong
significance for the moderating impact of resourced ACL legislation on economic
growth, foreign investment and trade in hypotheses H3A, H3B and H3C, respectively.
This suggests that adequately resourced ACL measures moderate the relationship
between a nation’s levels of corruption and economic growth, investment and trade, as
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suggested in the extant literature (Carlsson and Lundstrom, 2000; Graeff and
Mehlkop, 2003; Norbet, 2015; Pieroni and D’Agostino, 2013). Specifically, this study
provides additional support for the moderating impact of resourced ACL2 legislation
and government's ability to legislate and oversee ACL measures as suggested by
Graeff and Mehlkop (2003), whilst suggesting the lack of government regulations
results in more corruption, particularly in less developed countries (Pieroni and
D’Agostino, 2013), notwithstanding the contrary greasing-the-wheels view of Dreher
(2007).
The implementation of the legislated and resourced ACL measures, as posited
in hypotheses H4, testing the ACL3 construct, was found to have a significant impact
on the relationship between a nations’ levels of corruption and their macro-economic
performances. This study found strong significance for the moderating impact of the
implementation of the resourced ACL3 resourced legislation on economic growth,
foreign investment and trade, in hypotheses H4A, H4B and H4C, respectively. This
suggests that the implementation of resourced ACL3 legislation measures moderates
the relationship between a nations’ levels of corruption and economic growth,
investment and trade, as suggested in the extant literature (Carlsson and Lundstrom,
2000; Carlsson et al., 2003; Graeff and Mehlkop, 2003; Heineman and Heineman,
2006; Keefer and Knack, 1997; Norbet, 2015; Opper, 2004; Pieroni and D’Agostino,
2013; Treisman, 2000). Specifically, this study provides additional support to the
relationship between the moderating impact of implemented and resourced ACL
legislation on the relationship between corruption and macro-economic performance,
168

as determined by government's ability to effectively enforce ACL measures through
the proper organization and coordinated centralized resourcing for effective
implementation (Heineman and Heineman, 2006). Additionally, this study supports
the research findings on the positive relationship between governance, trade and
economic growth and its relationship to corruption levels (Carlsson et al., 2003), and
further the moderating impact of the freedom of trade component of the ACL3
construct on the relationship between levels of corruption and trade (Opper, 2004;
Pieroni and D’Agostino, 2013).
These results therefore indicate support for the moderating impact of the
phased introduction, resourcing and implementation of anticorruption legislation on
national macroeconomic performance. Specifically, these results support the research
on the moderating impact of the phased introduction of ACL measures on the
relationship between a nation’s level of corruption and macro-economic performance.
Contribution to applied practice
These results suggest a number of practical implications for policy advisors
and implementors of anti-corruption legislation.
Updated data for 2011-16
This study has used updated data for the period 2011-2016 providing a relevant
context for the theoretical framework applied, as posited in the hypotheses. This study
therefore provides updated and additional support to the extant literature on the
relationships between levels of corruption and macro-economic performance, as
analyzed in hypotheses H1A, H1B and H1C. Furthermore, this support for the extant
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literature on the relationship between levels of corruption and economic performance
provides the context for the additional hypotheses posited testing the moderating
impact of the phased introduction of Anti-Corruption Legislation, as analyzed in
hypotheses H2, H3 and H4.
Index of Economic Freedom
This study also provides empirical support for the use of the governance Index
of Economic Freedom (IEF) in measuring the extent of ACL legislation, resourcing
and implementation, in the absence of individual country research. The use of the IEF
index in this study, as a measure of the extent of ACL measures introduced, and with
relevant literature support, provides practitioners with a tools to empirically determine
the moderating impact of the phased introduction of ACL measures on the established
and supported relationship, between levels of corruption and macro-economic
performance, in the extant literature. Individual country research into the extent of
national ACL measures requires in depth knowledge of and access to judicial and
fiscal procedures, neither of which can be assumed to be either available or where so,
reliable. The use of the IEF index therefore provides an objective means to analyze the
extent of national ACL measures in many countries, as has been conducted in this
study.
The construct framework posited and analyzed in this study provides
regulatory bodies and other practitioners, such as multi-national and lateral
institutions, with measurable insights into the impact of adequately, legislated,
resourced and implemented Anti-Corruption Legislation measures.
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In summary, Chapter 4, provides a detailed empirical analysis of the
relationships between levels of corruption and economic performance and the ACL
constructs analyzed in the twelve hypotheses posited, as suggested in the extant
literature. The established and researched relationships between nations’ levels of
corruption and their macro-economic performance are analyzed in hypotheses H1 with
recent updated data and applied to the ACL constructs posited, in hypotheses H2, H3
and H4, so as to empirically determine the moderating impact of the phased
introduction of ACL measures on the relationship between corruption and macroeconomic performance.
Support for two of the three relationships between nations’ levels of corruption
and their macro-economic performances, economic growth and investment, tested in
hypotheses H1A and H1B, was determined indicating that levels of perceived
corruption, as measured by CPI, are a significant predictor of national economic
growth and foreign investment flows.
The Anti-Corruption Legislation constructs posited in hypotheses H2, H3 and
H4, found support in seven of the nine hypotheses, at higher than a 0.05 significance
level, as reflected in Table 25. The empirical results of this study therefore indicate
that the phased introduction of the ACL measures is a strong predictor of the
moderating impact on the relationships between nations’ levels of corruption and their
macro-economic performance. Significantly, this study determined even though the
direct effect of ACL measures on economic growth is significant, it does reduce the
impact of corruption especially when ACL measures were resourced and
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implemented, as posited in the hypotheses H3 and H4. Support was not found for the
moderating impact beyond the initial legislation of ACL measures in H2A, for unresourced and non-implemented ACL, on the relationship between nations’ levels of
corruption and investment and trade levels, as posited in H2B and H2C, respectively,
suggesting the importance of adequate resourcing and implementation of ACL
measures.
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Chapter 5
Discussion, Implications & Recommendations
Overview
Corruption has been shown, in the extant literature, to impact economic
growth resulting in the misallocation and inefficient use of resources, weakening
institutions necessary for the efficient functioning of the State and the markets and
impacting private sector development (Rugman, 2001). Research has also concluded
that corruption remains a major obstacle to economic growth resulting from foreign
investment and international trade (Bryant 2016; Mauro, 2004).
Countries have, as a result, introduced anti-corruption measures in an attempt
to combat the scourge of corruption on their respective national economies and
societies (Transparency International, 2017). Essentially countries aim, through their
anti-corruption measures, to increase the positive benefits derived from being honest
whilst also increasing the resultant cost of being corrupt (Rose-Ackerman, 1998).
These measures are therefore aimed at improving the conditions for foreign
investment and trade, and impacting economic growth, which when coordinated
internationally are more sustainably effective (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2008).
The extant literature primarily focuses on this impact of international multilateral measures as opposed to the numerous national measures introduced at the
country level (Friedman, 2010). Additionally, empirically measuring the resultant
impacts of these anti-corruptions developments remains a challenge in the absence of
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reliable data and objective assessment of national efforts beyond the stated intentions
and early implementation.
A review of the extant literature on nations’ levels of corruption and the impact
on national macro-economic performance, including economic growth, foreign direct
investment, and trade flows, indicates a correlation between the perceived levels of
corruption and a nation’s economic performance. However, while international studies
using political risk data demonstrate a strong link between the level of corruption and
economic development (Bohara, Mitchell, & Mittendorff, 2004; Gerring & Thacker,
2004; Montinola & Jackman, 2002; Treisman, 2000; Wilhelm, 2002) and where
increased economic prosperity is linked to reform, this does not automatically translate
into anti-corruption reform, evident in many countries (Brinegar, 2006; Getz, 2006).
Despite the increasing number of countries legislating and implementing anticorruption reforms, aimed at complying with international frameworks and guidelines,
research on their effectiveness remains inconclusive (Friedman, 2010). Key
components for the sustained effectiveness of ACL regimes are identified as the clarity
of objectives, the efficient allocation of resources, and a balanced and coordinated
implementation (Getz, 2006), however a number of studies also indicate that
international anti-corruption policy regimes have not significantly reduced perceived
levels of corruption whilst many supply side voluntary regimes were found to
unaligned with national cultural norms and practices (Argadoña, 2007; Husted, 2002;
Pacini, C., Swingen, J. A., & Rogers, H., 2002). The recent non-voluntary
developments of international ACL measures, including the updated OECD
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Convention (2010), the FCPA (2017) and the Anti-Bribery Act (2017) have therefore
added welcome criminal consequences to corrupt behavior by companies and
individuals.
A gap therefore exists in the extant literature in researching and determining the
impact of anti-corruption measures on this relationship, between levels of corruption
and the resultant impact on national economic performance variables, as measured by
economic growth, foreign investment, and trade flows. In essence, research into the
effectiveness of these anti-corruption measures and reforms remains inconclusive.
This study empirically updated this relationship between nation’s levels of
corruption and economic performance whilst also researching the moderating impact
of national anti-corruption legislation measures on the documented relationships
between the perceptions of corruption and the economic performance.
Twelve hypotheses were posited to test the two research questions posed, with
updated data for the period 2011-16.
The first research question, whether national levels of perceived corruption
impact national macro-economic performance, was tested in Hypothesis H1. Whereas
the impact of the posited moderating impact of the phased introduction, resourcing and
implementation of the ACL measures on this relationship, tested the second research
question in Hypotheses H2, H3 and H4, respectively.
Specifically, the impact of the legislation of ACL1 measures on the
relationship between levels of corruption and macro-economic performance, was
tested in hypotheses H2A, H2B and H2C for economic growth, investment and trade,
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respectively. The impact of the incremental resourcing of the legislated ACL2
measures was then tested in hypotheses H3A, H3B and H3C, respectively and finally
the implementation of the legislated and resourced ACL3 measures tested in
hypotheses H4A, H4B and H4C, respectively.
This study was able to empirically determine support for the relationship
between levels of corruption and economic growth and foreign investment. In
addition, even though there was evidence to support the direct effect of ACL measures
on economic growth, the moderating impact of the introduction of the anti-corruption
measures, the main focus of this study, was found to be significant on the relationship
between levels of corruption and economic performance, when ACL legislative
measures were resourced and implemented. The resourcing and implementation of
ACL measures therefore does reduce the impact of corruption on economic growth,
when controlled for a number of factors, as detailed in this study. In summary, this
study provides evidence supporting the moderating impact of anti-corruption
legislation, when resourced and implemented, on the economic impact of corruption.
Discussion
The relationship between corruption and macro-economic performance
The literature reviewed indicates a relationship between corruption and
economic performance, as discussed above; however, a gap exists in the literature in
investigating the impact of anti-corruption measures on the relationship between
corruption and the resultant impact on national economic performance.
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Based on the results of this study, there is evidence to support the impact
country levels of corruption, as measured by the CPI, have on economic growth and
foreign investment flows. These results are consistent with the literature on the sandin-the-wheels hypothesis, suggesting a negative relationship between corruption and
economic growth (Mauro, 1995; Voyer and Beamish, 2004) and between foreign
investment levels (Delgado et al., 2014; Shleifer & Vishny, 1993). These findings
further suggest a linear relationship between corruption and economic growth (Mauro,
1995; Paldam, 2002; Wei, 2000) although, as tested in the subsequent hypotheses, this
relationship may be conditional on the quality of governance, as moderated by the
impact of ACL measures.
However, national levels of corruption were not found to be a significant
predictor of international trade flows (H1C) possibly in support of the greasing the
wheels view. As discussed in the literature reviewed above, a number of studies
support this view (Dreher & Gassebner, 2007; Leff, 1964; Méon & Sekkat, 2005; and
Méon & Weill, 2010), where the rule of law and government regulations are either too
weak or too rigid, resulting in increased levels of corruption, particularly in less
developed countries (Pieroni and D’Agostino, 2013).
Whilst Dreher (1964) proposed that corruption ‘could be socially beneficial’,
other studies (de Jong & Bogmans, 2011), using specific measures of corruption,
including border corruption and the quality of customs, found that corruption does in
fact negatively impact international trade, with the caveat that the effects for importing
countries were different from those for exporting countries and that their specific
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measures of corruption were based on ‘direct experiences’65 rather than perceptions
data.
Since this study sample includes a predominant number of developing
countries (n=96) in its sample of 141 countries, as classified by the World Bank, the
impact of lower levels of governance, suggested from the literature, in these countries
may impact the results of this study, relevant to the relationship between levels of
corruption and trade flows. This suggests an area for further research, to explore the
impact of national levels of corruption on economic performance, specifically on trade
flows, in developing economies. There may therefore exist specific legal or fiscal
conditions in these developing countries, such as historical trading patterns and
geographic trading arrangements (D’Souza, 2012), which may impact the relationship
between levels of corruption and trade.
The impact of legislating ACL measures on the H1 relationships between
CPI and economic performance
This study researched the extent of the moderating impact of the ACL
measures using three different levels of engagement, legislation in ACL1, legislation
and resourcing in ACL2 and the implementation of the resourced measures in ACL3.
The incremental ACL constructs therefore served to measure the extent of governance
relevant to the development and deployment of measures aimed at reducing levels of
corruption. This allowed this study to empirically measure the moderating impact on

65

The de Jong & Bogmans (2011) study utilized specific corruption data based on ‘waiting time at the
border’ rather than perceptions survey data, such as CPI, but for only one year, which limits the
generalizability of the findings
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the relationship between the levels of corruption and economic performance for the
countries and economies researched.
This study indicates in hypotheses (H2A, H3A, H4A), that whilst support
exists for the impact of levels of corruption on economic growth, independently from
its impact on investment (Méon and Sekkat, 2005), these impacts vary depending on
the quality of governance.
As discussed above, the predictive impact of the introduction of legislated
ACL measures (ACL1) on the relationship between nations’ levels of corruption and
their macro-economic performance is strongly supported in this study, and detailed in
hypothesis H2A, providing support for the predictive impact that the initial legislation
of ACL1 measures, moderates the impact of corruption on economic growth.
The legislation of ACL1 measures was not found to reduce the impact of
corruption on foreign investment (H2B) and trade (H2C), as might have been
expected. The strong literature support for the resourcing and implementation of ACL
measures, suggests that the resultant limited effectiveness of un-resourced and nonimplemented ACL measures on these macro-economic variables, was to be expected,
however, the overall ACL1 models tested in hypotheses H2B and H2C, were found to
be significant.
Empirical support for the relationship between the extension of international
trade and corruption remains tenuous (Treisman, 2000), despite additional research
suggesting that good governance mechanisms have a positive effect on economic
performance, including trade, but which can also have the impact of reducing the risk
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of fraud (Pietra & Melis, 2016), and resulting in a competitive advantage when trading
with countries perceived to be corrupt (Lambsdorff, 1998).
Additionally, high levels of corruption and foreign investment have been
shown to coexist, where the impact of FDI on corruption is dependent on the quality
of governance (Norbet, 2005), and particularly the rule of law (Cuervo-Cazurra,
2008). Given that the rule of law dimension is included in the ACL constructs, this
anomaly may be explained by the high number of developing countries included in
this study and for which research (Aidt et al., 2008) suggests the existence of lower
levels of institutional quality and the rule of law, impacting the relationship between
levels of corruption and economic performance.
This study included a majority of countries classified as developing economies,
and which, as is suggested in the literature (Aidt et al., 2008), may reflect varying
levels of institutional quality. Corruption in countries with low quality institutions has
been found to have little or no impact on economic growth (Aidt et al., 2008) and
where the legislation of ACL1 measures was not found to impact the relationship
between levels of corruption and economic growth. may be relevant to this study’s
findings.
The impact of resourcing and implementing legislated ACL measures on
the H1 relationships respectively
This study also found strong support for the predictive impact of the
introduction of legislated and resourced ACL measures (ACL2) on the relationship
between nations’ levels of corruption and their macro-economic performance (H3A,
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H3B, H3C). These findings provide support for the research suggesting a strong
relationship between governance, the size of government, and levels of corruption,
specifically where the ability of government to contain corruption is driven by the
quality of governance (Blackburn et al., 2006; Haque & Kneller, 2009). These results
also support the empirical research findings that the relationship between corruption
and the different measures of the quality of governance, as tested in the ACL
constructs in this study, is consistently negative (Butkiewicz and Yanikkaya, 2006).
Similarly, their findings that the quality of governance also drives public sector
efficiency, impacting the optimal size of public spending66, is also supported. These
findings therefore support both the rule of law and government efficient dimensions
measured in the ACL constructs. Furthermore, the research findings, suggesting that
corruption distorts both the burden of the public sector driven by the quality of the
institutions, that is governance, and the productive inputs generated by the public
sector (Mauro, 1995; Keefer & Knack, 2002) are also supported. The results of this
study, therefore support the suggestion that corruption impacts economic performance
through inefficient government spending and hence resourcing, an important
component of governance, as tested in the ACL3 construct, and which provides further
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Some research findings on the relationship between corruption and government size, measuring
resources, appear inconsistent, as discussed in Chapter 2. Studies by Goel and Nelson (1998) and RoseAckerman (1999) suggest that where government size is related to the degree and inefficiency of
regulation, increases in government actually result in increased rent-seeking and corruption. However,
where size of government is indicative of its ability to control corruption and accountability, increases
in government can be expected to reduce corruption (La Porta et al., 1999) consistent with the seminal
research findings of Mauro (1995, 1997, 1998).
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support for the moderating impact of resourced and implemented ACL3 measures, on
the relationship between levels of corruption and economic performance.
These findings, when seen jointly, suggest the existence of a strong
relationship between governance and corruption, as suggested by Blackburn et al.
(2006); Butkiewicz and Yanikkaya (2006), and Haque and Kneller (2009). Equally,
this study’s findings suggest the relationship between corruption and economic growth
is directly dependent on the level of governance, given its link to corruption, and
indirectly dependent on public sector expenditure, as impacted by corruption. The
quality of governance, the extent of public resources and level economic development
have all been shown to impact the relationship between levels of corruption and
economic growth (Dzhumashev, 2014) and whereas this study indicates support for
the moderating impact of resourced and implemented ACL measures on the
relationship between levels of corruption and economic performance, including
economic growth, the relationship to economic development is not tested and suggests
an area for further study.
A review of the extant literature on the field in Chapter 2, indicates that whilst
research into the causes of corruption has largely determined its impacts as
summarized above, research into the effectiveness of these anti-corruption measures
remains inconclusive. The existence of multiple governance regimes and the regime
specific nature of the relationship between levels of corruption and economic
performance contributes to the literature on the ‘growth consequences of corruption’
providing a differing view to the more established position of a linear relationship
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between corruption and economic growth (Aidt et al., 2008). The results of this study,
whilst suggesting a linear relationship exists, also provides practical insights into the
use of the IEF governance indices in empirically measuring the effectiveness of ACL
measures on the relationship between levels of corruption and economic performance.
Further research into the moderating impact of ACL measures on the relationship
between levels of corruption and economic performance, in the context of weak
governance structures and hence rule of law (Méon & Sekkat, 2005) and within the
ambit of developing economies, may provide additional clarity.
The potential impact of the inclusion of the 96 developing countries, may
provide further clarity into the results obtained in hypotheses H2B and H2C and which
may be influenced by the extent of the rule of law in these developing economies. The
significant results obtained in the subsequent hypotheses (H3 and H4), testing for the
resourcing and implementation of the legislated ACL measures, highlights the
importance of extending the introduction of these measures into fully resourced and
implemented coordinated controls, as a more effective deterrent to levels of
corruption, and its impact on national macro-economic performance.
The results therefore indicate support for the moderating impact of the
introduction of the phased ACL measures on the relationship between nation’s levels
of corruption and their economic performance. These findings serve to provide
support for the areas in the extant literature reported as inconclusive, on the economic
impacts of anti-corruption measures, and which enhances the relevant body of
knowledge and adding to the extant literature on the field.
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Implications
Effective ACL measures require both a holistic and multifaceted approach,
based on the effective rule of law, adequate resourcing, regulatory efficiency and open
markets (Ades & Di Tella, 1999; Apergis et al., 2012; Cheloukhine & Verdier, 1998;
Graeff & Mehlkop, 2003; Mauro, 1997, 1998; Norbet, 2015). Equally the
effectiveness of these ACL measures relies on adequate preventative effects, including
but not limited to the areas of transparency and accountability. Research indicates that
transparency is necessary condition for the proper functioning of markets, through the
efficient allocation of resources and the increased risk of unsustainable policies, and a
core component of an effective anti-corruption policy (Kopits & Graig, 1998).
Transparency supports accountability, a key element for effective ACL measures,
which when combined, result in improved public understanding and possibly support
for government policies (Gaspar & Hagan, 2016). There is ample support for the view
that corruption impacts the level of public trust in governments and weakens their
capacity to perform core fiscal and regulatory functions, where increased levels of
corruption further impedes the effective implementation of policies and hence
implementation and the desired level of effectiveness. Since transparency is critical to
the efficient allocation of resources, thereby permitting the markets to function
efficiently and resulting in the market determining economic rents, whilst reducing
incentives for corrupt transactions, the combination of public transparency and
government accountability provides the foundation for more effective anti-corruption
policies. The IMF has published fiscal transparency evaluations (FTEs) to further
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enhance the understanding of the required standards and compliance, and which are
being introduced as conditions for IMF support (World Bank, 2013b), thereby
reinforcing the importance of combining transparency with accountability.
This study, by finding empirical support for both the relationship between
nations’ levels of corruption and macro-economic performance and for the moderating
impact of phased ACL measures on this relationship, allows policy makers and
governments to improve their understanding of their approaches to reducing
corruption, by providing tools to determine the effectiveness of their ACL reforms,
aimed at reducing the incidences of corruption, on the relationships between national
levels of corruption and economic performance. Some reforms may be focused
specifically on addressing existing corruption, whilst others can be designed and
expected to have an important preventative effect, specifically in the area of
transparency.

Limitations and Gaps
The hidden nature of corruption
The hidden nature of corruption makes detection and effective control difficult
(UNDP, 2019), whilst the ability to conceal corruption in transactions, particularly
those involving infrastructure or defense projects, obscures the nature of the corruption
(Rose-Ackerman, 1999). These realities thus enhance the justification for using
indices and international data over a period of time, making comparison more
meaningful than otherwise possible.
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International coordination of ACL measures
Anti-corruption measures reflect both international cooperation at the multilateral level as well as at the national levels of governance. The extant literature
primarily focuses on the impact, or lack thereof, of international multi-lateral anticorruption measures rather than on the numerous country-level measures introduced
by nations, attempting to comply with increasingly coordinated international ACL
developments (Friedman, 2010). Research further indicates that empirically
determining the resultant impacts of these ACL measures remains difficult in the
absence of reliable data and the objective assessment of national efforts, beyond the
stated intentions and early implementation. The coordinated and sustained
enforcement of these ACL measures remains a critical test of the success of the
relative ACL legislative initiatives, which still remains predominately undocumented.
Anti-corruption measures, like all public policy, require national and international
coordination, reinforced by efficient monitoring and enforcement to be a sustainable
deterrent (Getz, 2006). The effectiveness of the posited ACL measures in moderating
the impact of corruption on economic performance is therefore dependent on this
coordination.
Period of study 2011-16
This study selected a limited time period to exclude the possible impact of the
2008 global economic recession and for the subsequent years thereafter, including up
to 2010. Studies have often failed to control for global external shocks (D’Souza,
2012) and selecting a specific period allows researchers to avoid these pitfalls. The
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6-year period chosen, 2011-16, whilst avoiding the possible latent impacts of the
2008/9 shocks, is limited in its application in general, by this post-recession limited
restriction on the one hand and the availability of the most recently revised data (2016)
on the other.
Secondary data
As with secondary data, including macroeconomic statistics, this study is
dependent on the reliability of this information sourced from international institutions,
notwithstanding literature support for the use of secondary data. In order to minimize
the impact of revised data, data was sourced up to the 2016 year, as revised and
published in 2017. This study does not exclude the possible impact of further revision
published in 2018. The study excludes data for countries with incomplete data for all
variables measured and may therefore impact the results and the generalizability of the
findings.
Governance Indices
The primary question this study poses, is to what extent the effectiveness of
anti-corruption legislative measures, as part of governance, impacts the relationship
between corruption and economic performance, and whether these economic impacts
can be determined, in function of the extent of the ACL implementation. Using the
IEF governance indexes, as detailed in this study, is an objective attempt to apply
reliable and transparent measures of governance in the absence of country level anticorruption measures, to determine the effectiveness of ACL measures in moderating
the economic impact of corruption. This cannot be seen to replace detailed individual
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country-level analysis of respective ACL measures and their resultant impact on the
economic consequences of national corruption.
The use of the IEF index in this study, as a proxy for the moderating impact of
the phased introduction of ACL measures on the relationship between nations’ levels
of corruption and their macro-economic performances, whilst supported in the
literature, as outlined in Chapter 2, has its limitations. The index allowed this study to
analyze the impact of phased ACL measures in 141 countries and economies, which
would not otherwise have been possible given the lack of available and reliable data
and relevant policy information. The IEF index permits researchers to gauge the
effectiveness of governance and to determine whether policies, including ACL, are
essentially effective also in measuring the progress of the establishment of efficient
institutions. Where data and reliable policy information is available, in smaller sample
sizes, such as for regional or geographical groupings, detailed and focused research on
individual economies and their respective ACL policies is preferred and suggested.
This detailed national information and data may result in different results to that
presented in this study. Additional research comparing the results obtained from
detailed ACL policy analysis with the results determined from the use of the IEF
proxy index, is further suggested and is a specific interest of the author in proposed
future research.
Corruption levels measured using perceptions index
The use of the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), published by Transparency
International, as a measure of national corruption levels in over 180 countries across
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the world, published since 1993 has broad literature support. The CPI index has
established a measure of consistency based on the information obtained from multilateral institutions, although as with other perception-based indices, it may not provide
robust estimates of in-country corruption. However, the CPI index is considered
informative when used for cross-country comparisons of corruption (Pieroni &
D’Agostino, 2013) and many studies indicate a relationship between corruption, as
measured by CPI, and judicial effectiveness (Treisman, 2000).

Recommendations
Country income groupings and the potential for future research
This study, during the data research phase, conducted additional analysis,
filtered by the World Bank income groupings, into possible variances of the
significance of the posited hypotheses, as discussed in Chapter 3. The 141 countries
selected for this research, compliant with the data scrubbing procedures, and grouped
into three simplified income groups: low, medium, (composed of lower-middle and
upper-middle countries), and high income, were additionally analyzed for the
significance of the twelve hypotheses posited. This additional tangential analysis
produced some unexpected preliminary results, when testing the posited relationships
and constructs and when filtered by different country income groups. Since this
additional research is beyond the ambit of the current study, they are excluded from
the main findings of this study and may form part of additional research by the author.
Suffice to indicate briefly that, countries grouped by high-income, reflected a lower
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significance for the predictive impact of the phased introduction and implementation
of the posited ACL measures, when compared to countries grouped into medium-low
income category.
Additional variances in the significant relationships between levels of
corruption and economic performance, were also identified when differentiating
countries further between medium- and low-income groupings. These preliminary
findings may thus suggest support for Pieroni and D’Agostino’s (2013) findings that,
the weak rule of law, and the lack of government resources and regulations results in
increased incidences of corruption, particularly in less developed countries.
This suggests additional areas for relevant future research on the topic, with
specific focus on the variances of country income levels on the relationship between
levels of corruption and economic performance as well as the moderating impact of
ACL measures on that relationship.
The role governance in the effectiveness of anti-corruption measures
Empirical research by (Shleifer & Vishny, 1993) suggests that the structure of
governance drives corruption and that low levels of governance impact levels of
corruption. Countries, in their efforts to legislate and implement anti-corruption
measures are beginning to address their levels of governance, so as to provide the
supportive framework required to ensure the effectiveness and sustainability of the
ACL reforms and regimes. Improving government institutions and the effectiveness of
governance is therefore a key component of structural reforms and a critical factor in
the sustainability of effective ACL measures (Kopits & Craig, 1998). Furthermore, the
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preliminary results of the additional income grouping analysis undertaken, also
suggest support for the view that corruption has an increased impact on economic
growth when governance and the rule of law are weak (Aidt et al, 2008).
International coordination
Research suggests that anti-corruption measures, like all public policy, require
coordination, both international and national, reinforced by efficient monitoring and
enforcement to be a sustainable deterrent (Getz, 2006). The three key attributes
impacting ACL regime effectiveness – clarity of objectives, allocation of resources,
and balanced implementation were found to be significant predictors of the impact of
ACL measures on the relationship between corruption and economic performance.
Furthermore, the impact of anti-money laundering legislation (AML), as part of
national and international ACL measures, in identifying laundered proceeds from
corruption, particularly involving countries with weak governance structures, has
enhanced the effectiveness of international cooperation between countries and
institutions, including the IMF. An effective and coordinated AML framework, as an
integral part of introduced and implemented ACL measures, is therefore increasingly
critical in effectively combatting and deterring corruption, as an effective means of
combatting the distribution of proceeds derived from corruption activities. This
suggests further research into the impact of integrated AML measures in international
and national ACL policies aimed at increasing the cost of corruption and improving the
sustainability of anti-corruption measures, as demonstrated by the implemented FATF
(2018) measures.
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Corruption is, as highlighted in the extant literature, both relevant to the public
and private sectors, given that for every corrupt transaction with a public official, a
private counterpart exists. Effective ACL measures therefore need to also include the
private sector, encompassing relevant legal and financial consequences, as provided for
in the FCPA and ABAC Acts, amongst other legislative developments. Multi-lateral
organizations, including the OECD, have introduced conventions in 1999 and since
updated (OECD, 2010), which criminalize corruption by both public officials and
private counterparts, where sanctioning mechanisms against corrupt business and
leaders have increased significantly in recent years (Gaspar & Hagan, 2016). The
coordination, therefore, not only international but also between public and private
sectors, is essential to the effectiveness of ACL measures, in impacting the relationship
between levels of corruption and economic performance, as indicated in this study.
This study which focused on the empirical measurement of the resourcing and
implementation of these legislative initiatives and their impact on the established
relationship between countries’ corruption and economic performance, found support
for the predictive value of ACL measures on this relationship.
However, the contradiction between the introduction of anti-corruption
legislative measures, in the absence of meaningful and resourced implementation,
serves little purpose and function in addressing the key challenges of reducing
corruption and improving resultant foreign investment and trade resulting in improved
economic growth.
192

This study provides support for the established relationships between nation’s
levels of corruption and economic performance, specifically, economic growth and
foreign investment, as suggested in the first research question. This study also
indicates support for the second research question suggested, seeking to establish and
clarify the impact that nation’s anti-corruption measures have on the established
relationship between levels of corruption and economic performance. The results
obtained from the empirical analysis conducted, indicates strong support for the
predictive impact of ACL measures on the relationship between nations’ levels of
corruption and their macro-economic performance, particularly where these measures
are efficiently resourced and implemented. Governments and policy makers may
therefore, through a clarified relationship between the increased benefits of honest
behavior versus the increased cost of conducting corrupt transactions, be able to
amend and improve policy, monitoring, and enforcement through improved
understanding of the economic impacts of their respective anti-corruption legislation
measures, as indicated in this study.
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Appendices
Appendix A. Countries & Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) Data.

Country
Code

Country Name

Income Group Code

CPI2011

CPI2012

CPI2013

CPI2014

CPI 2015

CPI2016

CPI_Ave

ALB
DZA
AGO
ARG
ARM
AUS
AUT
AZE
BHR
BGD
BLR
BEL
BEN
BTN
BOL
BIH
BWA
BRA
BGR
BFA
BDI
CPV
KHM
CMR
CAN
CAF
TCD
CHL
CHN
COL
COM
COD
COG
CRI
CIV
HRV
CYP
CZE
DNK
DOM
ECU
EGY
SLV
EST
ETH
FIN
FRA
GAB
GMB
GEO

Albania
Algeria
Angola
Argentina
Armenia
Australia
Austria
Azerbaijan
Bahrain
Bangladesh
Belarus
Belgium
Benin
Bhutan
Bolivia
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Botswana
Brazil
Bulgaria
Burkina Faso
Burundi
Cabo Verde
Cambodia
Cameroon
Canada
Central African Republic
Chad
Chile
China
Colombia
Comoros
Congo, Dem. Rep.
Congo, Rep.
Costa Rica
Côte d'Ivoire
Croatia
Cyprus
Czech Republic
Denmark
Dominican Republic
Ecuador
Egypt, Arab Rep.
El Salvador
Estonia
Ethiopia
Finland
France
Gabon
Gambia, The
Georgia

Upper middle income
Upper middle income
Lower middle income
Upper middle income
Lower middle income
High income
High income
Upper middle income
High income
Lower middle income
Upper middle income
High income
Low income
Lower middle income
Lower middle income
Upper middle income
Upper middle income
Upper middle income
Upper middle income
Low income
Low income
Lower middle income
Lower middle income
Lower middle income
High income
Low income
Low income
High income
Upper middle income
Upper middle income
Low income
Low income
Lower middle income
Upper middle income
Lower middle income
Upper middle income
High income
High income
High income
Upper middle income
Upper middle income
Lower middle income
Lower middle income
High income
Low income
High income
High income
Upper middle income
Low income
Lower middle income

30.53
29.04
20.05
29.96
26.29
88.44
77.87
23.75
51.10
26.57
24.18
74.87
29.70
57.42
27.63
32.07
60.78
37.74
33.29
30.46
19.35
21.11
24.52
86.72
55.25
22.10
20.40
72.14
36.36
34.47
24.11
20.21
21.54
47.98
22.34
40.34
62.66
43.68
93.92
25.90
26.50
28.62
34.25
63.54
26.91
94.04
70.05
39.43
29.83
35.12

33.00
34.00
22.00
35.00
34.00
85.00
69.00
27.00
51.00
26.00
31.00
75.00
36.00
63.00
34.00
42.00
65.00
43.00
41.00
38.00
19.00
60.00
22.00
26.00
84.00
26.00
19.00
72.00
39.00
36.00
28.00
21.00
26.00
54.00
29.00
46.00
66.00
49.00
90.00
32.00
32.00
32.00
38.00
64.00
33.00
90.00
71.00
35.00
34.00
52.00

31.00
36.00
23.00
34.00
36.00
81.00
69.00
28.00
48.00
27.00
29.00
75.00
36.00
63.00
34.00
42.00
64.00
42.00
41.00
38.00
21.00
58.00
20.00
25.00
81.00
25.00
19.00
71.00
40.00
36.00
28.00
22.00
22.00
53.00
27.00
48.00
63.00
48.00
91.00
29.00
35.00
32.00
38.00
68.00
33.00
89.00
71.00
34.00
28.00
49.00

33.00
36.00
19.00
34.00
37.00
80.00
72.00
29.00
49.00
25.00
31.00
76.00
39.00
65.00
35.00
39.00
63.00
43.00
43.00
38.00
20.00
57.00
21.00
27.00
81.00
24.00
22.00
73.00
36.00
37.00
26.00
22.00
23.00
54.00
32.00
48.00
63.00
51.00
92.00
32.00
33.00
37.00
39.00
69.00
33.00
89.00
69.00
37.00
29.00
52.00

36.00
36.00
15.00
32.00
35.00
79.00
76.00
29.00
51.00
25.00
32.00
77.00
37.00
65.00
34.00
38.00
63.00
38.00
41.00
38.00
21.00
55.00
21.00
27.00
83.00
24.00
22.00
70.00
37.00
37.00
26.00
22.00
23.00
55.00
32.00
51.00
61.00
56.00
91.00
33.00
32.00
36.00
39.00
70.00
33.00
90.00
70.00
34.00
28.00
52.00

39.00
34.00
18.00
36.00
33.00
79.00
75.00
30.00
43.00
26.00
40.00
77.00
36.00
65.00
33.00
39.00
60.00
40.00
41.00
42.00
20.00
59.00
21.00
26.00
82.00
20.00
20.00
66.00
40.00
37.00
24.00
21.00
20.00
58.00
34.00
49.00
55.00
55.00
90.00
31.00
31.00
34.00
36.00
70.00
34.00
89.00
69.00
35.00
26.00
57.00

33.75
34.17
19.51
33.49
33.55
82.07
73.14
27.79
48.85
25.93
31.20
75.81
35.62
63.07
32.94
38.68
62.63
40.62
40.05
37.41
20.06
51.68
21.59
36.29
77.71
23.52
20.40
70.69
38.06
36.24
26.02
21.37
22.59
53.66
29.39
47.06
61.78
50.45
91.32
30.48
31.58
33.27
37.37
67.42
32.15
90.17
70.01
35.74
29.14
49.52
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Country
Code

Country Name

Income Group Code

CPI2011

CPI2012

CPI2013

CPI2014

CPI 2015

CPI2016

CPI_Ave

DEU
GHA
GRC
GTM
GIN
GNB
GUY
HTI
HND
HKG
HUN
ISL
IND
IDN
IRL
ISR
ITA
JAM
JPN
JOR
KAZ
KEN
KOR
KWT
KGZ
LAO
LVA
LBN
LTU
LUX
MDG
MWI
MYS
MLI
MLT
MRT
MUS
MEX
MDA
MNG
MNE
MAR
MOZ
NAM
NPL
NLD
NZL
NIC
NGA
NOR
OMN
PAK
PAN
PNG
PRY
PER
PHL
POL
PRT
QAT

Germany
Ghana
Greece
Guatemala
Guinea
Guinea-Bissau
Guyana
Haiti
Honduras
Hong Kong SAR, China
Hungary
Iceland
India
Indonesia
Ireland
Israel
Italy
Jamaica
Japan
Jordan
Kazakhstan
Kenya
Korea, Rep.
Kuwait
Kyrgyz Republic
Lao PDR
Latvia
Lebanon
Lithuania
Luxembourg
Madagascar
Malawi
Malaysia
Mali
Malta
Mauritania
Mauritius
Mexico
Moldova
Mongolia
Montenegro
Morocco
Mozambique
Namibia
Nepal
Netherlands
New Zealand
Nicaragua
Nigeria
Norway
Oman
Pakistan
Panama
Papua New Guinea
Paraguay
Peru
Philippines
Poland
Portugal
Qatar

High income
Lower middle income
High income
Lower middle income
Low income
Low income
Upper middle income
Low income
Lower middle income
High income
High income
High income
Lower middle income
Lower middle income
High income
High income
High income
Upper middle income
High income
Lower middle income
Upper middle income
Lower middle income
High income
High income
Lower middle income
Lower middle income
High income
Upper middle income
High income
High income
Low income
Low income
Upper middle income
Low income
High income
Lower middle income
Upper middle income
Upper middle income
Lower middle income
Lower middle income
Upper middle income
Lower middle income
Low income
Upper middle income
Low income
High income
High income
Lower middle income
Lower middle income
High income
High income
Lower middle income
Upper middle income
Lower middle income
Upper middle income
Upper middle income
Lower middle income
High income
High income
High income

41.33
80.46
38.51
27.28
21.10
22.02
24.88
18.00
25.92
83.90
45.55
82.74
30.99
30.28
75.36
58.07
39.07
33.41
80.41
44.86
26.94
22.43
53.56
46.16
21.20
22.14
41.94
24.87
47.52
85.07
30.41
30.02
43.07
27.59
55.92
24.27
50.67
29.71
28.79
26.77
39.70
34.43
26.88
44.30
22.11
88.94
94.63
25.30
24.49
89.90
48.35
24.68
32.66
21.65
22.18
33.86
26.44
54.82
60.98
71.55

79.00
45.00
36.00
33.00
24.00
25.00
28.00
19.00
28.00
77.00
55.00
82.00
36.00
32.00
69.00
60.00
42.00
38.00
74.00
48.00
28.00
27.00
56.00
44.00
24.00
21.00
49.00
30.00
54.00
80.00
32.00
37.00
49.00
34.00
57.00
31.00
57.00
34.00
36.00
36.00
41.00
37.00
31.00
48.00
27.00
84.00
90.00
29.00
27.00
85.00
47.00
27.00
38.00
25.00
25.00
38.00
34.00
58.00
63.00
68.00

78.00
46.00
40.00
29.00
24.00
19.00
27.00
19.00
26.00
75.00
54.00
78.00
36.00
32.00
72.00
61.00
43.00
38.00
74.00
45.00
26.00
27.00
55.00
43.00
24.00
26.00
53.00
28.00
57.00
80.00
28.00
37.00
50.00
28.00
56.00
30.00
52.00
34.00
35.00
38.00
44.00
37.00
30.00
48.00
31.00
83.00
91.00
28.00
25.00
86.00
47.00
28.00
35.00
25.00
24.00
38.00
36.00
60.00
62.00
68.00

79.00
48.00
43.00
32.00
25.00
19.00
30.00
19.00
29.00
74.00
54.00
79.00
38.00
34.00
74.00
60.00
43.00
38.00
76.00
49.00
29.00
25.00
55.00
44.00
27.00
25.00
55.00
27.00
58.00
82.00
28.00
33.00
52.00
32.00
55.00
30.00
54.00
35.00
35.00
39.00
42.00
39.00
31.00
49.00
29.00
83.00
91.00
28.00
27.00
86.00
45.00
29.00
37.00
25.00
24.00
38.00
38.00
61.00
63.00
69.00

81.00
47.00
46.00
28.00
25.00
17.00
29.00
17.00
31.00
75.00
51.00
79.00
38.00
36.00
75.00
61.00
44.00
41.00
75.00
53.00
28.00
25.00
54.00
49.00
28.00
25.00
56.00
28.00
59.00
85.00
28.00
31.00
50.00
35.00
60.00
31.00
53.00
31.00
33.00
39.00
44.00
36.00
31.00
53.00
27.00
84.00
91.00
27.00
26.00
88.00
45.00
30.00
39.00
25.00
27.00
36.00
35.00
63.00
64.00
71.00

81.00
43.00
44.00
28.00
27.00
16.00
34.00
20.00
30.00
77.00
48.00
78.00
40.00
37.00
73.00
64.00
47.00
39.00
72.00
48.00
29.00
26.00
53.00
41.00
28.00
30.00
57.00
28.00
59.00
81.00
26.00
31.00
49.00
32.00
55.00
27.00
54.00
30.00
30.00
38.00
45.00
37.00
27.00
52.00
29.00
83.00
90.00
26.00
28.00
85.00
45.00
32.00
38.00
28.00
30.00
35.00
35.00
62.00
62.00
61.00

73.22
51.58
41.25
29.55
24.35
19.67
28.81
18.67
28.32
76.98
51.26
79.79
36.50
33.55
73.06
60.68
43.01
37.90
75.23
47.98
27.82
25.41
54.43
44.53
25.37
24.86
51.99
27.64
55.75
82.18
28.73
33.17
48.85
31.43
56.49
28.88
53.45
32.28
32.96
36.13
42.62
36.74
29.48
49.05
27.52
84.32
91.27
27.22
26.25
86.65
46.22
28.45
36.61
24.94
25.36
36.48
34.07
59.80
62.50
68.09
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Country
Code

Country Name

Income Group Code

CPI2011

CPI2012

CPI2013

CPI2014

CPI 2015

CPI2016

CPI_Ave

ROU
RUS
RWA
STP
SAU
SEN
SRB
SLE
SGP
SVK
ZAF
ESP
LKA
SUR
SWE
CHE
TJK
TZA
THA
TGO
TTO
TUN
TUR
UGA
UKR
ARE
GBR
USA
URY
VNM
ZMB

Romania
Russian Federation
Rwanda
São Tomé and Principe
Saudi Arabia
Senegal
Serbia
Sierra Leone
Singapore
Slovak Republic
South Africa
Spain
Sri Lanka
Suriname
Sweden
Switzerland
Tajikistan
Tanzania
Thailand
Togo
Trinidad and Tobago
Tunisia
Turkey
Uganda
Ukraine
United Arab Emirates
United Kingdom
United States
Uruguay
Vietnam
Zambia

Upper middle income
Upper middle income
Low income
Lower middle income
High income
Low income
Upper middle income
Low income
High income
High income
Upper middle income
High income
Lower middle income
Upper middle income
High income
High income
Lower middle income
Low income
Upper middle income
Low income
High income
Lower middle income
Upper middle income
Low income
Lower middle income
High income
High income
High income
High income
Lower middle income
Lower middle income

36.12
24.49
49.83
38.79
29.86
43.87
28.71
48.22
24.61
91.67
9.83
62.30
32.95
30.29
92.98
88.02
22.72
29.51
33.81
23.82
31.70
37.59
42.07
24.34
22.97
68.23
77.75
71.36
70.44
28.64
31.95

44.00
28.00
53.00
42.00
44.00
36.00
39.00
31.00
87.00
46.00
43.00
65.00
40.00
37.00
88.00
86.00
22.00
35.00
37.00
30.00
39.00
41.00
49.00
29.00
26.00
68.00
74.00
73.00
72.00
31.00
37.00

43.00
28.00
53.00
42.00
46.00
41.00
42.00
30.00
86.00
47.00
42.00
59.00
37.00
36.00
89.00
85.00
22.00
33.00
35.00
29.00
38.00
41.00
50.00
26.00
25.00
69.00
76.00
73.00
73.00
31.00
38.00

43.00
27.00
49.00
42.00
49.00
43.00
41.00
31.00
84.00
50.00
44.00
60.00
38.00
36.00
87.00
86.00
23.00
31.00
38.00
29.00
38.00
40.00
45.00
26.00
26.00
70.00
78.00
74.00
73.00
31.00
38.00

46.00
29.00
54.00
42.00
52.00
44.00
40.00
29.00
85.00
51.00
44.00
58.00
37.00
36.00
89.00
86.00
26.00
30.00
38.00
32.00
39.00
38.00
42.00
25.00
27.00
70.00
81.00
76.00
74.00
31.00
38.00

48.00
29.00
54.00
46.00
46.00
45.00
42.00
30.00
84.00
51.00
45.00
58.00
36.00
45.00
88.00
86.00
25.00
32.00
35.00
32.00
35.00
41.00
41.00
25.00
29.00
66.00
81.00
74.00
71.00
33.00
38.00

43.35
27.58
52.14
42.13
44.48
42.14
38.78
33.20
75.10
56.11
37.97
60.38
36.83
36.71
89.00
86.17
23.45
31.75
36.14
29.30
36.78
39.77
44.84
25.89
25.99
68.54
77.96
73.56
72.24
30.94
36.83
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Variance
368.23
397.02
61.37
1,926.38
147.69
56.23
75.88
22.29
29.89
1.82
5.03
248.76
747,519.31
1,222,286.83
1,057,307.31

Std. Deviation
19.19
19.93
7.83
43.89
12.15
7.50
8.71
4.72
5.47
1.35
2.24
15.77
864.59
1,105.57
1,028.25

Mean
55.39
14.69
5.36
71.20
62.18
65.00
64.22
4.69
7.57
1.45
3.54
71.03
3,239.94
3,515.50
3,434.28

Maximum
81.33
105.80
56.94
378.44
91.84
91.19
90.56
30.43
27.23
6.25
9.77
94.60
4,791.31
5,307.60
4,925.37

Minimum
8.68
0.23
(1.28)
19.30
37.18
48.72
44.67
(0.38)
0.20
(1.28)
(3.24)
35.58
764.82
596.61
651.76

N
141.00
141.00
141.00
141.00
141.00
141.00
141.00
141.00
141.00
141.00
141.00
141.00
141.00
141.00
141.00
141.00

CPI_INV

GDP/CAP_Ave

FDI/GDP_AVE

NTB/GDP_AVE

ACL1-AVE

ACL2-AVE

ACL3-AVE

INF%-AVE

UNEMP%-AVE

POP%-AVE

GDP%_AVE

HDI-AVE

ACL1CPI

ACL2CPI

ACL3CPI

Valid N (listwise)

Descriptive Statistics

Appendix B. Descriptive Statistics
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Appendix C. Hypotheses 1 Results Summary

Regressions
Hypotheses
Dependent Variables
Independent Variable Corruption Perception Index (CPI)

Control Variables

Model Statistics

1A
1B
1C
H1A
H1B
H1C
GDP/CAP FDI/GDP NTB/GDP
-0.6237**** -0.2741**
-0.0209
(9.7846)
(2.1153)
(0.1624)
Constant
-37860.34***
-4.67
16.57
(-5.7956)
(-0.8940)
(0.5710)
Inflation (INF%)
-0.0382
0.0266
-0.0467
(-0.8455)
(0.2889)
(-0.5126)
Unemployment (UMEMP%)
-0.1059**
0.1715*
-0.0678
(-2.3698)
(1.8877)
(-0.7523)
Population Growth Rate (POP%)
0.2292****
0.0629
0.0716
(4.6209)
(0.6243)
(-0.7162)
Economic Growth Rate (GDP%)
-0.1501**
0.1903*
0.1107
(-3.1161)
(1.9438)
(1.1400)
Human Development Index (HDI)
0.3024****
0.0024
0.2751*
(4.3505)
(0.0171)
(1.9636)
2

R

0.7791

0.0872

0.1021

Adjusted R
0.7692
Model F-Value
78.7555
Significance
P=<0.0001
n=
141
1. t-stats in parenthesis
2. *p <.10, **p <.05, ***p <.001, ****p <.0001
3. All betas except constant are standardized
4. CPI data inverted

0.0463
2.1323
P=<0.10
141

0.0619
2.5389
P=<0.05
141

2

Notes:

230

Appendix D. Hypotheses 2 Results Summary

Regressions
Hypotheses
Dependent Variables
Independent Variables Corruption Perception Index
Anti-Corruption Legislation 1
Constant
Control Variables

Inflation
Unemployment
Population Growth Rate
Economic Growth Rate
Human Development Index

Moderating Variable

Anti-Corruption Legislation 1

Model Statistics

R2

0.8061
2

Notes:

2A
H2A
GDP/CAP
-0.3454
(-1.2047)
0.5542****
(-4.1081)
7491.13
(0.6120)
-0.0569
(-1.3142)
-0.0643
(-1.4752)
0.2235****
(4.7706)
-0.1141**
(-2.4655)
0.4100****
(5.7001)
1.3955***
(3.9033)

Adjusted R
0.7943
Significance
P=<0.0001
n=
141
1. t-stats in parenthesis
2. *p <.10, **p <.05, ***p <.001, ****p <.0001
3. All betas except constant are standardized
4. CPI data inverted
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2B
2C
H2B
H2C
FDI/GDP
NTB/GDP
-0.3836
-0.7679
(-0.6194)
(-1.2678)
-0.1920
0.1762
(-0.6591)
(0.6182)
3.26
18.23
(0.3139)
(0.3201)
0.7779
-0.0191
(0.2826)
(-0.2087)
0.0382**
-0.0426
(2.0934)
(-0.4620)
0.5529
-0.0723
(0.5950)
(-0.7310)
0.0383**
0.1210
(2.0921)
(1.2372)
0.8535
0.2036
(0.1850)
(1.3396)
0.8222
0.7103
(1.0646)
(0.9403)
0.0952

0.1344

0.0404
P=<0.10
141

0.0820
P=<0.05
141

Appendix E. Hypotheses 3 Results Summary

Regressions
Hypotheses
Dependent Variables
Independent Variables Corruption Perception Index
Anti-Corruption Legislation 2
Constant
Control Variables

Inflation
Unemployment
Population Growth Rate
Economic Growth Rate
Human Development Index

Moderating Variable

Anti-Corruption Legislation 2

Model Statistics

R2

3B
3C
H3B
H3C
FDI/GDP
NTB/GDP
-1.3003* -2.5302***
(-1.6801)
(-3.4858)
-0.3754
-0.3912*
(-1.5231)
(-1.6924)
20.7000
186.48**
(1.2926)
(2.2158)
0.0104
-0.0458
(0.1118)
(-0.5242)
0.2034***
0.0051
(2.2198)
(0.0594)
0.0443
-0.1101
(0.4414)
(-1.1703)
0.2020**
0.0840
(1.9979)
(0.8854)
0.0295
0.2471*
(0.1996)
(1.7852)
1.8095**
2.8515***
(2.0326)
(3.4150)

0.7979

0.1176

0.2237

Adjusted R
0.7857
Model F-Value
65.1504
Significance
P=<0.0001
n=
141
1. t-stats in parenthesis
2. *p <.10, **p <.05, ***p <.001, ****p <.0001
3. All betas except constant are standardized
4. CPI data inverted

0.0641
2.1980
P=<0.05
141

0.1767
4.7555
P=<0.0001
141

2

Notes:

3A
H3A
GDP/CAP
-0.0745
(-0.2011)
-0.3679**
(-3.1196)
16202.36
(0.8312)
-0.0706
(-1.5844)
-0.1115**
(-2.5426)
02286****
(4.7619)
-0.1025**
(-2.1179)
0.3810****
(5.3944)
0.8744**
(2.0595)
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Appendix F. Hypotheses 4 Results Summary

Regressions
Hypotheses
Dependent Variables
Independent Variables
Corruption Perception Index

4A
H4A
GDP/CAP

4B
H4B
FDI/GDP

4C
H4C
NTB/GDP

-0.5496
(-1.5037)
-0.4967****
(-4.1723)
26023.13
(1.5513)

-1.9998**
(-2.6365)
-0.3883
(-1.5716)
21.04
(1.5368)

-2.4750***
(-3.3794)
-0.2757
(-1.1555)
140.89*
(1.9026)

-0.0846*
(-1.8785)
-0.0800*
(-1.8519)
0.2248****
(4.7829)
-0.1137**
(-2.4461)
0.3938****
(5.5926)

0.0459
(0.4913)
0.2279**
(2.5426)
0.0519
(0.5321)
0.2011**
(2.0834)
-0.0072
(-0.0491)

0.0032
(0.0351)
-0.0042
(-0.0489)
-0.0844
(-0.8959)
0.1069
(1.1469)
0.2157
(1.5285)

1.4837***
(3.4424)

2.6142**
(2.9223)

2.8009**
(3.2426)

0.8048

0.1593

0.2162

Adjusted R
0.7930
Model F-Value
68.0472
Significance
P=<0.0001
n=
141
1. t-stats in parenthesis
2. *p <.10, **p <.05, ***p <.001, ****p <.0001
3. All betas except constant are standardized
4. CPI data inverted

0.1084
3.1269
P=<0.05
141

0.1687
4.5524
P=<0.0001
141

Anti-Corruption Legislation 3
Constant
Control Variables
Inflation
Unemployment
Population Growth Rate
Economic Growth Rate
Human Development Index
Moderating Variable
Anti-Corruption Legislation 3
Model Statistics
R

2
2

Notes:
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Appendix G. Control Variable Regression Results
Regressions
Hypotheses
Dependent Variables
Independent Variables
Corruption Perception Index

1A
H1A
GDP/CAP

1B
H1B
FDI/GDP

1C
H1C
NTB/GDP

Anti-Corruption Legislation 3
Constant
Control Variables
Inflation

-0.1433**
(-2.5017)
-0.1474**
(-2.5404)
0.2764****
(4.2923)
-0.1543**
(-2.4555)
0.7593****
(11.3056)

-0.0196
(-0.2172)
0.1532*
(1.6731)
0.0837
(0.8235)
0.1884*
(1.9007)
0.2032*
(1.9171)

-0.0502
(-0.5694)
-0.0692
(-0.7740)
-0.0700
(-0.7063)
0.1105
(1.1427)
0.2904**
(2.8084)

0.6212

0.0567

0.1019

Adjusted R
0.6072
Model F-Value
44.2827
Significance
P=<0.0001
n=
141
1. t-stats in parenthesis
2. *p <.10, **p <.05, ***p <.001, ****p <.0001
3. All betas except constant are standardized

0.0217
1.6221
P=0.1583
141

0.0686
3.0635
P=<0.05
141

Unemployment
Population Growth Rate
Economic Growth Rate
Human Development Index
Moderating Variable
Anti-Corruption Legislation 3
Model Statistics
R2
2

Notes:
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